本篇文章收錄2023年Berkshire Hathaway股東會下午場第11~15節原文(下午場總共25小節)、繁體中文翻譯、會議摘要，除了OT供自己學習外，也分享給有興趣的朋友們。
11. ‘We will not be making any offer for control of Occidental’
12. Elon Musk is a ‘brilliant, brilliant guy’ who ‘likes taking on the impossible job’
13. We want to save Berkshire’s cash to buy businesses
14. Munger: ‘Life is too short’ to be an ambitious lawyer
15. New minimum 15% corporate tax ‘doesn’t bother me in the least’
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Section 11 原文：
11. ‘We will not be making any offer for control of Occidental’
WARREN BUFFETT: Ok, Becky.
BECKY QUICK: This is a question from Monroe Richardson (PH). The Wall Street Journal reported in March that oil producers are producing less oil and may have reached their peak in the Permian Basin.
Given the major positions of both Occidental Petroleum and Chevron in the Permian, which you please explain the rationale for Berkshire’s significant holdings of both those companies, considering that future outlook for oil there?
WARREN BUFFETT: Well, there’s no question — it’s really interesting about oil, and Charlie knows way more about oil than I do, when did you buy that royalty in Bakersfield, or wherever it is? But that was before I met you, right?
CHARLIE MUNGER: Yes — no, it wasn’t before — it was — yes, it was. It was just before. You’re right. And that goddamn royalty is still paying me $70,000 a year.
WARREN BUFFETT: What’d you pay for the royalty?
CHARLIE MUNGER: A thousand dollars.
WARREN BUFFETT: Yeah. Yeah. Now that’s the opposite of the Permian. My dad bought $1,000 or $1,500 worth of royalties before he died in 1964. He left them to my mother. My mother left them to her two daughters. And my older sister died. And my younger sister is here today.
And she gets these checks every month. And she knows about all these different fields, and what they’re producing. And that’s the reality of half of the oil production, or something around that, in the United States. And then the other half is shale.
And, you know, if you’ve gone to the movies, and ever watched oil, you’ve never watched the things that are pumping Charlie’s royalties in California. You’ll see these gushers of oil. Well, in the Permian, this should sink in on you, in the first day, the first day when you bring in a well, you know, it may be 12,000 barrels, or maybe 15,000 barrels.
And it’s dangerous. Occidental had one come in at I think at 19,000 barrels or something like that in one day. And in a year, year and a half, it becomes partly nothing. It’s a different business in effect. In the United States, it’s interesting. We use maybe 11 and a fraction — well, we produce 11 and a fraction million barrels of oil equivalent a day.
But if shale stopped, I mean, it would drop to six million very fast. Well, just imagine taking five million barrels a day out of production in the world. And then we’re also taking down our strategic petroleum reserve. Strategic petroleum reserve is the ultimate oilfield. You don’t have to drill. It’s just we’ve got them.
And it was supposed to be strategic, but it gets involved in politics. And so, there’s all — when you talk about the oil business, you’re talking about different kinds of businesses, basically. And we like Occidental’s position in the Permian. And we wouldn’t like that position — well, it got to minus one day. It got to minus $30 a barrel.
That was crazy, of course. But if oil sells at X, you know, you do very well. And if it sells at half of X, you know, your costs are the same, and it doesn’t change the production. And it doesn’t work as well, but it also brings down the oil production of the United States very fast.
So, we don’t know what oil prices will be. But we do very much like the Occidental position they have. And that’s why we financed them a few years ago, when it looked like it was a terrible mistake. Then the oil market just totally collapsed. And then it changed around. And we bought a lot of the common stock.
In the last few months, they’ve reduced our preferred, which we don’t like, obviously. But we’d be disappointed in them if they didn’t reduce it. It’s intelligent from their standpoint. So, we’ve taken — of the $10 billion preferred, we’ve gotten maybe $400,000,000 or $500,000,000 of it, retired at 110% of par.
But, Vicki Hollub, she’s an extraordinary manager of Occidental. Her first job was with Cities Service. That was the first stock I bought in 1942. She knows what happens beneath the surface. I know the math of it. But I wouldn’t have the faintest idea what to do if I was in an oil field.
I mean, I can dig two feet down in my backyard. And that’s my understanding of subsoil in the world. I can’t picture the field that Charlie has been collecting that monthly check from, from 50-plus years, 60 years roughly, or my sister, getting at various fields, where they just keep pumping, and pumping, and pumping.
And we, in the United States, we’re lucky to have the absolutely to produce the kind of oil we’ve got from shale. But it is not a long-term source, like you might think, by watching movies about oil, or something of the sort. Charlie, do you have anything to add?
CHARLIE MUNGER: Yeah. It really dies fast, those shale wells. If you like quick death in your oil wells, we have them for you.
WARREN BUFFETT: But Occidental, they’re doing a lot of good things.
CHARLIE MUNGER: Yeah. They drill a lot of new wells. And they’re doing it at a profit, but it’s a different kind of oil than this.
