本篇文章收錄2023年Berkshire Hathaway股東會上午場第21~25節原文(上半場總共32小節)、繁體中文翻譯、會議摘要，除了OT供自己學習外，也分享給有興趣的朋友們。
21. Jain is happy with property catastrophe reinsurance portfolio
22. ‘We don’t get smarter’ but ‘we get a little wiser’
23. Why Buffett invested billions in Japanese ‘trading houses’
24. Apple is a ‘better business’ than any Berkshire company
25. U.S. and China both need to reduce ‘stupid, stupid, stupid’ economic tensions
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Section 21 原文：
21. Jain is happy with property catastrophe reinsurance portfolio
WARREN BUFFETT: OK, Becky?
BECKY QUICK: This question comes from Chai Gohill (PH). This he writes, this is for Ajit. “Reinsurance industry is going through one of the hardest pricing environments in the last 15 years. Berkshire historically has participated during these stressed times when economic returns are very attractive.
“This year, it appears Berkshire has not been interested in deploying its resources towards property cat reinsurance despite such strong returns. Can you elaborate on reasons for not participating despite these returns, and your broader view on how you’re planning to shape your reinsurance business post-acquisition of Alleghany?”
AJIT JAIN: OK. In terms of Alleghany, that’s an easy response. We treat our operating units independent of each other. And as far as Alleghany is concerned, they have a major presence in the reinsurance business under the brand name of TransAtlantic Re.
That company will operate the way it’s been operating in the past. There will be no change in terms of strategy or management. And they will keep doing what they’re doing. They’ve been very successful, and hopefully will keep being successful.
Now, in terms of the property cat business that I have been active in over these last several years, you’re right that the last 15 years has been a difficult time. Prices have not been attractive. And even though we have had some presence in the property cat business in the last 15 years, it really has been minimal.
This December 31st, which is a big renewal date for cat reinsurance, we were hoping that we would get a few days in the sun, and we’d be able to deploy our capital, and be able to write some fairly attractive business. As it happened towards the end of December, until about the third week of December, I was very optimistic that we would get a chance to put several billion dollars on the books.
But in the last ten days of December, unfortunately a lot of capacity came out of the woodworks. Pricing that we were expecting to realize didn’t really come and meet our pricing requirements, as a result of which January 1 was a big disappointment.
We did not write as much as we were hoping to write. Now, fast forward to April 1, which is another big renewal date, we had a lot of powder dry. And we were lucky that we kept the powder dry. Because April 1, suddenly prices zoomed up again, a lot higher than what they were on January 1, and started to look attractive to us.
So, now we have a portfolio that is very heavily exposed to property catastrophe. To put that in perspective, our exposure today is almost 50% more than what it was five, six months ago. So, I think we have written as much as our capacity will allow us to write.
We are very happy with what we’ve written. The margins have been healthy. The only thing that I want to mention to you is that, while the mentions have been healthy, we have a very unbalanced portfolio. What that means is if there’s a big hurricane in Florida, we will have a very substantial loss.
As opposed to that if we have a very big loss anywhere other than Florida, relative to our competition, we will have a much smaller loss. Net-net, I’m very happy with the portfolio. It is a lot better than what it’s been in the past. I don’t know how long it’ll last, and of course if the hurricane happens in Florida, we could lose, across all the units, as much as $15 billion. And if there isn’t a loss, we’ll make several billion dollars as profit.
WARREN BUFFETT: And, Ajit, when you called me and said you’d like to expose us to whatever it was, a couple billion more of exposure, how long I took to say yes. (Laugh)
AJIT JAIN: Yeah, so the way we think about our exposure is, you know, in the insurance operations collectively across the entire company. Given that we have about a little less than $300 billion of capital, we think of that as a 5% exposure that we’re willing to take on.
