本篇文章收錄2023年Berkshire Hathaway股東會下午場第1~5節原文(下午場總共25小節)、繁體中文翻譯、會議摘要，除了OT供自己學習外，也分享給有興趣的朋友們。
1. Washington should explicitly guarantee all U.S. bank deposits
2. Buffett: CEOs of failed banks should be punished
3. Aside from Bank of America, Berkshire is being cautious on bank stocks
4. It is ‘madness to keep printing money’
5. Buffet would have preferred to buy more of Pilot earlier, but it wasn’t for sale
 |
| 滾動你的SNOWBALL |
Section 1 原文：
1. Washington should explicitly guarantee all U.S. bank deposits
WARREN BUFFETT: OK, so take your seats please. Sales are terrific out there, so you’re my kind of crowd. (LAUGH) I’ve been getting reports we’re breaking all kinds of records. And we’re going to start off with question number 26, which goes to station two.
AUDIENCE MEMBER: Hi Warren and Charlie. My name is James from Malaysia. Given the recent challenges faced by the U.S. banks, what is your outlook on the banking industry? How do you assess the risk and the opportunity in this section?
WARREN BUFFETT: Well, anticipating a few questions on banks, I decided we should start using bank language here to (LAUGHTER) describe —
And Charlie. (LAUGHTER AND APPLAUSE)
The situation in banking is very similar to what it’s always been in banking, that fear is contagious, always.
And historically sometimes the fear was justified, and sometimes it wasn’t. My dad lost his job in 1931 because of a bank run, and they had a bank run on state banks. And the head of the Alamo National Bank said, “Well, we’re a national bank, and they didn’t never a run on the national banks.”
And, of course, they both faced the same problem. So, it used to be that if you saw people lining up at a bank, the proper response was to get into the line. And they’d always leave it. And the story is that Sidney Weinberg of Goldman Sachs, during one of the bank runs back in 1907 or thereabouts, had a job as a runner at Goldman Sachs, and asked his boss if he could take the week off.
And the boss said, “Sure, not much is going on anyway.” So, he got in line, whether it was the Knickerbocker Trust or wherever. And as he got toward the front of the line, he sold his place in line to somebody. He didn’t have an account at the bank, but that was an asset. (LAUGHTER)
And the banking system has changed so much over the years. And we did something enormously sensible, in my view, when we set up the FDIC. As many as 2,000 banks had failed in one year back after World War I. I mean, bank runs were just part of the picture.
And if you have people that are worried about whether their money is safe in the bank and are all trying to withdraw, you can’t run an economy very well. So, the FDIC was very logical. It’s got changed over the years some, but here we are in, you know, 2023.
And we actually see the FDIC pay off at a hundred cents on the dollar to everybody or make it available on all demand deposits. And yet you still have people very worried about their — periodically, geographically, all kinds of crazy ways.
And that just shouldn’t happen. So, the messaging has been very poor. It’s been poor by the politicians, who sometimes have an interest in having it poor. It’s been poor by the agencies, and I would say it’s been poor by the press.
I mean, you shouldn’t have so many people that misunderstand the fact that although there may be a debt ceiling, it’s going to get changed.
Although there’s a $250,000 limit on FDIC, the FDIC and the U.S. government and the American public have no interest in having a bank fail and have deposits actually lost by people. We had a demonstration project the weekend of Silicon Valley Bank, and the public is still confused.
So, it really, it’s something to have a law that became effective in 1934, although mollified it in some ways, not understood about something as important as the banking system.
I don’t think the American public is that dumb, and I just, well, I made that offer over in Tokyo, incidentally, that I haven’t heard from anybody that wants to take up my $1 million bet on whether the public will lose money if they have a demand deposit at a bank, no matter what the size.
So that’s the world we live in. It means that a lighted match can turn into a conflagration, or it can be blown out. And who knows what will happen. And we don’t have any worry — we keep our money in cash and Treasury bills at Berkshire, because we keep $128 billion or whatever it was at the end of the quarter.
And we want to be there if the banking system temporarily even gets stalled in some way. It shouldn’t, I don’t think it will, but I think it could. And I think that the incentives in bank regulation are so messed up, and so many people have an interest in having them messed up, that it’s totally crazy.
I mean, Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac were doing 40% or so of the mortgage business in the United States. That is huge. They were regulated, just those two companies were regulated by some group. I forget what they called it. But they had 150 people that were in charge of just figuring out whether Freddie and Fannie were doing the right thing.
Well, I could’ve done it. You know, Charlie could’ve done it. You know, and I’m not sure they needed an assistant even to do it. But the incentives were all wrong. And Freddie and Fannie, which were doing fine in August, or apparently doing fine in July and August of 2008, were put into conservatorship, you know, early in September.
And the things that followed from that were just incredible. So, there are second order and third order and fourth order effects that are somewhat unpredictable, as to what they will be and the sequence and all that. But things change. And if people think that deposits are sticky anymore, they’re just living in a different era.
You know, press a button, you don’t have to get in a line and wait for days and have the teller counting out the money slowly in gold so (LAUGH) that you hope the line goes away. You’re going to have a run in a few seconds. So, the way it hasn’t been addressed properly is a problem.
And who knows where it leads.