WARREN BUFFETT: It’s just different. Yeah. Yeah. And that’s true of almost half the oil produced in the United States. And there’s times —
CHARLIE MUNGER: There’s a lot of oil down there that nobody knows how to produce. And they’ve been working at it for, like, 50 years. But they worked at the existing shale production for about 50 years before they figured it out. And it was weirdly complicated when they finally were able to do it. There’s only one type of sand that works.
WARREN BUFFETT: Can you imagine a horizontal pipe, you know, maybe a mile and a half or something? It’s just so different than what you think about.
CHARLIE MUNGER: It goes laterally for three miles, two miles down. How in the hell do you drill two or three miles laterally, when you’re already two or three miles under the Earth? They have mastered a lot of very tricky technology to be able to get any oil out of these wells at all.
WARREN BUFFETT: And we love the position with Occidental. And we love having Vicki run it. And they’ve been —
CHARLIE MUNGER: And there’s a lot more oil down there, if anybody can figure out another magic trick. That’s all we need is another magic trick.
WARREN BUFFETT: But Occidental has some other things too.
CHARLIE MUNGER: Yes. Yes. But —
WARREN BUFFETT: But the price of oil still is incredibly important in terms of the economics of short-lived oil. I mean, no question about that.
CHARLIE MUNGER: Well, if it’s —
WARREN BUFFETT: And we will incidentally — you know — There’s speculation about us buying control. We’re not going to buy control. (Laughs) We don’t want to run — We’ve got the right management running it. We can’t — we wouldn’t know what to do with it. And (UNINTELLIGLE) wouldn’t know what to do with an oil field.
CHARLIE MUNGER: Admitting you’re buying coal would be like going out and seeking to acquire cancer or something. You can’t even borrow to expand a coal mine now. It got very unfashionable.
WARREN BUFFETT: Yeah. And we think, frankly, some of the things said are ridiculous.
And on both sides. In both extremes.
I mean, you’re dealing with physics. You’re dealing with — the politicization of positions on something that’s enormously important in terms of energy just lends itself to demagogues, and fundraisers, and advisory organizations, and everybody in sight. And we will make rational decisions. And we do not think it’s un-American to be producing oil.
CHARLIE MUNGER: And there is no oil basin in the United States that compares to the Permian, in terms of promise.
WARREN BUFFETT: Yeah. We were lucky.
CHARLIE MUNGER: Well, I don’t —
WARREN BUFFETT: We didn’t know it was there until –
CHARLIE MUNGER: Yes.
WARREN BUFFETT: — not that many years ago.
CHARLIE MUNGER: It had sort of been used up. And then they always knew the shale oil was there. But they thought it was going to stay unrecoverable forever.
WARREN BUFFETT: The second or third stock I bought was Texas Pacific Land Trust. And they owned 3,000,000 acres down there. And they were raising revenues of $10,000 a year or something like that. And they were sitting on this incredible amount of oil. And basically, that company is now actually part of Chevron.