So, to complete Warren’s story, a few weeks ago we had about $13 billion of exposure all across the globe. And I called up Warren and I said, “We’re up to $13. It’ll be nice if we can go up to $15. That’s a good round number.” And that was less than a 30-second phone call. (Laugh) I think Warren said yes without even listening to what the numbers were. (Laughter)
WARREN BUFFETT: I hope he calls me again. (Laughter)
Section 21 翻譯：
21. Jain對財產災害再保險投資組合感到滿意
WARREN BUFFETT: 好的，Becky？
BECKY QUICK: 這個問題來自Chai Gohill（PH）。這是給Ajit的。他寫道：“再保險行業正經歷過去15年中最困難的定價環境之一。波克夏以往在這些困境時期總是參與其中，因為經濟回報非常有吸引力。
“今年，似乎波克夏對財產災害再保險投資沒有興趣，儘管回報非常可觀。你能詳細說明一下為什麼不參與投資以及你對完成Alleghany收購後如何規劃再保險業務的整體觀點嗎？”
AJIT JAIN: 好的。關於Alleghany，這很容易回答。我們將我們的業務單元獨立對待。就Alleghany而言，他們在再保險業務中擁有重要的地位，品牌名為TransAtlantic Re。
該公司將繼續按照過去的方式運營。戰略或管理方面不會有任何變化。他們將繼續做他們一直做的事情。他們一直非常成功，希望能繼續成功。
現在，就我過去幾年在財產災害業務中的情況來說，你是對的，過去15年是困難的時期。價格並不具吸引力。儘管我們在過去15年中在財產災害業務中有所參與，但實際上非常有限。
今年12月31日是重要的災害再保險續保日期，我們希望能有幾天的好運，能夠動用資金，撰寫一些相當有吸引力的業務。到了12月底之前，直到12月第三週，我非常樂觀，認為我們有機會撰寫數十億美元的業務。
但在12月的最後十天，不幸的是，市場出現了很多容量。我們原本預期的價格並未如預期那樣達到我們的要求，因此1月1日成為一個令人失望的日子。
我們沒有撰寫多少我們原本希望的業務。現在，快轉到4月1日，另一個重要的續保日期，我們有很多乾粉(私募股權現金儲備(private equity cash reserves)，俗稱乾粉(dry powder))。我們很幸運保持了乾粉。因為4月1日，價格突然再次飆升，比1月1日高得多，開始對我們具有吸引力。
所以，我們現在的投資組合非常大部分暴露於財產災害業務。為了讓你有個概念，我們今天的風險幾乎比五六個月前多了50%。所以，我認為我們已經盡量撰寫了能夠承擔的業務。
我們對我們所撰寫的業務非常滿意。利潤率很高。我唯一要提醒你的是，雖然利潤率很高，但我們的投資組合非常不平衡。這意味著如果佛羅裡達州發生大型颶風，我們將會遭受非常大的損失。
相反，如果除了佛羅裡達州之外的地方發生了非常大的損失，相對於我們的競爭對手，我們的損失將小得多。總結來說，我對這個投資組合非常滿意。它比過去要好得多。我不知道它能持續多久，當然如果佛羅裡達州發生颶風，我們可能會損失多達150億美元。如果沒有損失，我們將獲利數十億美元。
WARREN BUFFETT: Ajit，當你打電話給我說你想增加我們的曝險度，數十億美元的曝險度，我花了多長時間才說是的。(笑聲)
AJIT JAIN: 是的，我們對曝險度的考慮是，在整個公司的保險業務中共同考慮。考慮到我們有將近3000億美元的資本，我們認為這是我們願意承擔的5%的風險。
所以，為了完整Warren的故事，幾個星期前我們在全球範圍內的曝險度約為130億美元。我給Warren打電話，我說：“我們的曝險度增加到13億美元了。如果能增加到15億美元，那就好了。這是一個好的整數。”那一通電話不到30秒。(笑聲)我想Warren甚至在聽數字之前就說是的。(笑聲)
WARREN BUFFETT: 我希望他再給我打電話。(笑聲)
Section 21 會議摘要：
在第21段中，Becky Quick提出了一個關於巴菲特公司再保險業務的問題，並特別向Ajit Jain提問。問題是關於再保險行業正處於過去15年中最困難的價格環境之一，而Berkshire Hathaway在這些困難時期歷來都參與其中，因為經濟回報非常有吸引力。然而，今年似乎Berkshire Hathaway對於財產災害再保險並不感興趣，儘管回報非常強勁。詢問原因是為什麼不參與，以及在收購Alleghany後，他們對再保險業務的整體規劃和構建的觀點。
Ajit Jain首先回答了關於Alleghany的問題，他解釋他們將繼續將其營運單元視為獨立的，不會有策略或管理上的改變。關於再保險業務，他確實承認過去15年一直是困難時期，價格並不吸引人。儘管在過去的15年中他們在財產災害再保險方面有一些存在，但數量非常有限。
在去年12月31日這個重要的續保日期，他們本來希望能夠部署資本，撰寫一些相對有吸引力的業務。然而，到了12月底，尤其是最後10天，市場上突然湧現出大量容量，所期望的價格並未實現，無法滿足他們的定價要求，因此1月1日成為一個令人失望的日子，他們沒有寫入預期的業務量。
然而，快轉到4月1日的另一個重要續保日期，他們保留了大量資本。幸運的是，4月1日，價格突然再次飆升，遠高於1月1日的水準，開始對他們顯得有吸引力。因此，他們現在擁有一個非常重視財產災害業務的投資組合。相對於五六個月前，他們的風險暴露增加了近50%。
Ajit Jain表示，他們撰寫的業務已經達到了他們的能力範圍。他對他們所撰寫的業務感到非常滿意，利潤率是健康的。但他提到他們的投資組合存在一個問題，即非常不平衡。這意味著如果佛羅裡達州發生大型颶風，他們將面臨非常大的損失。相反，如果在佛羅裡達州以外的地方發生大型損失，相對於競爭對手，他們將面臨較小的損失。
總的來說，Ajit Jain對這個投資組合非常滿意。它比過去要好得多。他無法預測它將持續多久，並且如果佛羅裡達州發生颶風，他們可能會在所有業務部門中損失高達150億美元。而如果沒有損失，他們將獲得數十億美元的利潤。
在會議中，Ajit Jain提到他向Warren Buffett提出希望增加幾十億美元的風險暴露，而Buffett只用不到30秒的時間就表示同意。他們以幾乎5%的風險暴露來看待整個公司的保險業務。最近的數據顯示，他們的全球風險暴露約為130億美元，他們希望將其增加到150億美元。
Section 22 原文：
22. ‘We don’t get smarter’ but ‘we get a little wiser’
WARREN BUFFETT: OK, station eight.
AUDIENCE MEMBER: Hello. My name is Adal Flores (PH), and I’ve been a shareholder for about 16 years. And I’m coming from Guadalajara, Mexico.
My question is for Warren and Charlie. Companies have the eternal dilemma between building products that can make profits and increase their company’s competitive position.
In the best case, you can build products that have both characteristics at the same time, like Google did.
But most of the time, companies need to choose between short-term profits and long-term defensibility. For example, Amazon was focused on building their famous Amazon flywheel with limited profits initially, in order to obtain stronger network effects, with the hope of getting more defensible profits in the future.
When you invest, you constantly speak about the importance of building competitive moats. What advice would you give to CEOs about how to balance this dilemma, which is essentially short-term profits versus long-term defensibility? Thank you.
WARREN BUFFETT: Well, the answer is to control your destiny, which we’ve been able to do at Berkshire. We feel no pressure from Wall Street. You know, we don’t have investor calls. We don’t have to make promises. We get a chance to make our own mistakes, and occasionally find something that works well.
But we recognize that the people in this room and people like them are the ones that we’re working for. And we’re not working for a bunch of people that care about whether we meet the core estimate or anything. So, we have a freedom that we get to use.
And we’re interested in owning a wonderful business forever. We learned from many wonderful businesses. But we do learn a lot as we go along. Charlie and I have often mentioned how we learned so much when we bought See’s Candies, which we did.