Section 1 翻譯：
1. 華盛頓應明確保證所有美國銀行存款
華倫·巴菲特：好的，請就坐。外面的銷售情況非常好，所以你們是我喜歡的觀眾（笑聲）。我得到的報告顯示我們打破了各種各樣的紀錄。我們將從第26個問題開始，發給第二站。
聽眾成員：嗨，華倫和查理。我是來自馬來西亞的詹姆斯。鑒於美國銀行面臨的最新挑戰，您對銀行業的前景有何看法？您如何評估這個領域的風險和機會？
華倫·巴菲特：好吧，預料到會有一些關於銀行的問題，我決定我們應該開始使用銀行術語來（笑聲）描述——
還有查理（笑聲和掌聲）
銀行業的狀況與一直以來的銀行業類似，恐懼總是具有傳染性。
歷史上，有時恐懼是有理由的，有時則不然。我父親因為銀行擠兌而失去了工作，那時他們對州銀行進行了擠兌。阿拉莫國家銀行的負責人說：“嗯，我們是一家全國銀行，他們從來沒有對全國銀行進行過擠兌。”
當然，他們都面臨著同樣的問題。過去，如果你看到人們在銀行排隊，正確的反應是加入隊伍。然後他們總是會離開隊伍。有一個故事是關於高盛的西德尼·溫伯格，他在1907年左右的一次銀行擠兌中，在高盛擔任一個傳遞員的工作，然後問他的老闆能否請假一周。
老闆說：“當然可以，反正沒什麼事情要做。”所以，他加入了隊伍，不管是在Knickerbocker Trust還是其他地方。當他接近隊伍前面時，他把自己的位置賣給了其他人。他沒有在銀行開戶，但那是一項資產（笑聲）。
銀行業多年來發生了很大的變化。我們在我看來非常明智地設立了聯邦存款保險公司（FDIC）。在一戰後的某年，多達2,000家銀行在一年內倒閉。我是說，銀行擠兌只是整個局面的一部分。
如果人們擔心他們的錢是否安全存放在銀行中，並試圖全部提取出來，那麼經濟就無法良好運轉。因此，聯邦存款保險公司（FDIC）是非常合乎邏輯的。儘管它在多年來發生了一些變化，但在我們所處的2023年，我們實際上看到FDIC以百分之百的面值向每個人支付或提供所有活期存款的保障。然而，你仍然有人們非常擔心他們的存款的情況——無論是定期的、地理上的，還是其他種種瘋狂的方式。
這種情況不應該發生。因此，傳遞資訊的方式非常糟糕。無論是政界人士、機構還是媒體，都做得很糟糕。
我的意思是，我們不應該有這麼多人誤解這個事實，即儘管可能存在債務上限，但它將會被改變。
儘管聯邦存款保險公司（FDIC）有25萬美元的限額，但聯邦存款保險公司、美國政府和美國公眾都不希望銀行倒閉，讓人們的存款真正損失。我們在矽谷銀行有一個示範項目，但公眾仍然感到困惑。
所以，這真的是令人擔憂的。對於一個1934年生效的法律來說，儘管在某些方面有所緩和，卻對銀行系統這樣重要的事情不瞭解。
我不認為美國公眾如此愚蠢，我在東京也提過這個賭注，順便說一下，我還沒有聽到任何人想要接受我的100萬美元賭注，即公眾是否會因為在銀行存有活期存款而損失資金，不論數額大小。
這就是我們生活的世界。這意味著一根點燃的火柴可以變成大火，也可以被吹滅。誰知道會發生什麼。我們並不擔心——我們在波克夏將我們的資金保存為現金和國債，因為我們在季度末持有1,280億美元或類似的資金。
我們希望在銀行系統暫時甚至發生某種中斷的情況下保持那裡的資金。我認為它不應該發生，但我認為它可能發生。我認為銀行監管中的激勵機制非常混亂，很多人有興趣讓它們混亂，這是完全瘋狂的。
我的意思是，房利美和房地美曾經在美國承擔著大約40%的抵押業務。這是一個巨大的比例。只有這兩家公司受到某個機構的監管。我忘記他們叫什麼。但他們有150人負責判斷房利美和房地美是否在做正確的事情。
嗯，我可以做到。查理也可以做到。我甚至不確定他們是否需要一個助手來完成這項工作。但激勵機制完全錯誤。房利美和房地美在2008年7月和8月似乎還做得不錯，但在9月初就被置於託管之下。
隨後發生的事情令人難以置信。因此，二級、三級和四級效應有些難以預測，不確定它們將會是什麼，以及其順序和所有這些。但事情會變化。如果人們認為存款現在不再具有粘性，那他們就生活在一個不同的時代。
按下一個按鈕，你無需排隊等待幾天，也無需讓出紙幣櫃員慢慢數金幣，希望隊伍會消失。你將在幾秒鐘內看到擠兌發生。因此，對這個問題沒有得到妥善解決是一個問題。
誰知道它會導致什麼結果。
Section 1 摘要：
在Section 1的會議中，Warren Buffett針對銀行業提出了他的看法和觀點。他強調銀行業的情況與過去類似，恐懼情緒始終具有傳染性。他回顧了歷史上一些銀行擠兌的事件，並提到建立聯邦存款保險公司（FDIC）的重要性，以保護存款者並維護經濟穩定。他認為銀行監管激勵機制存在問題，導致不正確的激勵和管理，以及一些機構和媒體對銀行系統的消息傳遞不當。他強調公眾對銀行系統的理解和信心非常重要，特別是在涉及存款安全性的問題上。
Section 2 原文：
2. Buffett: CEOs of failed banks should be punished
WARREN BUFFETT: But you will have to have a punishment for the people that do the wrong thing. And if you take First Republic, for example, you could look at their 10-K and see that they were offering non-government guaranteed mortgages to, in jumbo amounts, at fixed rates, sometimes for ten years before they changed to floating.
And that’s a crazy proposition. If it’s to the advantage of a bank, they’ve got the guy coming in and says, “I’ll refinance at 1.5% and then 1%,” and if it’s to the advantage the other way, they keep it out ten years. You don’t give options like that.
But that what First Republic was doing, and it was in plain sight. And the world ignored it till it blew up. And some of the stock in some of these banks that were held by insiders was sold. And who knows whether they had a plan, or some plan that was innocent, or whether they started sensing what was coming.
But you do know that the directors are not going to be able to read some book or anything like that. But they do have the ability to hold the CEO accountable. The CEO gets the bank in trouble, both the CEO and the director should suffer.
The stockholders of the future shouldn’t suffer. They didn’t do anything. It doesn’t teach anybody any lessons or anything, it teaches the lesson that if you run a bank and you screw it up, you’re still a rich guy and the clubs don’t drop you and the charity groups don’t quit asking you to their benefits.
And the world goes on. And that is not a good lesson to teach people who are holding the behavior of the economy in their hands. So, I think there’s some work to be done, but it’s not a difficult problem. It’s just we’ve screwed up the answer and we’ve screwed up the communication of it. Charlie?
CHARLIE MUNGER: Well, I’m so old fashioned that I kind of liked it that when banks didn’t do investment banking. That makes me very outmoded in the modern world.
WARREN BUFFETT: And the country decided it was contrary to public interest for a while, and then the banks wanted to get back into it.
CHARLIE MUNGER: Did they ever.
WARREN BUFFETT: Yeah. No, I mean —
CHARLIE MUNGER: And I don’t think having a bunch of bankers, all of whom are trying to get rich, leads to good things. But I (APPLAUSE) think a banker should be more like an engineer. He’s more, like, into avoiding trouble than he is getting rich.
WARREN BUFFETT: Yeah, and they could do fine.
CHARLIE MUNGER: They can do fine that way. And I think that we’re making a big mistake when we get a bank where everybody who joins it plans to get rich. It’s a contradiction in values.
WARREN BUFFETT: And we came to that conclusion, I don’t know when Glass-Steagall was passed or anything, but then they want to get back in. How many of you know, and maybe I’m wrong on this, I haven’t looked lately, but the Federal Reserve actually was given the responsibility for setting margin requirements.
And they change margin requirements a lot of time because it was known that people that borrow a lot of money cause a danger to the banking system if you get too many in the picture and all of that sort of thing. And what’s happened? The banks figured out a thousand different ways to get so you could borrow on 100% margin, you know? I mean, through derivatives and everything, they just totally distorted all the lessons that were learned in the ’29 crash and —
CHARLIE MUNGER: Imagine taking banking into derivatives trading. Who in his right mind would have allowed that?