And it went through Texaco and did all kinds of things. And there’s still a Texas Pacific Land Trust. But a lot of that property is fee owned by — the minerals are owned by Chevron, which is some advantage. But it’s an interesting subject, I’ll put it that way.
And we will not be making any offer for control of Occidental. But we love the shares we have. And we may or may not own more in the future. But we certainly have warrants, which we got as part of the original deal, on a very sustainable amount of stock, at around $59 a share. And those warrants last a long time. I’m glad we have them.
Section 11 翻譯：
「我們不會對Occidental控制權作出任何報價」
華倫·巴菲特：好的，Becky。
BECKY QUICK：這是來自Monroe Richardson（PH）的問題。《華爾街日報》在三月份報導稱，石油生產商正在減產，可能已經達到了Permian盆地的峰值。
考慮到Occidental Petroleum和Chevron在Permian盆地的主要地位，請解釋一下Berkshire持有這兩家公司的重要原因，考慮到未來Permian盆地的石油前景？
華倫·巴菲特：油價確實非常有趣，查理對石油的瞭解遠遠超過我。你是什麼時候買的Bakersfield的油權，或者是其他地方的？但那是在我認識你之前，對吧？
查理·蒙格：是的，不，不是在——是的，在——是的，是的。就在那之前。你說得對。那該死的油權到現在還每年給我支付7萬美元。
華倫·巴菲特：你花多少錢買的油權？
查理·蒙格：一千美元。
華倫·巴菲特：是的。是的。這和Permian盆地完全相反。我爸爸在1964年去世之前花了一千美元或一千五百美元買了一些油權。他把它們留給了我媽媽。我媽媽把它們留給了她的兩個女兒。我的姐姐去世了。我妹妹今天在這裡。
她每個月都會收到這些支票。她對各個不同的油田以及它們的產量瞭若指掌。這就是美國大約一半的石油生產現實。另一半則是頁巖油。
如果你去看電影，觀察一下石油，你從來沒有看過抽油機抽到查理在加州的油田中的油。你只會看到這些油噴出來的情景。在Permian盆地，你要明白這一點，在第一天，當你開鑽一口井時，可能是一萬二千桶或一萬五千桶。
而且這是危險的。Occidental曾經有一口井一天產出了我記得是一萬九千桶左右。但是一年一年半之後，它幾乎變成了沒有產量。這實際上是一個不同的業務。在美國，這很有趣。我們每天使用的石油當量大概是1100多萬桶，如果頁巖油停止生產，這個數字會迅速下降到600萬桶。
想像一下在世界範圍內每天減少500萬桶的產量。此外，我們還在降低戰略石油儲備。戰略石油儲備是最終的油田，你不需要鑽探，我們已經擁有了它們。
它本應是戰略性的，但卻捲入了政治。因此，在談到石油業時，你實際上在談論不同種類的業務。我們喜歡Occidental在Permian盆地的地位。如果價格達到X，你就會做得很好。如果價格只有X的一半，成本卻沒有變化，產量也不會改變。它的效果不會那麼好，但它也會迅速降低美國的石油產量。
因此，我們不知道油價將會如何。但我們非常喜歡Occidental目前的地位。這就是為什麼幾年前當情況看起來糟糕透頂的時候，我們提供了資金給他們，然後石油市場完全崩潰了。然後情況發生了變化，我們買了很多普通股。
在過去的幾個月中，他們減少了我們的特別股，我們當然不喜歡這一點。但如果他們不減少的話，我們會對他們感到失望。從我們持有的100億美元特別股中，我們可能已經回購了價值4億美元或5億美元的特別股，回購價格為面值的110%。
但Vicki Hollub是Occidental的卓越經理人。她的第一份工作是在Cities Service工作。那是我在1942年買的第一支股票。她知道地底下發生的事情。我瞭解其中的數據，但如果我在油田中，我對該怎麼做一點概念都沒有。
我的理解只限於我在後院挖兩英尺深。我無法想像查理收到的這些月結賬支票的油田，大約有50多年或大約60年的歷史，或者我妹妹在不同的油田收到的支票，它們不斷地抽油。
在美國，我們很幸運地能夠生產出頁巖油這樣的石油。但它不是像你通過觀看關於石油的電影之類的東西所想像的那樣是一個長期的資源。查理，你有什麼要補充的嗎？
查理·蒙格：是的。它真的會很快地枯竭，這些頁巖油井。如果你喜歡油井的快速枯竭，我們可以提供給你。
華倫·巴菲特：但是Occidental正在做很多好事。
查理·蒙格：是的。他們正在開鑿很多新的井。他們做到了有利可圖，但那是一種不同類型的石油。
華倫·巴菲特：它只是不同。是的。是的。這適用於美國大約一半的石油生產。有時候——
查理·蒙格：還有很多人不知道如何開采那裡的石油。他們已經研究了大約50年。但在最終成功開采頁巖油之前，他們研究了大約50年。當他們終於能夠做到時，這是非常奇特的。只有一種沙子能夠起作用。
華倫·巴菲特：你能想像一根水準管道，也許有一英里半長。它和你的想像完全不同。
查理·蒙格：它水準延伸三英里，向下延伸兩英里。你怎麼可能在已經在地下兩三英里的情況下，再鑽探兩三英里的水準井呢？他們掌握了很多非常棘手的技術，才能從這些井中取得任何石油。
華倫·巴菲特：我們喜歡Occidental的地位。我們喜歡Vicki的管理。他們一直都——
查理·蒙格：還有更多的石油在那裡，如果有人能夠找到另一個魔法。我們所需要的只是另一個魔法。
華倫·巴菲特：但Occidental還有其他一些東西。
查理·蒙格：是的。是的。但是——
華倫·巴菲特：但是石油價格對於短壽命石油的經濟非常重要。這是毫無疑問的。
查理·蒙格：嗯，如果它——
華倫·巴菲特：而且，我們不會對Occidental控制權作出任何報價。我們不想經營——我們有合適的管理團隊在運營。我們不知道該怎麼做。(笑聲)我也不知道該怎麼處理一個油田。
查理·蒙格：承認你在購買煤炭就像是尋求癌症一樣。現在你甚至無法借錢擴大煤礦。煤炭已經變得非常不時尚。
華倫·巴菲特：是的。而且我們認為，坦率地說，有些言論很荒謬。
那兩種極端都有。
Section 11 摘要：
在第11部分的會議中，貝基向巴菲特提出了一個關於Occidental Petroleum和Chevron在Permian盆地的主要地位以及石油未來前景的問題。巴菲特解釋了他對這兩家公司的重要持股的理由。
巴菲特提到了石油行業的複雜性，並指出了石油生產的不同類型和方法。他解釋了頁岩油井的特點以及它們快速枯竭的問題。他強調了Occidental在Permian盆地的地位，表示對其未來的前景持樂觀態度。
巴菲特還談到了美國石油產量的重要性，特別是頁巖油對產量的貢獻。他提到了石油價格對產量和經濟的重要影響，並表示Berkshire Hathaway對Occidental的持股持樂觀態度。
巴菲特和蒙格都提到了石油行業的複雜性和不確定性。他們強調了石油是一個重要能源資源，並表示他們會根據理性的決策來進行投資，而不受政治化觀點的影響。
Section 12 原文：
12. Elon Musk is a ‘brilliant, brilliant guy’ who ‘likes taking on the impossible job’
WARREN BUFFETT: OK. Station seven.