But we learned when we bought Ben Rosner’s chain of women’s dress shops spread all over the eastern part of the country. We learned when we tried getting into the department store business back in 1966. And as the ink was drying on our purchase price, we realized we’d done something (Laugh) dumb.
I mean, we’re learning all the time how consumers behave. I’m not going to be able to learn the technical aspects of businesses. It’d be nice if I knew it, but it isn’t essential. And, you know, obviously we’ve got a business at Apple, which is larger than our energy business.
And we may only own five points, 6% or 7%. But our ownership goes up every year, and I don’t understand the phone at all. But I do understand consumer behavior. And I know how people think about whether to buy a second car. I know how they go out to different — we own auto dealerships.
We’re learning all the time from all of our businesses how people react to Garanimals versus selling them something else. And so, See’s was a sort of breakthrough. But we just keep learning as to more about how people behave and how a good business can turn into a bad business, and how some good businesses can maintain their competitive advantage over time.
And so, we don’t have some formula, Berkshire people. But we can also tell in ten seconds whether it’s something of interest. I mean, when I get these calls and we want to send decks and all that sort of thing, which is nonsense, I mean, it’s a bunch of guys (Laugh) that get paid for drawing up these projections of the future and everything like that.
If they knew the future, you know, we don’t know the future, but we do know certain kinds of businesses. We know what the right price is, and we know what we think we can project out in terms of consumer behavior and threats to a business. And that’s what we’ve been about and that’s what we’ll continue to be about.
We don’t get smarter over time, we get a little wiser, though, following it over time. And you can do it while sitting in the office with a telephone, too, which we like. Charlie?
Section 22 翻譯：
22. 「我們不會變得更聰明」但「我們會變得更有智慧」
WARREN BUFFETT: 好的，第八個。
觀眾：你好。我叫Adal Flores，我已經是股東約16年了。我來自墨西哥瓜達拉哈拉。
我的問題是給Warren和Charlie的。公司在建立能夠獲利並增加公司競爭力的產品之間面臨著永恆的困境。
在最好的情況下，你可以建立同時具有這兩個特點的產品，就像Google所做的那樣。
但大多數情況下，公司需要在短期利潤和長期競爭能力之間做出選擇。例如，亞馬遜在最初注重建立著名的亞馬遜飛輪時，其利潤是有限的，以獲取更強大的網絡效應，希望在未來獲得更具競爭力的利潤。
當你們進行投資時，你們經常談到建立競爭壕溝的重要性。你們會給首席執行官們什麼建議，如何平衡這個困境，即短期利潤與長期競爭能力之間的平衡？謝謝。
WARREN BUFFETT: 嗯，答案就是掌握自己的命運，這就是我們在Berkshire Hathaway能夠做到的。我們不受華爾街的壓力。你知道，我們不需要參加投資者電話會議。我們不必做出承諾。我們有機會犯錯，偶爾也能找到一些行之有效的東西。
但我們意識到，這個房間裡的人和像他們一樣的人才是我們在為之工作的人。我們不是為那些在意我們是否達到核心預估值的人工作。所以，我們有了可以使用的自由。
我們有興趣永遠擁有一家出色的企業。我們從許多出色的企業中學到了很多東西。但隨著時間的推移，我們也不斷學習。Charlie和我經常提到當我們收購See's Candies時，我們學到了很多東西。
但當我們收購Ben Rosner在全美東部地區遍佈的女裝連鎖店時，我們也學到了很多東西。當我們在1966年試圖進入百貨公司業務時，我們意識到我們做了一些愚蠢的事情，就在我們購買價格的墨跡未乾之時。
我的意思是，我們一直在學習消費者的行為。我無法學會業務的技術層面，如果我知道的話倒是挺好的，但這並非必要。你知道，顯然我們在蘋果公司擁有一個業務，其規模超過我們的能源業務。
我們可能只擁有5.6%或7%的股份。但我們的持股比例每年都在增加，而我根本不懂那款手機。但我瞭解消費者的行為。我知道人們如何考慮是否要買第二輛車。我知道他們如何前往不同的地方——我們擁有汽車銷售經銷店。
我們從我們的所有業務中不斷學習，瞭解人們對Garanimals和其他產品的反應。所以，See's Candies是一個突破。但我們在不斷學習，瞭解更多關於人們的行為方式，以及一個好的企業如何變成一個糟糕的企業，以及一些好的企業如何在長期中保持其競爭優勢。
所以，我們並沒有一個固定的公式。但我們可以在幾秒鐘內判斷出一件事是否值得關注。當我接到這些電話，他們要發送各種報告和展示文稿之類的東西，這都是無稽之談。這些人為繪制未來的預測付費，但他們也不知道未來會怎麼樣，你知道，我們不知道未來會怎麼樣，但我們確實知道某些類型的業務。我們知道正確的價格是多少，我們知道我們認為我們可以預測消費者行為和對業務的威脅的事情。這就是我們一直以來的做法，也是我們將繼續堅持的做法。
我們不會隨著時間而變得更聰明，但我們會變得更有智慧，因為隨著時間的推移，我們對這個行業有了更多的經驗。而且，你可以坐在辦公室裡通過電話進行投資，這正是我們所喜歡的。Charlie呢？
Section 22 會議摘要：
在第22段會議紀要中，股東向巴菲特和蒙格提出了關於公司如何平衡短期利潤和長期競爭優勢的問題。股東指出大多數公司需要在兩者之間做出選擇，而巴菲特和蒙格強調了控制自己的命運的重要性。
巴菲特表示，波克夏有自主決策的自由，他們不受華爾街的壓力，也不需要履行承諾或回答投資者的電話。他們為股東工作，而不是為那些關心他們是否達到核心預期等事項的人。他們擁有自由選擇的權利，並能夠自行決策和承擔錯誤的風險。
巴菲特和蒙格強調他們對於擁有優秀企業的長期持有，並且在此過程中不斷學習。他們表示自己並不會變得更聰明，但隨著時間的推移，他們會變得更加明智。他們通過從各個業務中學習消費者行為、競爭威脅等方面來提高智慧。
他們沒有固定的公式，但能在短時間內判斷一個投資是否有吸引力。他們知道正確的價格，並能夠預測消費者行為和業務的威脅。他們強調自己的投資方法，並表示將繼續堅持這種方法。
總而言之，該段會議紀要的重點是巴菲特和蒙格強調控制自己的命運、持有優秀企業並不斷學習的重要性，以及他們對投資方法的信心。
Section 23 原文：
23. Why Buffett invested billions in Japanese ‘trading houses’
CHARLIE MUNGER: Well, tell them the story of the Japanese investment. That should be told again. That’s a nice story.