WARREN BUFFETT: Yeah. Well, there’s more money in it. And —
CHARLIE MUNGER: Well, that’s why they’re in on it.
WARREN BUFFETT: Yeah. And —
CHARLIE MUNGER: And but it isn’t necessarily a great social outcome for the rest of us.
WARREN BUFFETT: That’s what those Senate committees decided back in 1931 and ’32. And then in the late 1990s, particularly, I mean, very decent people, but, you know, Bob Ruhlman and some of the people, you know, they said this was the modern world. And here’s what the modern world has turned out to hand us. And banking can have all kinds of new inventions, but it needs to have old values. And —
CHARLIE MUNGER: Well, if we do —
WARREN BUFFETT: —we don’t know what’s going to happen. You know, because there are a lot of things that could happen out of the present situation.
Depositors will not lose money. Stockholders and debt holders, the holding company and all that, they should lose money.
And people borrowed out on commercial real estate and now it isn’t, the loans aren’t getting extended, they should leave. It’s too bad. That’s part of borrowing on 100% margin, which is what people have been doing with commercial real estate.
You’ve got to have the penalties, hit the people that cause the problems. And if they took risks that they shouldn’t have, it needs to fall on them if you’re going to change how people are going to behave in the future. (APPLAUSE)
Section 2 翻譯：
2. 巴菲特：CEO們應該受到懲罰，尤其是那些失敗的銀行的CEO。
WARREN BUFFETT: 但你必須對那些做錯事的人進行懲罰。以第一共和銀行為例，你可以查看他們的10-K報告，看到他們向非政府擔保的大額貸款提供固定利率，有時長達十年之久，然後才轉為浮動利率。
這是一個荒謬的主張。如果對銀行有利，他們會找個人來說：“我將以1.5%再融資，然後是1%”，如果利率朝著另一方向有利，他們將將其保持十年。你不會給出這樣的選擇。
但第一共和銀行正在這樣做，這一事實是昭然若揭的。直到事情爆發前，世人才對此置之不理。一些股票由內部人員持有，並在這些銀行中進行銷售。誰知道他們是否有計劃，或者一些無辜的計畫，或者是否開始察覺到即將發生的事情。
但你知道董事們不可能讀一本書或者什麼的。但他們確實有責任追究首席執行官的責任。首席執行官導致銀行陷入困境時，首席執行官和董事都應該承擔後果。
未來的股東不應該承受損失。他們什麼也沒做。這不會給任何人教訓，也不會給人們傳遞這樣的資訊：如果你經營一家銀行，把它搞砸了，你仍然是個有錢人，俱樂部不會拋棄你，慈善團體也不會停止邀請你參加他們的活動。
而世界依然繼續轉動。這不是一個好的教訓，特別是對那些掌握著經濟行為的人來說。因此，我認為還有些工作要做，但這不是一個困難的問題。問題在於我們搞砸了答案，也搞砸了傳達的方式。查理？
CHARLIE MUNGER: 嗯，我是如此過時的人，我有點喜歡銀行不做投資銀行業務。在現代世界，這讓我過時了。
WARREN BUFFETT: 而這個國家決定有一段時間是不符合公共利益的，然後銀行想要重新涉足。
CHARLIE MUNGER: 他們的確這麼做了。
WARREN BUFFETT: 是的。不，我的意思是 —
CHARLIE MUNGER: 他們是為了金錢才這樣做的。
WARREN BUFFETT: 是的。而且 —
CHARLIE MUNGER: 但這對我們其他人來說不一定是個好的社會結果。
WARREN BUFFETT: 這就是1931年和1932年的那些參議院委員會的決定。然後在20世紀90年代末，我是說非常不錯的人，但是你知道，鮑勃·魯爾曼（Bob Ruhlman）和其他一些人，他們說這是現代世界。而現代世界給我們帶來了這樣的情況。銀行業可以有各種各樣的新發明，但它需要保持舊的價值觀。
CHARLIE MUNGER: 如果我們這樣做 —
WARREN BUFFETT: ——我們不知道將會發生什麼。你知道，目前的情況可能會引發許多事情。
存款人不會損失錢。股東和債權人、控股公司以及所有這些人應該承擔損失。
而那些在商業房地產上借錢，現在貸款沒有得到延長的人，他們應該離開。這是百分之百保證金借貸的一部分，這就是人們在商業房地產上一直在做的事情。
你必須有懲罰，打擊那些造成問題的人。如果他們冒險做了不應該做的事情，後果就應該由他們承擔，這樣才能改變人們未來的行為方式。
Section 2 摘要：
在Section 2的會議中，Warren Buffett表達了對於銀行首席執行官應受到懲罰的觀點。他提到了一些銀行的錯誤行為，並指出需要對那些做錯事的人進行追究。他強調了對於銀行的監管和價值觀的重要性，認為銀行應該更注重避免風險而不是追求個人利益。他還談到了銀行業在過去幾十年中發生的變化，以及一些監管和溝通上的失誤。
Section 3 原文：
3. Aside from Bank of America, Berkshire is being cautious on bank stocks
WARREN BUFFETT: OK, Becky?
BECKY QUICK: This question comes from Davis Hans in Houston, Texas. He writes, “What do you think about the business models of the big banks as compared to the regional banks in the wake of the events at Silicon Valley Bank? And how does the perceived implicit guarantee of all deposits at all banks affect big banks and those regional banks?”
WARREN BUFFETT: Yeah. Well, I can say this. If you follow sound banking methods, which means not doing some things that other people do, a bank can be a perfectly decent investment. And in fact, Charlie and I, well, me originally in 1969, we bought a bank at Berkshire.
And we had $19 million invested in that bank. And we had $17 million I think invested in our insurance companies. And if the Banking Holding Company Act of 1970 hadn’t been passed, we might’ve ended up owning a lot of banks instead of a lot of insurance companies.
We were looking at more banks, and Harry Keefe was taking us around Chicago. And there were other things we could do. And then, bingo, they passed the 1970 Bank Holding Company Act, and we had to divest ourselves of that bank in ten years, which we did —
CHARLIE MUNGER: By the way, it never had a bad debt.
WARREN BUFFETT: Oh, it —
CHARLIE MUNGER: It never had an unnecessary cost. It made nothing but money with no risk. It never presented any deposit insurance risk to the government.
WARREN BUFFETT: Zero.
CHARLIE MUNGER: It was a lovely, sound, constructive institution in this community. And any person who went in and deserved credit could get credit.
WARREN BUFFETT: Yeah, and we were going to buy more banks.
CHARLIE MUNGER: And we were forced out of it.
WARREN BUFFETT: We were going to buy more banks. And if we bought more banks, we probably wouldn’t have expanded the insurance business. But, you know, the law changed and so we divested, and we’ve done OK in insurance. But banking was more attractive to us. It was bigger and there were more targets to buy.
And you could run a perfectly sound bank then, and no negotiable certificates of deposit. All these things, all the inventions that came later, and you could still run them today and you could earn good money. Very good money. And we would’ve found more banks. But we’re precluded from doing that.