AUDINCE MEMBER: My name is Max Joa (PH). I’m from Toronto, Canada. I have a question for Charlie regarding a statement you made in the past.
You once mentioned that you’d prefer to hire someone with an IQ of 130 who believes it’s 120, over someone with the IQ of 150 who thinks it’s 170.
I understand that you are referring to Elon Musk. (LAUGHTER)
Given the recent success of his ventures, such as Tesla, SpaceX, and Starlink, I’m curious to know if you still hold the view that Elon Musk overestimates himself. Thank you so much. (APPLAUSE)
CHARLIE MUNGER: Well, yes. I think Elon Musk overestimates himself. But he has a — he is very talented. So, he’s overestimating somebody who doesn’t need to overestimate to be very talented.
WARREN BUFFETT: There’s a Bill Maher program, about a week old, maybe two weeks old.
But he interviews Elon. And Elon does a terrific job toe-to-toe with Bill Maher. It’s worth watching.
And Elon is — he’s a brilliant, brilliant guy. And I would say that, you know, he might score over 170.
But he — you know, it’s — he dreams about things. And his dreams have got a foundation.
CHARLIE MUNGER: He would not have achieved what he has in life if he hadn’t tried for unreasonably extreme objectives.
He likes taking on the impossible job and doing it. We’re different, Warren and I. Warren and I are looking for the easy job that we can identify. (LAUGHTER)
WARREN BUFFETT: Yeah. If we can do it playing tic-tac-toe, we’ll do it, you know? (LAUGHS)
CHARLIE MUNGER: We have a totally different way of going about it.
WARREN BUFFETT: But we don’t want to compete with Elon in a lot of things.
CHARLIE MUNGER: We don’t want that much failure.
WARREN BUFFETT: Yeah. (LAUGHTER) Yeah.
And it takes over your life in a way that it just doesn’t fit us. But there are going to be — well, there have been important things done by Elon already. And it requires — fanaticism isn’t the word.
CHARLIE MUNGER: Yeah. It is the word.
WARREN BUFFETT: OK. (LAUGHTER)
Well, it isn’t quite the word. But it’s a dedication to solving the impossible. And every now and then, he’ll do it. But it would be torturous to me or Charlie. And I like the way I’m living. And I wouldn’t enjoy being in his — but he wouldn’t enjoy being in my shoes, either.
Watch the Bill Maher interview.
Section 12 翻譯：
12. 埃隆·馬斯克是一位「聰明絕頂、聰明絕頂的傢夥」，他「喜歡迎接不可能的工作」
WARREN BUFFETT：好的，第七個問題。
觀眾：我的名字是Max Joa（名字不清晰）。我來自加拿大的多倫多。我有一個問題是關於查理以前提到過的一句話。
您曾經提到過，您更願意雇傭一個智商為130但自認為是120的人，而不是一個智商為150但自認為是170的人。
我理解您是在指馬斯克（ELON MUSK）。鑒於他最近的成功，如特斯拉、SpaceX和Starlink等企業，我很想知道您是否仍然認為馬斯克高估了自己。非常感謝。（掌聲）
CHARLIE MUNGER：嗯，是的。我認為馬斯克高估了自己。但他非常有才華。所以，他高估了一個本來就很有才華的人。
WARREN BUFFETT：有一檔比爾·馬赫（Bill Maher）的節目，大約是一周前，也可能是兩周前。
他採訪了埃隆。埃隆在與比爾·馬赫的對話中表現得非常出色。這值得一看。
埃隆是一位聰明絕頂、聰明絕頂的傢夥。我會說，你知道，他的分數可能超過170。
但他，你知道，他夢想著一些事情。他的夢想有著堅實的基礎。
CHARLIE MUNGER：如果他沒有追求過超乎理性的極端目標，他就不會取得他在生活中所取得的成就。
他喜歡迎接不可能的工作並將其完成。我們與他不同，華倫和我都在尋找那些可以明確識別的簡單工作。（笑聲）
WARREN BUFFETT：是的，如果我們能玩井字遊戲來做這件事，我們會這麼做。（笑聲）
CHARLIE MUNGER：我們採取了完全不同的方式。
WARREN BUFFETT：但我們不想在許多事情上與埃隆競爭。
CHARLIE MUNGER：我們不想有那麼多失敗。
WARREN BUFFETT：是的。（笑聲）是的。
這會讓你的生活完全被佔據，這在某種程度上不適合我們。但埃隆已經做過一些重要的事情了。這需要-狂熱不是一個恰當的詞。
CHARLIE MUNGER：是的，這就是那個詞。
WARREN BUFFETT：好的。（笑聲）
嗯，這不完全是那個詞。但這是一種致力於解決不可能問題的奉獻精神。有時，他會成功。但這對我和查理來說會是一種煎熬。我喜歡我現在的生活方式。而我相信他也不會喜歡處在我的位置上。
看看比爾·馬赫的採訪。
Section 12 摘要：
在第12節中，一個觀眾問到查理·蒙格關於過去他所說的一句話，即他更願意雇傭一個自認為智商為120的人，而不是一個自認為智商為170的人。觀眾提到這似乎是在指Elon Musk。觀眾想知道是否查理·蒙格仍然認為Elon Musk高估了自己。Warren Buffett也加入了討論，並表示Elon Musk是一個非常聰明的人。
蒙格承認馬斯克高估了自己，但他也承認馬斯克非常有才華。他說馬斯克是一個願意迎接不可能任務並將其完成的人。而蒙格和巴菲特則更傾向於尋找相對簡單且可識別的工作。
巴菲特表示馬斯克是一個非常聰明的人，他可能在智商上超過了170分。他認為馬斯克的夢想是有著堅實基礎的。蒙格補充說馬斯克之所以取得如此成功，是因為他不斷追求超乎理性的極端目標。
巴菲特和蒙格表示，他們並不想與馬斯克在許多領域競爭，因為追求這種目標會讓生活變得非常困難，與他們目前的生活方式不符合。
他們鼓勵觀眾觀看比爾·馬赫與馬斯克的訪談。總的來說，他們對馬斯克持讚賞的態度，認為他是一位聰明且富有天賦的人，但也指出他追求極端目標的方式與他們不同。
Section 13 原文：
13. We want to save Berkshire’s cash to buy businesses
WARREN BUFFETT: OK. Becky.