WARREN BUFFETT: Well, it was pretty simple. I mean, back when I started other people were going through Playboy and I was going through Moody’s, I mean, basically. And there’s a movie out called “Turn Every Page,” which I saw again for the second time a couple of days ago, Lizzie Gottlieb.
And I recommend everybody in this world watch that, because I turned every page in the past. And I did it for thousands and thousands of pages at Moody’s, and I did it at the Department of Public Utilities in Boston. I did it in the insurance department. I just kept turning pages. Well, that goes on for a while. But now we need big ideas in order to find things. And what was your question, Charlie?
CHARLIE MUNGER: Tell them about the Japanese.
WARREN BUFFETT: Well, the Japanese thing was simple. I mean, Ben and I liked looking at companies. I mean, I like looking at figures about companies. And here were five very, very substantial companies, understandable companies. Most of them, maybe all of them we’d done business with in a dozen different ways.
If you go a couple miles from where this place is, our last coal generating plant was built by one of the companies. So here they were. They were sitting as a group where they were earning, we’ll say 14% on what we were going to pay to buy them.
They were paying decent dividends. They were going to repurchase shares in some cases. They owned a whole bunch of businesses that we could understand as a group, although it didn’t mean we had deep understanding on any. But we’d seen them operate and everything.
There wasn’t anything to it. And at the same time, we could take out the currency risk by financing in the end. And that was going to cost a half of 1%. Well, if you get 14% on one side and a half a percent on the other side, and you’ve got money forever, and they’re doing intelligent things, and they’re sizable, so we just started buying them.
I didn’t even probably tell Greg until maybe six months after we’d gotten going. And then when we hit 5% in all of them, we announced on my birthday, 90th, that we owned over 5%. And recently went over for the first time to visit with them. And we were more than pleasantly surprised, delighted, with what we find there. And now we own 7.4% of them. We won’t go over 9.9% without their agreeing, and we sold another $164, whatever it is billion by the end.
CHARLIE MUNGER: They would’ve done it for us if we only had $5 billion or something. And it made $10 billion simply in that way. We would look like heroes. Now $10 billion just sort of disappears as if it’s a little dot in Berkshire’s reports.
WARREN BUFFETT: But it’s fun.
CHARLIE MUNGER: It is fun, and it is $10 billion.
WARREN BUFFETT: And Charlie says it keeps (Laughter) me out of bars when I talk to him about it. And I probably talked to Charlie about those the year after I started. But who knows? I mean, I knew he’d like it, I mean, obviously.
CHARLIE MUNGER: We tried to do every dollar. We would do — we could only do about $10 billion.
WARREN BUFFETT: Well, not even quite that much. But, you know, we are $4 or $5 billion ahead, plus dividends. And we’ve got a carry that’s terrific. And they welcome us, and they should welcome us. But we love it the way we’re operating. We’re not there to tell them what to do in the least.
But we did say we’d never go over 9.9%, and we mean it. And they know that we’ll be true to our word. And I went over there, partly to introduce Greg to those people, because we’re going to be with them 10, 20, 30, 40 years from now. And they may occasionally find something that we can do jointly. And they look forward to doing that, and we look forward to it, and in addition we have some other operating businesses in Japan. So, Greg, do you have anything?
GREG ABEL: No, the only thing I would add is that 1) as, Warren, you went over there, it was to build the trust with these Japanese companies. Because we do hope there’s long-term opportunities. But fundamentally, as you highlighted, they’ve been a very good investment.
I’d also highlight the five meetings we had were really quite remarkable. I mean, these companies, the culture and the history around it, and how proud they are, you know, there’s just moments of learning from them. So, it was just a great experience to spend really two days with the five companies.
WARREN BUFFETT: And an issue that we intended to be 56 billion of yen that we were issuing and selling turned out to be 164.4 or something like that. And everything’s worked so well. And as Charlie says, you know, it doesn’t move $500 billion of net worth that much.
But this one, you know, will keep adding over the years to Berkshire’s value with this very widespread, probably $4 or $500 million a year. And, you know, we’ll just keep looking for more opportunities. And Japan, Berkshire is the largest borrower, outside of corporate borrowers, outside of Japan that exists.
And we didn’t set out to be that. But (Laugh) it’s turned out that way. And we’re not done. I mean, you know, in terms of what may come along there. And we have some direct operations there, as I mentioned. And we’ve got some really wonderful partners working for us. And I don’t have to do anything.