And we’ve sold banks, bank stocks in the last, well, we sold them first when the pandemic broke out, and then we sold some more in the last six months. And we don’t know where the shareholders of the big banks, necessarily, or the regional banks or any bank, are heading now.
I’ve got my own personal money, and I’m probably above the FDIC limit, and I’ve got it with a local bank. And I think, I don’t worry about it in the least. But in terms of owning banks, events will determine their future. And you’ve got politicians involved.
You’ve got a whole lot of people who don’t really understand how the system works. And I would say you’ve had something less than a perfect communication between various people and the American public. So, the American public is probably as confused about banking as ever.
And that has consequences. And nobody knows what the consequences are because every event starts recreating a different dynamic. I mean, in physics you know that pie is going to be 3.14, you know, infinite number of numbers after that, but no matter what happens.
But you don’t know what has happened to the stickiness of deposits at all. It got changed by 2008. It’s gotten changed by this. And that changes everything. And so, we’re very cautious in a situation like that about ownership of banks. And we do remain with one bank holding, a deal, but we originated that deal with the Bank of America.
And I like Bank of America. I like the management. And I proposed the deal with them, so I stick with it. But do I know how to project out what’s going to happen from here? The answer is I don’t, because I’ve seen so many things in the last few months which really weren’t that unexpected to me to see.
But which reconfirmed my beliefs that the American public doesn’t understand our banking system, and some people in Congress perhaps don’t understand it any more than I don’t understand why the spaceships go up. I mean, there’s all kinds of things I don’t know about. But if you’re in Congress, you have to take a position on everything. And sometimes it’s to your advantage if you really understand it not to say exactly what you feel. And here we are. Charlie?
CHARLIE MUNGER: Well, a lot has happened in banking in my lifetime. I welcomed all that early banking of the deserving immigrants by the early Bank of America. And I think all the credit cards when they came in as original bank cards were a great contribution to civilization.
CHARLIE MUNGER: And but the gamier it gets and the more it looks like investment banking, the less I like it, as a citizen. I don’t want, I am always, I am deeply distrustful of situations in which everybody wants to get rich and envies everybody else. I regard that atmosphere as utterly toxic.
And to people who like one story, which this is, again, a true story, and I’m not naming the name, and it wasn’t Pete Jefferies, because he might fit this name, but it wasn’t Pete. But our hero, Gene Abegg, was going to have to retire at some point.
And so, we hired a future replacement. This is kind of a little bit of the problem I talked before, about having the perfect business, and now we’re going to bring in somebody. We actually bring in somebody who went to Central High with Charlie, although —
CHARLIE MUNGER: My class.
WARREN BUFFETT: Yeah. (LAUGH) And Charlie didn’t know I was picking out this guy. He wasn’t —
CHARLIE MUNGER: If he’d have asked me, we wouldn’t have hired him. (LAUGHTER)
WARREN BUFFETT: Well, if I asked you, I probably wouldn’t have hired anybody, but that’s another question. But this guy comes over, and perfectly decent guy, but presentable, you know, looks like a banker and everything. And, of course, the first thing he wants to do, we’ve got this wonderful bank, but we’ve got the crummiest looking building in Rockford.
And we don’t need a great building, we just need a great banker. And naturally this guy wants to build a new building. And because we were the most profitable bank, but we didn’t look like we were the most profitable (LAUGH) bank. So, I told him he could have any building he wanted, as long as it was not higher than, it had to be shorter than our nearest competitor.
And he lost interest totally. (LAUGH) He wanted to be on the top floor of the biggest building in town, and I told him he could horizontally do anything he wanted but he couldn’t do it vertically. And it taught me a lot about the guy’s motivations in life. But — and he didn’t end up running the bank anyway. Anyway, that’s all I know about banking and probably more.
Section 3 翻譯：
3. 除了美國銀行，波克夏謹慎對待銀行股票
華倫·巴菲特：好了，貝基？
貝基：這個問題來自德維斯·漢斯，他來自德克薩斯州休斯頓。他寫道：“在矽谷銀行的事件之後，您如何看待大型銀行和地區銀行的商業模式？隱含的保證所有銀行存款如何影響大型銀行和地區銀行？”
華倫·巴菲特：是的。我可以說這樣一句話。如果你遵循健康的銀行經營方法，也就是不做其他人做的一些事情，銀行可以成為一個非常不錯的投資。事實上，查理和我，實際上是我在1969年，我們在波克夏買了一家銀行。
我們在那家銀行投資了1900萬美元。我認為我們在保險公司投資了1700萬美元。如果1970年的銀行控股公司法案沒有通過，我們可能最終會擁有很多銀行而不是很多保險公司。
我們正在考慮購買更多的銀行，哈利·基夫（Harry Keefe）帶著我們四處考察芝加哥。還有其他事情我們可以做。然後，突然間，他們通過了1970年的銀行控股公司法案，我們必須在十年內剝離那家銀行，我們做到了 —
查理·蒙格：順便說一下，它從來沒有壞賬。