BECKY QUICK: This question comes from Foster Taylor (PH).
“At the 2010 Berkshire annual meeting, you said the one question that you would ask of the Berkshire CEO would be about the distribution of cash to shareholders, as the Berkshire cash pile grows larger and larger.
“So, let me ask that question. Do you still feel confident of the future prospects for our over $100 billion in cash on hand, or are we getting closer to cash distributions?”
WARREN BUFFETT: Well, the one thing, if Berkshire shares are selling for less than we think they’re worth, that could be a pretty big way to distribute cash. But what we would really like to do is buy great businesses. If we could buy a company for $50 billion, or $75 billion, $100 billion, we could do it.
And we could do it. And our word’s good. It’s difficult with a public company, because in effect, if you bid on a company, you make the bid, and their shareholders vote months later. And you’re giving out an option. If we’re good for it, and the other guy has a way to —
CHARLIE MUNGER: Top you.
WARREN BUFFETT: —top you, or all kinds of things, they can get out of it. And then you get paid 2% for that, or 1% that, that is not an appropriate price. And on the other hand, Delaware will decide whether they should do it or not. And that’s the way the world is. I mean, that’s the law. So, it’d be easier to do with a private company.
And there aren’t very many that are big. On the other hand, there’s nobody else that can quite make a deal like we can, under the right circumstances. And there could be a situation where a number of very decent companies have got a very uncomfortable borrowing structure, and money comes due to them at the exact wrong time.
And that’s when they pick up a phone, as did Tiffany, and Harley-Davidson, and you name it. I mean, a whole bunch of companies in 2008. That sort of thing will happen again, whether it results in us getting the calls, or what the world is exactly at that time.
But the one thing we know is that the number of phone calls that you can make at a time like that is very, very limited. And there can be good companies, they don’t want to sell the company necessarily, but they just may need $5 billion, or $10 billion, or $20 billion, depending on what company you’re talking about.
And that can happen. And our own shareholders can be selling the stock too cheap. And we’ll never do anything to make them sell it cheap. And we’ll tell them the truth about what the business is. But if market circumstances result in us being able to buy in $50 billion of our own stock, we’ll buy it.
So, we’ll see what the world holds. But we don’t have the opportunities we used to have. But we’ve got enough. And we’re making money with the things we have. It isn’t killing us to hold $130 billion of bills at 5% plus bond equivalent yields.
And everybody says, “Well, yields are going to go down in the future.” I don’t have the faintest idea what yields are going to do in the future.
And, you know, the prime rate was 21.5% in 1981 or ’2. And people were worried that it was going to go totally out and spin out of control. And [Federal Reserve Chairman Paul] Volcker kept it from happening.
But if Volcker hadn’t been in there, who the hell knows what would’ve happened.
So, we’re running Berkshire so that we’ll do OK. And maybe we’ll do a little bit better than OK. Charlie?
CHARLIE MUNGER: OK. Maybe. Fine.