Section 23 翻譯：
23. 巴菲特為何投資數十億美元於日本的「貿易公司」
查理·蒙格：好的，告訴他們有關日本投資的故事。這是個不錯的故事。
華倫·巴菲特：嗯，這其實很簡單。當我開始時，其他人都在看《花花公子》，而我在看《穆迪》（Moody's），基本上是如此。有一部名為《翻過每一頁》（Turn Every Page）的電影，我幾天前第二次看了，由Lizzie Gottlieb製作。
我建議每個人都要看這部電影，因為我過去每一頁都翻過。在穆迪，我翻過數以千計的頁面，也在波士頓公用事業部門和保險部門翻過。我一直在翻閱。這種情況持續了一段時間。但是現在我們需要重大的想法才能找到投資標的。你的問題是什麼，查理？
查理·蒙格：告訴他們關於日本的事情。
華倫·巴菲特：日本的事情很簡單。本（巴菲特）和我喜歡研究公司。我喜歡研究有關公司的數據。這裡有五個非常非常大的公司，容易理解。我們可能在各種不同的方式與它們做過生意。
如果你從這個地方走幾英里，我們最後一個煤炭發電廠就是由其中一家公司建造的。所以它們就在那裡。它們以一組公司的形式賺錢，我們將要用來購買它們的錢賺取14%的回報。
它們支付合理的股息，有時會進行股份回購。它們擁有一堆我們可以作為一組理解的業務，儘管這並不意味著我們對任何一個業務有深入的瞭解。但我們看到它們的運營方式等等。
沒有其他特殊原因。與此同時，我們可以通過最終的外匯融資來消除貨幣風險，這只需花費0.5%。嗯，如果你在一邊獲得14%的回報，另一邊只需0.5%，而且你的錢可以永遠存在，它們也在做明智的事情，而且它們規模很大，所以我們開始買進它們。
可能過了大約六個月，我才告訴葛列格（Warren的助手）。然後當我們在每個公司持有5%時，我們在我的90歲生日時宣佈我們擁有超過5%的股份。最近，我第一次去了那裡與他們會面。我們對於我們在那裡所見所聞感到非常滿意。現在，我們持有它們7.4%的股份。我們不會在未經他們同意的情況下超過9.9%，他們知道我們會信守承諾。
我去那裡的一個目的是將葛列格介紹給那些人，因為我們在未來10、20、30、40年將與他們合作。他們可能偶爾會找到我們可以共同合作的項目，他們期待著這樣做，我們也期待著，此外，我們在日本還有其他的經營業務。葛列格，你有什麼要補充的嗎？
葛列格·艾貝爾：沒有了，我唯一要補充的是，華倫，你去那裡是為了與這些日本公司建立信任。因為我們希望有長期的機會。但基本上，正如你強調的，它們一直都是非常好的投資。
我還要強調我們與這五家公司的五次會議真的非常了不起。這些公司，它們的文化和歷史，以及他們的自豪感，你知道，有很多學習的時刻。所以，花兩天時間與這五家公司在一起是一個很好的經歷。
華倫·巴菲特：還有一個問題，我們原本打算發行和出售價值560億日元的債券，最終數字變成了1644億日元左右。一切進展順利。正如查理所說，這並不能夠顯著影響5000億美元的淨值。
但對於波克夏來說，這個投資將在未來的幾年為其增值，每年可能達到約4或5億美元。我們將繼續尋找更多的機會。伯克希爾是除日本企業外最大的借款人。我們本來並沒有打算成為如此，但事實就是這樣。
我們還沒結束。就日本而言，可能還會出現一些機會。我們在那裡也有一些直接經營的業務，正如我之前提到的。我們有一些非常出色的合作夥伴為我們工作。而且我不需要做任何事情。
Section 23 會議摘要：
在第23段會議紀要中，巴菲特和蒙格談到了他們對日本公司的投資。巴菲特解釋了他們購買日本公司的簡單原因：這些公司是非常有實力且容易理解的公司，他們之前也與這些公司有過多種業務往來。這些公司的盈利率高，股息也不錯，並且進行回購等智慧舉措。此外，他們可以通過外匯融資來消除貨幣風險。
他們開始逐步購買這些日本公司的股份，並在巴菲特90歲生日時宣佈已擁有超過5%的股權。他們對這些公司的參觀訪問感到非常滿意，並且目前持有這些公司7.4%的股份。巴菲特和蒙格表示他們不會超過9.9%的股權，並且他們的言行是可靠的。
巴菲特和蒙格談到這次投資讓他們感到開心，也帶來了10億美元的回報。儘管這筆回報相對于波克夏整體規模來說不算太大，但他們認為這是一次有趣的投資。巴菲特還提到了他們計畫長期與這些日本公司合作，並希望能夠找到更多的共同機會。同時，他們在日本還有其他的經營業務。
最後，Greg Abel補充說他們希望通過此次訪問與這些日本公司建立長期的信任，並強調這些公司對他們來說是非常好的投資。他們在與這些公司會面的過程中得到了很多有價值的學習機會。巴菲特進一步強調了他們對於日本市場的興趣，並表示波克夏將繼續尋找更多的機會，並與日本公司合作。
Section 24 原文：
24. Apple is a ‘better business’ than any Berkshire company
WARREN BUFFETT: (Laughter) OK, Becky?
BECKY QUICK: This next question comes from Ellie Amin Tebet (PH), who asks, “During an episode of Investing the Templeton Way podcast, Professor Damodaran, who he respects almost as much as Warren and Charlie, mentioned that he is not comfortable with positions becoming a large part of his portfolio. For example, when they reach 25-35%. He mentioned that Apple is now 35% of Berkshire’s portfolio and thinks that that is near a danger zone.” Wonders if Warren and Charlie can comment.
WARREN BUFFETT: Well, I’d like to make one comment first, but Charlie will come up with —
CHARLIE MUNGER: I think he’s out of his mind.
WARREN BUFFETT: Yeah, I knew that was coming. (Laughter) Apple is not 35% of Berkshire’s portfolio. Berkshire’s portfolio includes the railroad, the energy business, Garanimals, you name it, See’s Candies, they’re all businesses. And, you know, the good thing about Apple is that we can go up.
They buy in their stock, and instead of owning 5.6%, they got about 15 billion, 700 and some million shares outstanding. They get down to 15 and a quarter billion without us doing anything. We got 6%. So, we can’t own more than 100% of the BNSF.
We can’t own more than 100% of Garanimals or See’s Candies. And it would be nice. We’d love to own 200%, but it just isn’t doable. But they’re all the same. They’re good businesses. And to think that our criteria for Apple is different than the other businesses we own, it just happens to be a better business than any we own.