華倫·巴菲特：噢，它 —
查理·蒙格：它從來沒有不必要的成本。它只賺錢而沒有風險。它從未對政府構成任何存款保險風險。
華倫·巴菲特：零。
查理·蒙格：它是一個可愛的、穩健的、有建設性的機構在這個社區。任何一個值得獲得貸款的人都能獲得信貸。
華倫·巴菲特：是的，我們本來要買更多的銀行。
查理·蒙格：我們被迫退出。
華倫·巴菲特：我們本來要買更多的銀行。如果我們買了更多的銀行，我們可能不會擴大保險業務。但是，你知道的，法律發生了變化，所以我們進行了剝離，我們在保險方面做得不錯。但是銀行對我們來說更具吸引力。規模更大，有更多可以購買的目標。
而且，你可以經營一個完全健康的銀行，沒有可轉讓的存款憑證。所有這些事情，所有之後出現的發明，即使到今天你仍然可以經營它們並且可以賺到很好的錢。非常好的錢。我們本來會找到更多的銀行。但是我們無法這樣做。
在過去的幾個月裡，我們賣掉了銀行股票，首先是在疫情爆發時，然後在過去六個月裡又賣掉了一些。我們不知道大銀行的股東，無論是大型銀行還是地區銀行，或者任何銀行的股東，現在的前景在哪裡。
我有自己的個人資金，我可能超過了FDIC的限制，我把它存在一家當地銀行。而且我想，我一點也不擔心。但是就擁有銀行而言，事件將決定它們的未來。而且你有政客參與其中。
有許多人實際上並不真正瞭解系統如何運作。我可以說，在各方面的溝通上，沒有達到完美。因此，美國公眾對銀行業的認識可能與以往一樣混亂。
這就產生了一些後果。而且誰也不知道這些後果是什麼，因為每一個事件都在重塑著不同的動態。在物理學中，你知道圓周率將是3.14，之後是無限的數字，無論發生什麼。
但你不知道存款的穩定性發生了什麼變化。它在2008年發生了變化，它又因此次情況而發生了變化。這一切都發生了改變。所以，在這種情況下，我們對銀行所有權非常謹慎。我們確實保留了一家銀行控股公司的股權交易，但是我們最初是與美國銀行進行的交易。
我喜歡美國銀行，我喜歡他們的管理層。我向他們提出了這筆交易，所以我堅持這個交易。但我是否知道如何預測從這裡發生的事情？答案是我不知道，因為在過去的幾個月裡，我見證了很多事情，這些事情對我來說並不意外。
但這些事情再次證實了我的看法，即美國公眾不理解我們的銀行系統，某些國會議員也許對此一無所知，就像我不明白為什麼太空船會飛一樣。我的意思是，有很多事情我不懂。但如果你在國會中，你必須對所有事情表態。有時，如果你真的理解情況，不說出你真正的感受可能對你更有利。而我們現在就是這樣。查理？
查理·蒙格：在我的一生中，銀行業發生了很多變化。我歡迎早期美國銀行對應得上的移民進行的所有銀行業務。我認為當信用卡最初作為銀行卡面世時，對文明作出了巨大貢獻。
查理·蒙格：但它變得更加危險，看起來更像投資銀行，我就越不喜歡它，作為一個公民。我總是對每個人都想變得富有並羡慕別人的情況深感不安。我認為那種氛圍完全是有害的。
還有一個故事，這是一個真實的故事，我不會透露姓名，因為它不是彼特·傑佛瑞斯，因為他可能符合這個名字，但不是彼特。但是我們的英雄，吉恩·阿貝格（Gene Abegg）在某個時候不得不退休。
因此，我們雇傭了一個未來的替代者。這有點像我之前談到的問題，擁有完美的企業，現在我們要引入某個人。我們實際上請了一個和查理一起上中學的人，儘管 —
查理·蒙格：和我是同班同學。
華倫·巴菲特：是的。（笑）而且查理並不知道我選擇了這個人。他並不 —
查理·蒙格：如果他問過我，我們就不會雇傭他。（笑）
華倫·巴菲特：嗯，如果我問你的話，我可能不會雇傭任何人，但這是另外一個問題。但是這個人過來了，完全是個像樣的傢伙，看起來像個銀行家。當然，他想做的第一件事，我們有這麼一家很棒的銀行，但是我們在羅克福德有著最破舊的大樓。
我們不需要一座豪華的大樓，我們只需要一位優秀的銀行家。當然，這個人想要建一座新大樓。因為我們是最賺錢的銀行，但我們看起來卻不是最賺錢的銀行。（笑）所以，我告訴他他可以建任何他想要的建築，只要它不比我們最近的競爭對手高。
他完全失去了興趣。（笑）他想要在城裡最高的建築的頂樓，我告訴他他可以橫向做任何他想做的事情，但他不能縱向做。這教會了我很多關於這個人生活動力的東西。但是 — 他最後也沒有掌管銀行。無論如何，這就是我對銀行的瞭解，也許更多一些。
Section 3 摘要：
在第三部分的會議中，華倫·巴菲特談到了他對大型銀行和地區銀行的業務模式的看法，並討論了對所有銀行存款的隱含擔保對大型銀行和地區銀行的影響。
巴菲特表示，如果銀行遵循健康的銀行方法，即不做一些其他人做的事情，銀行可以成為一個完全體面的投資。他提到他們在1969年買下一家銀行，並強調了銀行業務的吸引力和潛力。然而，由於1970年的銀行控股公司法案，他們不得不在十年內剝離該銀行。
對於大型銀行和地區銀行的股東而言，目前的形勢仍不確定。巴菲特談到了他對銀行業的謹慎態度，並表示對銀行的擁有將取決於事件的發展，政治家和公眾對銀行業的理解仍然存在困惑。他認為溝通不暢可能導致負面後果，而且每個事件都會創造出不同的動態。
在這種情況下，巴菲特對銀行股的持有非常謹慎，除了與美國銀行的一宗交易外。他肯定了自己對美國銀行管理層的喜愛，並強調了他對該交易的支援。然而，他承認無法預測未來會發生什麼，因為他在過去幾個月中看到了許多事情，這些事情並不出乎他的意料，但卻再次證實了美國公眾對銀行業的認識不足，甚至有些國會成員可能對其瞭解不多。
總體而言，本節會議強調了對銀行業務模式的討論，以及巴菲特對銀行股的謹慎態度和對銀行業未來走向的不確定性的看法。
Section 4 原文：
4. It is ‘madness to keep printing money’
WARREN BUFFETT: Station three?
AUDIENCE MEMBER: Mr. Buffett and Mr. Munger, hi.
WARREN BUFFETT: Hi.
AUDIENCE MEMBER: My name is Daphne. I’m 13 years old, and this is my sixth annual Berkshire Hathaway Shareholder’s Meeting. (APPLAUSE) And I’ve had the privilege to ask you both questions in years past.
My question for you today is the following. As you know, the U.S. national debt is currently at an estimated $31 trillion, making up about 125% of the U.S. GDP.
In the meantime, over the past few years, the Federal Reserve has telegraphed that they intend to monetize the debt by printing trillions of dollars, even as they insist that they’re fighting inflation. Already other major economies in the world, such as China, Saudi Arabia, and Brazil are moving away from the dollar in anticipation of this.
My question is are we likely to face a time in the future when the U.S. dollar is no longer the global reserve currency? How is Berkshire prepared for this possibility? And what can we do as American citizens to attempt to shelter ourselves from what’s beginning to look like the beginnings of de-dollarization?
WARREN BUFFETT: Well, (APPLAUSE) I should ask you to come up here and answer some questions. I mean, (LAUGHTER) maybe. It’s very interesting, I mean, we are the reserve currency. I see no option for any other currency to be the reserve currency. And I think that nobody understands the situation better than Jay Powell.
And but he’s not in control of fiscal policy, and every now and then he drops a few hints. And there was no question that when the pandemic broke out, I mean, it was a semi-war-like situation. But nobody knows how far you can go with a paper currency before it gets out of control.
If, and particularly if you’re the world’s reserve currency, nobody knows the answer to that. And you don’t want to try and pick out the point at where it does become a problem, because then it’s all over. And I think we should be very careful.
I mean, you know, we all learned Keynesianism and we applied it in World War II to the advantage of the country, and we did everything we could to prevent inflation during the war. And then the war ended in August of ’45 and I think in January of ’46, and I’m not giving you exact figures at all now, but in January of ’46 I think the rate of inflation was at, you know, something like 1% or thereabouts.
And by the end of the year, I think it was at, like, 15%. And again, I’m doing this from long memories. But it’s easy for America to do it a lot, but if we do too much it’s very hard to see how you recover once you let the genie out of the bottle.