Section 13 翻譯：
13. 我們希望保留波克夏的現金以購買業務
WARREN BUFFETT：好的，Becky。
BECKY QUICK：這個問題來自Foster Taylor。在2010年的波克夏股東大會上，您說過如果波克夏的現金儲備越來越大，您會問波克夏的首席執行官一個問題，關於將現金分配給股東的事情。
所以，讓我問這個問題。您是否仍然對我們手頭上超過1000億美元的現金的未來前景感到有信心，還是我們正在接近現金分配的時候？
WARREN BUFFETT：嗯，如果波克夏的股票價格低於我們認為的價值，那就是一種相當大的現金分配方式。但我們真正想做的是購買優秀的企業。如果我們可以以500億美元、750億美元或1,000億美元的價格收購一家公司，我們是可以做到的。
我們能做到。我們的承諾是可靠的。對於一家上市公司來說，這是困難的，因為事實上，如果你對一家公司出價，他們的股東會在幾個月後投票。你就像給他們一個選項。如果我們能夠履行承諾，而對方有辦法超越你，或有其他種種原因，他們可以退出交易。然後你只能獲得2％或1％的報酬，這是不適當的價格。另一方面，德拉瓦州將決定他們是否應該進行交易。這就是世界的運作方式。我的意思是，這是法律。所以，對於私有公司來說，這會更容易一些。
但是大公司中的私有公司並不多。另一方面，沒有其他公司能夠像我們一樣，在適當的情況下達成交易。也許會有一個情況，很多非常好的公司存在著非常困難的融資結構，貨款的到期時間正好是非常不適當的時候。
Section 13 摘要：
在這個部分的會議中，股東向Warren Buffett提出了關於波克夏的現金分配的問題。Buffett表示，如果波克夏的股票價格低於他們認為的價值，那可能是一種分配現金的方式。然而，他們更希望用這筆資金來購買優秀的企業。
他提到了如果能以500億美元、750億美元或1,000億美元的價格收購一家公司，他們是可以做到的。然而，由於公開公司的特性，進行交易並不容易，因為需要股東投票和法律審查。
Buffett強調了在特定時刻可能出現的機會，即一些優秀公司可能在財務結構上面臨困難，需要資金援助。他們可能需要數十億或數千億美元，這取決於公司的規模。
此外，Buffett也提到了他們的股東有時可能會以過低的價格出售股票，但他們不會做出任何事情來促使股東以低價出售。如果市場環境使得回購波克夏的股票成為可能，他們將會進行回購。
總的來說，他們對於波克夏手頭的資金感到自信，並且希望利用這些資金來進行戰略性的收購。他們強調了對優秀企業的購買機會的重要性，並表示他們將繼續謹慎管理波克夏的資金。
Section 14 原文：
14. Munger: ‘Life is too short’ to be an ambitious lawyer
WARREN BUFFETT: OK. Station eight.
AUDIENCE MEMBER: Hello, Mr. Buffett and Mr. Munger. My name is Carlos Sanchez (PH). And I am honored to be here from Guadalajara, Mexico. Mr. Munger, as a fellow lawyer, I have a question regarding corporate law.
Considering your experience and success, if you were to offer guidance to someone like Ralph Tortorella when he was at the beginning of his career, and before becoming Berkshire Hathaway Company’s lawyer, what key principles or lessons would you suggest to help him excel in his profession?
CHARLIE MUNGER: Well, I’m not sure I quite caught all of that. But I don’t think I have a lot of advice about how to succeed as a lawyer. I have a son-in-law who describes modern law practice in a big firm.
He says, “It’s like a pie-eating contest where if you win you get to eat more pie.” (LAUGHTER) And I advise you to avoid that kind of a law firm. Life is too short to just do nothing but eat pie.
WARREN BUFFETT: Yeah. Charlie has not practiced law since what 1964 maybe, whatever it was.
CHARLIE MUNGER: 1962.
WARREN BUFFETT: ’62. And Charlie has given me four or five pieces of advice that don’t really come from his legal background, but because he knows the system so well, and, you know, really did do quite well at Harvard Law School, despite his taunting of teachers in a few things.
He has given me four of five solutions on things that nobody else in the world would’ve given me, law firm or otherwise. And it’s been within a nanosecond of when I described the problem to him. And he just gave me the answer that nobody else would’ve come up with.
And I told you one of them last year. So, I won’t repeat it at this meeting. But we’ve got the best lawyer in the world in Charlie, if it’s something that really matters. And there’ve been times when I’ve taken advantage of that. And Charlie didn’t want to be a lawyer.
He didn’t want to sell his time, maybe at 20 bucks an hour or something, to people he thought were making the wrong the decisions. And he knew more about it than they did. And that just did not strike him as a good way to go through life. And I think he’s probably right on that.
I think he’d have really gotten to be miserable if he had to keep doing that. It’s just no fun. It’d be like me giving investment advice to somebody that — or taking it from somebody. I just wouldn’t want to do it. And Charlie figured that out. And so, we decided to work for ourselves. And this worked. Been happy, happily ever after.
CHARLIE MUNGER: We have no complaints.
WARREN BUFFETT: Yeah. None.