And we put a fair amount of money in it, but we haven’t got more money in it than we’ve got in the railroad. And Apple is a better business. Our railroad is a very good business. But it’s not remotely as good as Apple’s business. Apple, you know, has a position with consumers where they’re paying, you know, maybe the $1,500 bucks or whatever it may be for a phone.
And these same people pay $35,000 for having a second car. And if they had to give up a second car or give up their iPhone, they’d give up their second car. I mean, it’s an extraordinary product. We don’t have anything like that that we own 100% of.
But we’re very, very, very happy to have 5.6%, or whatever it may be, and we’re delighted every tenth of a percent that goes up. That’s like adding $100 million to our share of the earnings. And they use the earnings to buy out our partners, which we’re glad to see them sell out, too.
The index funds have to sell if they (Laugh) bring the number of shares down. And, you know, we went up slightly last year, and I made a mistake a couple years ago when I sold some shares when I had certain reasons why gains were useful to take that year from a tax standpoint.
But having heard me say that, it was a dumb decision. (Laugh) And, Charlie, you’ve already given your comment about it. But we do not have 35% of Berkshire’s portfolio. Berkshire’s portfolio is the funds we have to work with. And we want to own good businesses. And we also want to have plenty of liquidity. And beyond that, you know, the sky’s the limit or our mistakes. Who knows what the bottom is? (Laugh) Charlie, do you want to add anything to your earlier comment?
CHARLIE MUNGER: Well, I think one of the inane things that’s taught in modern university education is that a vast diversification is absolutely mandatory in investing in common stocks. That is an insane idea. It’s not that easy to have a vast plethora of good opportunities that are easily identified.
And if you’ve only got three, I’d rather be in my best ideas instead of my worst. And now, some people can’t tell their best ideas from their worst. And the act of deciding that an investment is already good, they get to thinking it’s better than it is.
I think we make fewer mistakes like that than other people. And that is a blessing to us.
We’re not so smart, but we kind of know where the edge of our smartness is. That is a very important part of practical intelligence. And a lot of people who are geniuses on IQ tests think they’re a lot smarter than they are. And what they are is dangerous.
But if you know the edge of your own ability pretty well, you should ignore most of the notions of our experts about what I call “deworsification” of portfolios.
Section 24 翻譯：
24. Apple是比波克夏任何一家公司都好的“業務”
BECKY QUICK: 下一個問題來自Ellie Amin Tebet（PH），他問：“在《投資與坦普頓方式》（Investing the Templeton Way）播客的一集中，達摩達倫教授（Professor Damodaran）提到，他尊重他們像華倫和查理一樣的人，他提到，他對持倉成為投資組合的大部分（例如，佔到25-35%）不感到舒服。他提到，蘋果現在是波克夏投資組合的35%，他認為這接近危險區域。”他想知道華倫和查理對此有何評論。
華倫·巴菲特：好吧，首先我想先做一個評論，然後查理再來——
查理·蒙格：我覺得他瘋了。
華倫·巴菲特：是的，我知道這是要來的。（笑聲）蘋果並不占波克夏投資組合的35%。波克夏的投資組合包括鐵路、能源業務、Garanimals、See's Candies等等，它們都是企業。而且，蘋果的好處是我們可以增加持股。
他們回購他們的股票，而我們無須做任何操作，他們的股票從157億股左右減少到152.5億股。而我們持有的股份是6%。所以，我們無法擁有比波克夏國家鐵路（BNSF）更多的股份。我們也無法擁有比Garanimals或See's Candies更多的股份。雖然我們很想擁有200%的股份，但這是不可能的。
但它們都是一樣的。它們都是好業務。認為我們對蘋果的標準與我們擁有的其他業務不同，事實上蘋果只是比我們擁有的任何業務更好而已。我們在蘋果上投入了相當多的錢，但我們在鐵路上投入的資金並不比蘋果少。蘋果是一個更好的業務。我們的鐵路業務是一個非常好的業務，但它遠不如蘋果的業務好。
蘋果在消費者中擁有一個位置，他們願意為手機支付大約1500美元，而這些人同樣願意為第二輛汽車支付35000美元。如果他們必須放棄第二輛汽車或放棄他們的iPhone，他們會選擇放棄第二輛汽車。這是一個非常出色的產品。我們沒有任何我們完全擁有的產品可以與之相提並論。
但我們非常、非常、非常高興擁有5.6%或其他的股份，而且每增加0.1%都像增加1億美元的股份收益一樣。他們用這些收益來買回我們的合作夥伴的股份，我們很高興看到他們賣出。指數基金必須出售股份，如果他們把股份數量減少。我們去年稍微增加了一點，而幾年前我賣掉了一些股份，當時我有某些原因認為從稅收角度來看，利潤是有用的。
但聽了我說這些後，我發現那是一個愚蠢的決定。（笑聲）查理，你之前對此已經發表過評論了。但我們並沒有35%的波克夏投資組合。波克夏的投資組合是我們要操作的資金。我們希望擁有好業務，同時也希望有充足的流動性。除此之外，天空是極限，或者說錯誤是極限。誰知道底線是什麼？（笑聲）查理，你想對之前的評論再補充點什麼嗎？
查理·蒙格：我認為現代大學教育中傳授的一個愚蠢的觀念是，在投資普通股時，廣泛分散是絕對必要的。那是一個瘋狂的想法。要找到大量易於識別的好機會並不容易。
如果你只有三個機會，我寧願選擇我的最好的想法而不是最差的想法。有些人分不清他們最好的想法和最差的想法。一旦他們決定某個投資已經不錯，他們就會認為它比實際情況更好。
我認為我們在這方面犯的錯誤比其他人少。這對我們來說是一種幸運。
我們並不聰明，但我們知道自己的聰明的邊界在哪裡。這是實際智慧的一個非常重要的部分。很多在智商測試上表現出色的人認為自己比實際情況更聰明。他們是危險的。
但如果你相當瞭解自己能力的邊界，你應該忽略大多數所謂“去分散化”投資組合的專家的觀點。
Section 24 會議摘要：
這段會議紀要講述了有關蘋果在波克夏投資組合中所佔比重的討論。有人提到蘋果在投資組合中佔比35%，並認為這已接近危險區域。巴菲特則表示這是一個誤解，因為波克夏的投資組合包含了多個業務，而蘋果只是其中之一。
巴菲特強調蘋果是一個優秀的業務，比波克夏擁有的任何其他業務都更好。他們對於蘋果的表現感到非常滿意，並且每增加0.1%的持股比例就像增加1億美元的收益一樣。他們也提到蘋果的商業模式和消費者對其產品的價值，以及他們在日本的其他業務。
查理·蒙格則對現代大學教育中強調廣泛分散投資組合的觀點表示不同意，認為這是一個愚蠢的想法。他強調應該選擇最好的機會，而不是最差的機會，並且他們在投資中會犯錯誤的次數比其他人少。
重點是巴菲特對蘋果的投資持樂觀態度，認為它是一個優秀的業務並帶來可觀的回報。同時，他們也對於廣泛分散投資策略的懷疑，並認為選擇最好的機會比廣泛分散更重要。
Section 25 原文：
25. U.S. and China both need to reduce ‘stupid, stupid, stupid’ economic tensions
WARREN BUFFETT: OK. (Applause) Station nine?