And people lose faith in the currency. And they behave in an entirely different manner than they do when they feel that if they put some money in the bank or have a pension plan, or whatever it may be, that they’re going to get to have something with roughly equal purchasing power.
And it just changes the (UNINTEL). And all kinds of things can happen then. And I can’t predict them and nobody else can predict them. But I do know they aren’t good. And we will see, and I do this as, you know, I’ve voted for both parties. And it’s not limited to politicians of either party or anything of the sort.
But people take positions, some of them understand what they’re doing, some of them don’t understand what they’re doing. And, you know, if they put me on some medical board, I don’t understand what I’m doing. You know, there’s nothing wrong with the fact that you can’t master everything.
We can’t all be Isaac Newton. But you can’t go around pretending you do or making decisions on it. And we are not as well off in relation to curbing inflation expectations, which become self-fulfilling, then we are not as well off as we were earlier.
And Berkshire is better prepared than most investments for that kind of a period. And, I mean, I said this in the annual report, but we aren’t perfectly prepared, because there’s no way to perfectly prepare. You don’t know what course of action will occur.
And it’s a very political decision now. It’s a tribal decision to some degree. And you hope for leadership that actually will do something, recognizes the problem. And America’s an incredible society, rich, you know? We’ve got everything going for us. But that doesn’t mean we can just print money indefinitely as debt. And it’ll be interesting to see how it turns out. Charlie?
CHARLIE MUNGER: Well, at some point printing money to buy votes will be counterproductive.
WARREN BUFFETT: Yup.
CHARLIE MUNGER: And we don’t know (APPLAUSE) exactly where that comes. And if something is going to be dangerous and unproductive, you ought to keep it a fair distance away. Now, if you have a culture that is exceptionally strong, like Japan, they have done some strange things there.
WARREN BUFFETT: But they couldn’t have been a reserve currency.
CHARLIE MUNGER: No, of course not. And, but Japan bought back most of the national debt and most of the, a lot of the common stocks and debt. Just the federal reserve owns practically everything in Japan, and the country’s working. It’s had 30 years of economic stasis, but it’s not going to hell. I really admire Japan. And, but I don’t think we should try and imitate it. I don’t think we’re as good as Japan at taking —
WARREN BUFFETT: They have a cohesive culture, and we don’t, Charlie. We —
CHARLIE MUNGER: Yeah, that’s exactly right.
WARREN BUFFETT: Yeah.
CHARLIE MUNGER: In Japan, everybody’s supposed to suck it up and cope, and in America we complain. (LAUGHTER)
WARREN BUFFETT: So, I hope you come next year with a tougher question. (LAUGHTER) But — and thank you.
And I predict, I would love to be being born again today in the United States. I mean, we can do a lot of dumb things and get away with it. We can’t do an unlimited number.
There are people who care about that. And, you know, you have to be willing to be extraordinarily unpopular. I mean, Paul Volcker, there are other Federal Reserve chairpeople that would not have done what he did. It’s just, it’s too uncomfortable.
And there used to be a politician in Nebraska, and if you asked him some really tough question like, you know, how do you stand on abortion, he would look you right in the eye and he’d say, “I’m all right on that one.” And then he’d move next.
Well, that’s what people have done basically on inflation. And they, one way or another, they say, “I’m all right on that,” and then they don’t really think about what the consequences of their actions could be, particularly. And it’s so much fun to, if there’s 435 of you, to just be one of 435 instead of being the person actually responsible.
Anyway, I am still, next to the question of two superpowers and when you get in to really destroying a planet, destroying the reserve currency of the world when there’s really no substitute, and forget about all the toys, you know, I mean, it’s a joke to think of any tokens or (LAUGH) that sort of madness.
But it’s also madness to just keep printing money, yeah. And we know how to do it, and we actually came from a money-printing economy in World War II, which was required. And we suffered significant inflation, the price level — I mean, there’s a million ways to judge it — but it’s maybe ten times what it was then or something like that.
Well, that’s getting close to the edge of where you don’t want to hold dollars anymore, you want to hold something else. You want to hold real estate; you want to hold interest in a business. There’s a lot of good, and your best defense is your own earning power.
If you’re the best doctor in town, if you’re the best lawyer in town, if you’re the best teacher in town, or even if you’re the tenth best, you’re going to make a good living. You know, the economy is productive. And you will succeed with your talents. But you won’t succeed by hoarding dollars, you’ll just succeed by the fact that your value to the community, which is a rich community overall, is sustained. And so the best investment is always in yourself. That’s the answer I would give you.
CHARLIE MUNGER: Well, we have a situation where we’ve learned to print money in gobs, and a big chunk of our young people go right into wealth management. (LAUGHTER) This is —
WARREN BUFFETT: Like we did. (LAUGH)