Section 14 翻譯：
14. Munger:「做一個有野心的律師，時間太短暫了」
WARREN BUFFETT: 好的，第八個問題。
觀眾成員: 你好，Buffett先生和Munger先生。我叫Carlos Sanchez (PH)，很榮幸從墨西哥瓜達拉哈拉來到這裡。Munger先生，作為一位律師，我有一個關於企業法的問題。
考慮到您的經驗和成功，如果您要給像Ralph Tortorella這樣在職業生涯初期，還沒成為波克夏公司的律師時的他一些建議，您會提供什麼關鍵原則或教訓，幫助他在職業中取得成功？
CHARLIE MUNGER: 嗯，我不確定我完全理解你的問題。但我對如何在律師職業中取得成功沒有太多的建議。我有一個女婿描述大型律師事務所的現代法律實踐方式。
他說，“這就像是一場吃派比賽，如果你贏了，你就可以吃更多的派。”(笑聲) 我建議你避免這樣的律師事務所。生命太短暫了，不能只做一件事情，就是吃派。
WARREN BUFFETT: 是的，Charlie自從1964年，或者不管是什麼時候，他就沒有從事法律工作了。
CHARLIE MUNGER: 1962年。
WARREN BUFFETT: 62年。Charlie給了我四五個建議，這些建議並不完全來自他的法律背景，而是因為他對體制非常瞭解，他在哈佛法學院真的做得非常出色，儘管他有時會挑釁教師一些事情。
他給了我四五個解決方案，其他人絕對想不到，不管是來自律師事務所還是其他方面。而且他只用了不到一秒鐘的時間就給了我答案，其他人絕對想不出來。
去年我告訴了你們其中一個。所以，在這次會議上我就不再重複了。但如果是重要的事情，Charlie是全世界最好的律師。在某些時候，我曾經利用了這一點。Charlie並不想成為一個律師。
他不想把時間賣給那些他認為做出錯誤決策的人，而他對這些事情瞭解得比他們多。這種生活方式對他來說並不好。我想他在這方面可能是對的。
如果他一直這樣做下去，他可能真的會變得非常痛苦。那樣根本沒有樂趣。就像我給別人提供投資建議，或者接受別人的建議。我都不想這樣做。Charlie明白這一點。所以，我們決定為自己工作。這種方式奏效了。過得非常開心。
CHARLIE MUNGER: 我們沒有抱怨。
WARREN BUFFETT: 是的，一點也沒有。
Section 14 摘要：
一位來自墨西哥瓜達拉哈拉的觀眾問Charlie Munger，作為一位律師，他如何對剛開始他職業生涯，並在成為Berkshire Hathaway公司律師之前的Ralph Tortorella提供指導。他想瞭解有哪些關鍵原則或課程可以幫助他在其職業中表現出色。
Charlie Munger的回答表明，他不認為他有很多關於如何成為一名成功律師的建議。他引用他的女婿對於在大型律師事務所的現代法律實踐的描述：“它就像一個吃派的比賽，如果你贏了，你可以吃更多的派。”（笑聲）他建議避免那種類型的律師事務所，因為人生太短，不能只是吃派。
Warren Buffett補充說，自1962年以來，Charlie Munger就沒有執業過。儘管他在哈佛法學院表現得相當出色，但他給出的四五個建議並不真的源於他的法律背景，而是因為他非常瞭解該系統。這些建議對Buffett非常有用，沒有人能給出這樣的建議。Buffett認為如果遇到真正重要的事情，Charlie是世界上最好的律師。
Buffett認為Charlie並不想成為律師，因為他不想以每小時20美元的價格把他的時間賣給他認為正在做錯誤決策的人，而他對此知道的比他們更多。他認為這並不是一種好的過生活的方式，如果他必須繼續這樣做，他可能真的會變得很痛苦。因此，他們決定為自己工作，並從此過得很快樂。
Section 15 原文：
15. New minimum 15% corporate tax ‘doesn’t bother me in the least’
WARREN BUFFETT: OK. We’re at Becky.
BECKY QUICK: This question come from Ryan Harding (PH). And it’s about the new 15% corporate minimum tax rate. As he sees it, its implementation is currently understood, he thinks as he understands it, to apply over rolling three-year periods, and to be based on reported earnings.
First, does the inclusion of unrealized gains and losses in reported earnings under the current financial reporting standards contribute to the calculation for corporate minimum tax rate purposes?
And could it potentially convert some of those notional deferred taxes into cash taxes, even if a rise in the market price of a major holding is only temporary, but rather extreme? And then second, could it reduce the effect of some of the renewable energy tax incentives, and others?
WARREN BUFFETT: I think the answer on the second part, probably, is no. But I don’t want to say it is for sure, because he’s asking the same questions I ask of Marc Hamburg, who’s the smartest guy on combining understanding a business, understanding the tax code, understanding SEC rules, and everything else, that you’ll find in corporate America.
And these questions — the particular question on marginable securities — I don’t think has been answered yet. And I think that there are a number of things about the new tax act that were not enacted yet. But I would say this. We have said ourselves what we think the proper approach to operating income.
We didn’t design that because this tax law came along, we did some years back. So, we would think that you wouldn’t include capital gains, unrealized capital gains in. But we’ve got enough, I think no matter how things turn out. The 15% tax doesn’t bother me in the least.
And we can figure ways, once we know the rules, where we will pay the 15% tax. And, you know, we were paying 52% tax as federal income taxes when I bought control in the partnership of Berkshire Hathaway. I mean, the tax rate has come down dramatically.
And the deferred tax that was embodied, for example, at Sanborn MAT, when it was involved in a system that was allowed under the tax law to avoid that tax. But that was a huge tax, 52%. So, we will live with this tax code. And we do not think corporations are overtaxed in the United States.