AUDIENCE MEMBER: Hi, Charlie and Warren. Thank you for this superb shareholder meeting celebration. My name is David Chung (PH) from Hong Kong, and a proud graduate of Chicago Booth. I’m also here with my two sons, Aiden (PH) and Ashen (PH), who are currently studying at the University of Chicago as a freshman and sophomore.
This is my second time attending the conference, last being 2019 four years ago, which I was only a guest shareholder of my friend, Andrew. So, after the shareholder meeting, I have decided to buy into Berkshire Hathaway, which has given me a great return of 62% since 2019.
So, I wanted to thank you for that. (Applause) I have also taken your advice to give my children a share for each of their birthdays. Although they want Berkshire Hathaway A shares, (Laughter) they will do just fine with B shares. (Laughter)
My question is how do you see the current U.S./China internet companies’ valuation and the price disparity, given there have been many uncertainties such as geopolitical tensions, significant cost optimizations with leading U.S. tech firms, while China tech has been through all that already? Thank you.
WARREN BUFFETT: Charlie, you want to?
CHARLIE MUNGER: Well, there’s been some tension in the economic relationship of United States and China. I think that that tension has been wrongly created on both sides. I think we’re equally guilty of being stupid. If there’s one thing we should do, it’s get along with China.
And we should have a lot of free trade with China in our mutual interest. (Applause)
And I just can’t imagine. It’s just so obvious. There’s so much safety and so much creativity that’s possible. Think of what Apple has done by engaging in a partnership with China as a big supplier.
It’s been good for Apple and good for China. That’s the kind of business we ought to be doing with China. And more of it. Everything that increases the tension between the two countries is stupid, stupid, stupid. It ought to be stopped on each side. And each side ought to respond to the other side’s stupidity with reciprocal kindness. That’s my view.
WARREN BUFFETT: And it creates one enormous problem, of course, which is that you have the two superpowers of the world, and they know they have to get along with each other. Either one can destroy the other. And they’re going to be competitive with each other. But part of it is, always in a game like that, is trying to judge how far you can push the other guy without them reacting wrong.
And, you know, if either side is a bully in some ways, they can get away with it, to an extent, because the alternative would drive them both into destruction. But if they push it too far, they increase the probability that something really does go wrong.
So, it’s one of those game theory dilemmas. But you really need the leader of both countries. And you need the populace to understand, at least, the general situation in which these countries are going to operate over the next century. And know that some leader that promises too much can get you in a hell of a lot of trouble.
And, you know, you’ve got one kind of a system that gets its leader one way. They’ve got another system that gets its leader another way. And keeping either side from trying to play the game too hard, and thinking the other side will go along, you know, it’s like playing chicken, you know, and driving toward a cliff.
So, if you’ve got any diplomacy skills, persuasive skills, or anything like that, you really want people that will convince the other country, as well as his own or her own country, that, “This is what we’re engaged in. We’ve got to do it right. We won’t give away the store, but we won’t try and take the whole store, either.”
And we’re just at the beginning of this, unfortunately. I mean, we learned what the situation was. It used to be the Soviet. And mutually assured destruction was our policy then. And that kept a lot of things from happening, but it also came with a very, very, very close call with Cuba.
And these are different games that existed hundreds of years ago. Britain might rule and seize France or Spain, but now you’re playing with a game that you can’t really make a huge mistake in. And I think that the better that’s understood in both countries, the more the leaders feel that their citizenry does understand that, the better off we’ll be.
And that a lot of demography, or a lot of inflammatory speaking, but a lot of authoritarian action, I mean, it all carries its dangers. And the world has stumbled through the years post 1945 with a lot of close calls in the nuclear arena.
And now we’ve got pandemics. And we’ve got cyber, and a whole bunch of other things. So, we’ve got more tools of destruction than the world’s ever had. And it’s imperative that China and the United States both understand what the game is and understand that you can’t push too hard.
But both places are going to be competitive. And both can prosper. That’s the vision that is out there, that China will have a more wonderful country, the United States will have a more wonderful country. And the two are not [incompatible].
They’re almost imperative in terms of what’s going to happen in the next 100 years or so. And I think that the leaders of both countries have got an important job in having that understood, and not to do inflammatory things. And we’ll see whether the luck that has taken us from 1945 to present holds out. And I think we can affect, to some extent, that luck. And with that cheery message, we will hand it to Becky. (Laugh)
Section 25 翻譯：
25. 美國和中國都需要減少「愚蠢、愚蠢、愚蠢」的經濟緊張關係
WARREN BUFFETT: 好的。(掌聲) 第九站?