CHARLIE MUNGER: Yeah, like we did, like we did. Yes, we’re bad examples.
And I want to say that I didn’t realize wealth management was going to get so big when I went into it. And I want to apologize for what’s happened. (LAUGHTER)
WARREN BUFFETT: Yeah, well. Anyway, you did well. (LAUGH)
Section 4 翻譯：
4. 印鈔造成通脹是「瘋狂的」
WARREN BUFFETT：第三站？
聽眾：巴菲特先生和蒙格先生，你們好。
WARREN BUFFETT：嗨。
聽眾：我叫Daphne，今年13歲，這是我第六次參加Berkshire Hathaway的股東大會（掌聲）。在過去幾年裡，聯邦儲備系統一直暗示他們打算以印刷數萬億美元的方式貨幣化債務，即使他們堅稱他們正在抗擊通脹。而其他主要經濟體，如中國、沙烏地阿拉伯和巴西，已經在預見這一點，正在遠離美元。
我的問題是，我們是否有可能在未來面臨美元不再是全球儲備貨幣的時刻？波克夏對這種可能性有何準備？作為美國公民，我們該如何避免開始出現的去美元化現象？
WARREN BUFFETT：嗯（掌聲），我應該叫你上來回答一些問題。我是說（笑聲），也許。這很有趣，我們是儲備貨幣。我認為沒有其他貨幣能取代美元成為儲備貨幣。沒有人比Jay Powell更瞭解這種情況。
但他無法控制財政政策，有時他會透露一些資訊。毫無疑問，當疫情爆發時，這是一種類似戰爭的情況。但沒有人知道紙幣貨幣能走多遠，就在你失去控制之前。特別是如果你是世界的儲備貨幣，沒人知道答案。你不希望試圖挑出它成為問題的那一點，因為那樣一切都完了。我認為我們應該非常小心。
我是說，你知道，我們都學過凱恩斯主義，並在二戰中將其應用於國家的利益，我們在戰爭期間竭盡所能防止通脹。然後戰爭在1945年8月結束，我想是在1946年1月（我現在不給你確切數字），但我想通脹率大約是1%左右。
到年底時，我想通脹率大約達到了15%。再次說明，這是來自長久的記憶。但是美國很容易做這樣的事情，但如果我們做得太多，就很難看到當你讓精靈從瓶子裡逃出來後，如何恢復。
人們對貨幣失去信心，他們的行為方式會完全改變，他們覺得如果他們把錢存入銀行或擁有養老金計劃，或者其他任何東西，他們將獲得大致相等的購買力。
這改變了（無法理解）。然後可能發生各種事情。我不能預測它們，別人也不能預測。但我確實知道它們不是好事。我們將會看到，我這麼說並不是作為，你知道，我投了兩黨的票。這並不局限於任何一方的政客或其他任何類似的情況。
但人們採取立場，其中一些人知道自己在做什麼，一些人不知道自己在做什麼。你知道，如果他們讓我加入某個醫學委員會，我不知道自己在做什麼。你知道，你不能掌握一切沒有問題。
我們不可能都成為艾薩克·牛頓。但你不能四處裝作你知道，或者根據它做出決策。在控制通脹預期方面，我們並不如以前那麼好。這些預期是自我實現的。波克夏比大多數投資更有準備應對這種時期。我在年報中說過這一點，但我們並不是完全準備就緒，因為沒有辦法完全準備就緒。你不知道將採取什麼行動。
蒙格表示，在某個時候，為了購買選票而印鈔將產生反效果。
WARREN BUFFETT：是的。
蒙格：我們不知道（掌聲）具體出現的位置。如果某件事危險且無效，你應該保持一段相當的距離。現在，如果你有一個非常強大的文化，像日本一樣，他們在那裡做了一些奇怪的事情。
WARREN BUFFETT：但他們不可能成為儲備貨幣。
蒙格：當然不可能。但是日本買回了大部分國債和許多普通股和債務。日本的央行幾乎擁有該國的一切，但該國正在運作。它經歷了30年的經濟停滯，但不會崩潰。我真的很欽佩日本。但我不認為我們應該試圖模仿它。我不認為我們在吸收這方面像日本那樣擅長。
WARREN BUFFETT：他們有一個凝聚力強大的文化，而我們沒有，Charlie。我們——
蒙格：是的，完全正確。
WARREN BUFFETT：是的。
蒙格：在日本，每個人都應該忍受並應對，而在美國，我們抱怨（笑聲）。
WARREN BUFFETT：所以，我希望你明年問一個更困難的問題（笑聲）。謝謝你。
我預測，我很樂意在今天再次在美國出生。我的意思是，我們可以做很多愚蠢的事情並逃脫處罰。但我們不能無限制地印鈔貨幣化債務。看看最終會出現什麼樣的結果將是有趣的。Charlie？
蒙格：我們的情況是，我們學會了大量印鈔，而我們的許多年輕人直接從事財富管理工作（笑聲）。這是——
WARREN BUFFETT：就像我們一樣（笑聲）。
蒙格：是的，就像我們一樣，是的，我們是不好的榜樣。
我想說的是，當我進入這個行業時，我沒有意識到財富管理會變得如此重要。對於發生的事情，我感到抱歉（笑聲）。
WARREN BUFFETT：是的，不管怎樣，你做得很好（笑聲）。
Section 4 摘要：
在第四部分的股東會議中，Warren Buffett和Charlie Munger回答了一位13歲股東的問題，詢問美國國債高企、聯準會不斷印鈔以及可能面臨的全球儲備貨幣地位轉變的問題。Warren Buffett表示他認為美元仍然是全球儲備貨幣，並且認為沒有其他貨幣能夠取代美元。然而，他也強調目前無法確定紙幣貨幣能夠承受多大程度的印鈔而不失控，特別是作為全球儲備貨幣。他警告稱印鈔過度可能導致人們對貨幣失去信心，改變行為方式，並引發不良後果。Warren Buffett強調應該謹慎對待印鈔，並表示自己個人資金大多存在於當地銀行，並不擔心貨幣問題。Charlie Munger則表示，過度印鈔可能會變得危險和無效，並建議保持距離。他提到日本的情況，並指出日本的狀況與美國不同，日本的文化更具凝聚力。Warren Buffett最後強調最好的投資是投資於自己的能力，並表示自己對美國的信心，但也強調不能無限制地印鈔貨幣化債務，並期待未來的發展。整體來說，他們呼籲謹慎對待印鈔和貨幣政策，並警告可能出現的後果。
Section 5 原文：
5. Buffet would have preferred to buy more of Pilot earlier, but it wasn’t for sale
WARREN BUFFETT: Becky?
BECKY QUICK: This question comes from Gary Gambino in Parma, Ohio, who says he’s been a Berkshire shareholder since 2004.
He says, “The amount paid this year for the 41.4% stake in Pilot values the entire company at around $19 billion. That’s about six times what BP is paying for Travel Centers of America, but Pilot’s market share is just three times Travel Centers of America’s.
“Was it a big mistake to base the final price in 2022 earnings, which has unusually high fuel margins?”
WARREN BUFFETT: Yeah. Well, that’s a very good question. And the answer is that we arranged to buy it in three stages, with the third stage being at the option of the owner of 20%. The first stage we bought at what turned out to be a very attractive price. The second stage turned out to be a very good year for the diesel business, which means that the seller got a very good price.
And I would say that overall, we feel very good about the fact that we own the 80% at the price that we do, but we would’ve been better if we just bought the 80% to start with. And the last 20% the seller has the option, and that’s always an unintelligent way of structuring something.
We’ve had that arrangement with other, well, we had it with the Furniture Mart, we bought 80% of the [Nebraska] Furniture Mart on August 30th, 1983, almost 40 years ago, and it’s worked out perfectly. But when you give the other person the option, they’ve got some advantage.
We have 80% now of a business we like very much, and the comparison to Travel America is really spurious, because Travel America is not only much smaller, but they rent all their properties. And we have hundreds and hundreds of locations on the interstate that are zoned for what we, commercial, maybe 15 acres or, there’s nothing like it.
And they’re not going to move the interstate two miles to the right or something, you know, or anything of the sort. So, we’ve got a position that, you know, BP may or may not have made a fine deal. I’ve read the prospectus and I can understand.
I mean, it’s a big source of output for BP. But I like the management we have had at Pilot. I like very much the fellow who’s coming in that’s the new CEO. I just have to tell you a little bit about Adam Wright, who’s taking that job on. He came from Omaha.
He wasn’t selected because he came from Omaha. He came from Omaha. He came from North High, a public school that my wife graduated from. I’ve got grandchildren that graduated from there. He went to the University of Nebraska and almost set the rushing record in football, which will never be beaten because they’ve given up football, but I think he rushed for maybe (LAUGHTER) 3,600 yards.
He held three jobs while he went through there. He interned at MidAmerica 20 years ago, his mother worked to put him through school. I mean, it’s just, it’s Horatio Alger-squared. And we have him to manage Pilot. And the Haslams have given us a wonderful business, “Big Jim,” and now he (UNINTEL) great people. And here we are.