And, you know, I think that the conversation about how we’d lose out to the world, and all that sort of thing is really nonsense. But we’ve got a new law that the regulations haven’t been written on. And when we know what the game is, we will absolutely figure out a way to pay 15% every year, which generally, we’ve been paying anyway.
And as I pointed out, if there were a thousand corporations in the United States that paid what Berkshire has been paying, nobody else in the United States, no individual, no corporation, would ever pay any income tax, social security tax, gift tax, estate tax, anything else.
A thousand like Berkshire Hathaway would produce the revenue that’s being derived under the present tax code from everybody in the United States. And I don’t feel badly about that. And I love to get it to one five-hundreth, or something of the sort. But I’d like to do it — we can do it at this rate. I’m happy to do it.
I think we are privileged to live in the United States. But we also have to control spending. And that’s something that Congress doesn’t quite like to do. And they didn’t like to do it when my dad went to Congress. But they’ve dug in more, as the years have gone by. Charlie?
CHARLIE MUNGER: Well, we covered this subject earlier.
WARREN BUFFETT: OK. (LAUGHTER)
Section 15 翻譯：
15. 新的最低15%的企業稅「對我一點也不煩惱」
華倫·巴菲特：好的，現在是Becky的問題時間。
BECKY QUICK：這個問題來自Ryan Harding（PH）。他問的是關於新的15%的企業最低稅率。他認為，目前的實施方式是每三年滾動一次，並基於報告的盈利。
首先，現行金融報告標準下的未實現盈利和虧損在報告盈利中的包含，是否有助於計算企業最低稅率的計算？
它是否可能將一些名義上的遞延稅款轉換為現金稅款，即使一個主要持有股票的市場價格的上升只是暫時的，但卻相當極端？其次，它是否可能減少一些可再生能源稅收激勵措施和其他的影響？
華倫·巴菲特：我認為對於第二部分的回答可能是否。但我不想肯定地說，因為他問的問題和我問Marc Hamburg的問題一樣，Marc Hamburg是美國企業界中對於結合理解業務、理解稅收法規、理解證券交易委員會規則等所有事物最聰明的人。
而這些問題——特別是關於可邊際證券的問題——我認為還沒有得到答案。我認為新稅法的許多內容還沒有實施。但我要說的是，我們自己說過，我們認為應該針對營業收入採取什麼樣的方法。
我們並不是因為這個稅法出現，我們幾年前就設計了。所以，我們認為你不應該包括未實現的資本利得。但我們有足夠的，我認為無論事情如何發展。15%的稅我一點也不煩惱。
我們可以找到方法，一旦我們知道規則，我們就會支付15%的稅。而且，你知道，當我通過合夥買下波克夏·哈撒韋的控制權時，我們正在支付52%的聯邦所得稅。我的意思是，稅率已經大幅下降了。
而在Sanborn MAT參與避稅系統時，體現出的遞延稅是一筆巨大的稅，52%。所以，我們會適應這個稅法。我們認為美國的公司並沒有被過度稅務。
而且，我認為我們會如何在世界上落後，等等這種話真的是胡說八道。但我們有一個新的法律，規定還沒有制定。當我們知道遊戲規則是什麼時，我們絕對會找到一種方法每年支付15%，我們總的來說，已經在支付了。
我指出，如果美國有一千家公司像波克夏一樣支付稅款，美國的其他人，無論是個人還是公司，都不需要支付任何所得稅，社會保障稅，贈禮稅，遺產稅，或其他任何稅。
一千家像波克夏這樣的公司將產生目前的稅法從美國所有人那裡得到的收入。我並不覺得對此有任何遺憾。我希望能將它降低到五百分之一，或者類似的程度。但我願意以這種稅率來做。我很樂意做。
我認為我們有幸住在美國。但我們也必須控制開支。這是國會不太喜歡做的事情。當我父親去國會時，他們就不喜歡這樣做。但隨著時間的推移，他們的抵抗變得更加強硬。Charlie？
CHARLIE MUNGER：嗯，我們早些時候已經討論過這個主題了。
華倫·巴菲特：好的。 （笑聲）
Section 15 摘要：
巴菲特對於新的15%的企業最低稅率表示不煩惱。他表示，儘管稅法的具體細節和規定尚未制定，但他們將適應這個新的稅法。未實現的資本利得應該不包括在計算企業最低稅率的盈利中。然而，他也承認有些問題，例如有關可邊際證券的問題，仍然沒有得到明確的答案。
巴菲特明確表示，他認為美國的公司並未被過度稅收，並批評了關於美國將如何在全球範圍內落後的說法。巴菲特也表達了他對居住在美國的欣賞，並強調了需要控制開支的必要性，儘管這是國會不喜歡做的事情。
在回答有關新稅法可能對可再生能源稅收激勵措施的影響的問題時，巴菲特表示他認為可能性不大，但仍需要對稅法的具體規定有更清晰的瞭解。巴菲特和Munger表示，一旦新的稅法規定明確，他們將確定如何支付15%的企業稅。
總的來說，這部分的重點在於巴菲特對新的15%企業最低稅率表示的接受與不煩惱，以及他對美國公司稅務問題的看法。
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