聽眾成員: 嗨，Charlie 和 Warren。非常感謝這場卓越的股東會慶典。我是來自香港的David Chung（PH），也是芝加哥布斯商學院的畢業生。我還帶著我的兩個兒子Aiden（PH）和Ashen（PH）來，他們目前是芝加哥大學的大一和大二學生。
這是我第二次參加股東會，上一次是在四年前的2019年，那時我只是朋友Andrew的一個股東會客人。所以，在股東會之後，我決定投資波克夏，從2019年以來，我的回報率達到了62%。
所以，我想感謝你們。 (掌聲) 我還遵從了你們的建議，每年給我的兩個兒子買一股股票作為生日禮物。儘管他們想要波克夏的A股， (笑聲) 但B股對他們來說也很好。 (笑聲)
我的問題是，您如何看待當前美國和中國互聯網公司的估值和價格差異，考慮到存在著諸如地緣政治緊張、美國領先科技公司的重要成本優化等很多不確定因素？謝謝。
WARREN BUFFETT: Charlie，你要說些什麼嗎？
CHARLIE MUNGER: 嗯，美國和中國之間的經濟關係確實存在一些緊張。我認為這種緊張是在雙方都錯誤地製造的。我們在愚蠢的行為上同等有罪。如果有一件事我們應該做的，那就是與中國相處融洽。
而且我們應該在互利的基礎上與中國進行大量的自由貿易。 (掌聲)
我無法想像這一點是如此明顯。這樣做有很多安全和創造力的可能性。想想蘋果公司通過與中國的合作作為大型供應商所取得的成就。
這對蘋果和中國都是有益的。這就是我們應該與中國進行的業務。而且應該增加這樣的業務。任何增加兩國之間緊張關係的事情都是愚蠢、愚蠢、愚蠢的。雙方都應該停止這種行為，並以互相友善的方式回應對方的愚蠢。這是我的觀點。
WARREN BUFFETT: 這也帶來了一個巨大的問題，那就是你有兩個世界超級大國，他們知道他們必須彼此相處。任何一方都可以摧毀另一方。他們將互相競爭。但在這樣的遊戲中，一直都在試圖判斷你能多大程度地推動對方而不引發錯誤反應。
你知道，如果其中一方成為了恃強淩弱者，在某種程度上他們可以逃脫懲罰，因為其他選擇會導致雙方共同毀滅。但如果他們推得太遠，就增加了真正出問題的可能性。
所以，這是一個博弈理論的困境。但你真的需要兩個國家的領導人。你需要人民至少瞭解這兩個國家在未來一個世紀將如何運作的整體情況。並且知道一個承諾太多的領導人會帶來大麻煩。
你知道，你有一種體制通過某種方式獲得領導人，他們有另一種體制通過其他方式獲得領導人。防止任何一方試圖過於強硬地玩這個遊戲，以及認為對方會配合，這就像玩雞遊戲，你知道，朝著懸崖開車。
所以，如果你具有外交技巧、說服技巧或其他任何技巧，你真的希望有人能說服對方國家，以及自己的國家，「這是我們所從事的事情。我們必須做得正確。我們不會放棄一切，但也不會試圖搶走一切。」
而我們現在才剛剛開始這一切，不幸的是。我們瞭解了局勢是什麼。過去是蘇聯。互相確保毀滅是我們當時的政策。這阻止了很多事情的發生，但它也使古巴局勢非常緊張。
現在的遊戲與數百年前的遊戲不同。英國可能統治並佔領法國或西班牙，但現在你在玩的是一個不能犯大錯的遊戲。我認為中國和美國的領導人都有重要的任務，讓人們理解這一點，不要做激化情緒的事情。我們將看看從1945年到現在帶給我們的運氣是否繼續下去。我認為我們可以在某種程度上影響那種運氣。說完這個令人愉快的資訊，我們將把話筒交給Becky。(笑聲)
Section 25 會議摘要：
這段會議紀要談到了中美兩國之間的經濟緊張局勢。有人問及關於中美互聯網公司的估值和價格差異，並提到兩國之間存在地緣政治緊張和美國科技公司的成本優化等不確定因素。巴菲特和蒙格對此發表了看法。
蒙格表示，中美之間的經濟關係出現了一些緊張，並認為這種緊張在雙方都是愚蠢的。他認為兩國應該相互合作，並進行大量的自由貿易，這符合雙方的共同利益。他舉蘋果與中國展開合作的例子，指出這對蘋果和中國都是有益的。他認為增加兩國之間的緊張只是愚蠢的行為，應該予以停止。
巴菲特則指出中美是世界上兩個超級大國，它們必須相互合作，因為任何一方都有能力摧毀另一方。雙方之間會有競爭，但是必須在試探對方的底線時保持謹慎，避免局勢惡化。他強調領導人和公眾對兩國未來發展的整體情況有一定的瞭解，並明白承諾過多可能帶來麻煩。他認為理解這一點對於兩國的外交能力和說服力至關重要。
巴菲特提到，現在的情況是兩個超級大國正在起步，世界上有比以前更多的工具可以造成破壞，如核武器、疫情和網絡安全等。他強調中美兩國必須明白遊戲規則，不能過度推擠對方，但兩國都能夠繁榮發展。他表示，中國和美國都有更加美好的未來，兩者並不矛盾，這在未來100年左右的時間裡將會發生。他認為兩國領導人的重要任務是讓這一點被理解，不要採取煽動性的行動。
總結起來，這段會議紀要強調中美兩國之間的合作和相互理解的重要性，並呼籲兩國領導人避免緊張局勢升級和煽動性的行為。巴菲特和蒙格認為兩國之間的競爭是不可避免的，但是必須謹慎處理，以確保雙方的利益和世界的和平穩定。
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