And I’m very glad we own Pilot, I just wish we bought 100% (LAUGH) of it when I first made the deal, but that was not the deal that was offered to us —
CHARLIE MUNGER: Warren, it wasn’t for sale.
WARREN BUFFETT: It wasn’t for sale. Yeah. And the last 20% of the Furniture Mart wasn’t for sale when we bought it, so we bought 80% of it. And that’s worked out well. And we’ve done various deals various ways. The best way to do it is just write people the check and get the stock.
But we did that with TTI, but you can’t always make the same deal. If we like the business well enough and the people well enough, we will tailor it differently, but our preference is to write a check and own the whole place and keep the management in place. Charlie, anything to add on?
CHARLIE MUNGER: No.
WARREN BUFFETT: Yeah. It’s really wonderful to watch something like Adam Wright work out. I mean, basically, you know, I don’t know what his mother was earning, but he went to North High, which is probably four or five miles from here. Public school graduate. And worked his way up.
Went through a short period at Pacific Gas and Electric, and we brought him home there on Pilot. And Pilot, well, Pilot, the prices on diesel were way different last year. Pilot was close to $80 billion of sales last year, but more normal prices this, it’s significant, you know, it’s half that or thereabouts, maybe a little more.
But he is, I don’t know how old Adam would be, but he’s in his 40s. And he came up through the organization that Greg Abel was involved with. And now here he is, running a very major business. It’s good at Berkshire to be able to do that. And I don’t, you know, somebody else may have gone to more prestigious business schools, and I think so what? You know, we’ve seen what Adam can do.
Section 5 翻譯：
5. 巴菲特本來更希望早些時候就能買下更多的Pilot公司，但那時候它並不出售。
WARREN BUFFETT: Becky?
BECKY QUICK：這個問題來自俄亥俄州帕瑪的Gary Gambino，他表示自2004年以來一直是波克夏的股東。
他說：“今年以41.4％的股權支付的金額將整個公司的價值定為約190億美元。這是BP支付Travel Centers of America價格的6倍，但是Pilot的市場份額僅為Travel Centers of America的3倍。
“基於2022年的盈利來確定最終價格是一個大錯，當時燃料利潤異常高嗎？”
WARREN BUFFETT：是的，這是一個非常好的問題。答案是我們安排以三個階段購買，第三個階段由20％的所有者選擇。第一階段的價格事實上非常具吸引力。第二階段是柴油業務的一個非常好的年份，這意味著賣方獲得了很好的價格。
總的來說，我們對以目前價格擁有80％的股權感到非常滿意，但如果我們一開始就買下了80％，情況可能會更好。最後的20％由賣方選擇，這種結構方式並不明智。
我們在與其他企業的交易中也有類似的安排，例如Furniture Mart，我們在近40年前的1983年8月30日購買了其80％的股權，結果非常成功。但是，當你給予對方選擇的權利時，他們就佔有一些優勢。
我們現在擁有了一個非常喜歡的業務的80％，將其與Travel America進行比較是不合適的，因為Travel America不僅規模小得多，而且他們租賃所有物業。我們在高速公路上有數百個位置，這些位置都是商業區域，沒有任何可以取代的。所以我們擁有了一個很好的地位。
BP可能做了一筆不錯的交易，我讀過招股書，我能理解，這對於BP來說是一個重要的收入來源。但我很喜歡Pilot的管理團隊，我對即將上任的新CEO Adam Wright非常滿意。讓我向大家介紹一下Adam Wright，他將接任該職位。他來自奧馬哈。
他之所以被選中不是因為他來自奧馬哈，而是他確實來自奧馬哈。他畢業於North High，那是我妻子畢業的一所公立學校。我的孫子也從那裡畢業。他去了內布拉斯加大學，幾乎創下了足球衝刺紀錄，這個紀錄永遠不會被打破，因為他們已經放棄了足球，但我想他衝了大概3600碼。
他在上學期間還做了三份工作。他20年前在MidAmerica實習，他的母親為他付學費。這是個出人頭地的故事。Haslam一家給我們帶來了一個了不起的業務，"Big Jim"，現在他（不確定）了一些了不起的人。我很高興我們擁有Pilot，我只是希望一開始就買下了100％（笑）。但那不是他們提供給我們的交易方式。
CHARLIE MUNGER：華倫，那時它不是出售的。
WARREN BUFFETT：它不是出售的。是的。當我們購買Furniture Mart時，最後的20％也不是出售的，所以我們只買下了80％。結果很好。我們以不同的方式進行過各種交易。最好的方法是寫支票並擁有全部股權，同時保留管理團隊。但我們在TTI的交易中就是這樣做的，但你不能總是做同樣的交易。如果我們非常喜歡這個業務和這些人，我們會進行不同的調整，但我們的首選是寫支票並擁有整個企業，並保留管理團隊。Charlie，你有什麼要補充的嗎？
CHARLIE MUNGER：沒有。
WARREN BUFFETT：是的。看到Adam Wright這樣的人物真是太棒了。基本上，你知道，我不知道他的母親賺了多少錢，但他在North High上學，那裡可能離這裡有四五英里。他是一所公立學校的畢業生。他自力更生。
他在Pacific Gas and Electric工作了一段時間，我們在Pilot公司找到了他。Pilot去年的柴油價格差異很大。Pilot去年的銷售額接近800億美元，但今年價格更為正常，大約是那個數字的一半，或者更多一點。但他還年輕，可能40多歲，他在Greg Abel所涉及的組織中崛起。現在他在經營一家非常重要的企業。在Berkshire，我們能夠做到這一點真是太好了。我不知道其他人是否曾就讀於更有聲望的商學院，我想，那又如何呢？我們見證了Adam的能力。
Section 5 摘要：
在第五節中，Gary Gambino來自俄亥俄州的Parma，他問了一個關於Pilot公司收購的問題。Warren Buffett解釋了Pilot公司的收購過程，指出他們分三個階段購買，最後20％的購買權掌握在業主手中。他提到第二階段的收購在柴油業務上取得了很好的成果，但他們本來希望一開始就購買100％的股權。然而，Buffett表示他們仍然對以目前的價格擁有80％的股權感到滿意。
此外，Buffett回應了比較Pilot和Travel Centers of America的問題，指出兩者在規模和經營模式上存在很大差異，並解釋了Pilot在高速公路上擁有大量地點的優勢。他對Pilot的管理團隊以及即將上任的新CEO Adam Wright表示讚揚，提到他的背景和成就。
最後，Buffett強調了他對Pilot的滿意，但也表示希望一開始就買下全部股權。他提到過去他們曾以類似的方式購買其他公司的80％股權，並表示Berkshire在進行交易時的偏好是直接支付買價，並保留原管理團隊。
總體而言，本節重點在於Pilot公司的收購過程和相關交易安排，以及對該公司管理團隊和未來展望的評價。
參考資料：
沒有留言:
張貼留言