本篇文章收錄2023年Berkshire Hathaway股東會上午場第1~5節原文(上半場總共32小節)、繁體中文翻譯、以及會議摘要，除了OT供自己學習外，也分享給有興趣的朋友們。
1. Berkshire’s own ‘King Charles’
2. Directors introduced
3. The woman who organized the whole thing
4. Most Berkshire businesses will report lower earnings next year
5. Failure to guarantee Silicon Valley Bank’s deposits would have been ‘catastrophic’
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Section 1 原文：
1. Berkshire’s own ‘King Charles’
WARREN BUFFETT: Good morning, good morning. And thanks for coming. Omaha loves it, I love it, Charlie loves it. We’re glad to have you here.
We’re going to make this preliminary, before the questions, very short because we want to get in at least 60 questions, half divided by the audience outside this arena and half from you.
So, I would just like to get right to the directors and the earnings that have been put up on a web page this morning, but we’ll cover those very fast and then we’ll get to the questions. Now, when I woke up this morning, I realized that we had a competitive broadcast going out somewhere in the UK.
And (Laughter) they were celebrating a King Charles, and we’ve got our own King Charles here today. (APPLAUSE AND CHEERING)
And next to him we have Greg Abel, who’s in charge of all the operations except for insurance. (Applause)
And next to Greg, we have a man I ran into in 1986 and has made us look good ever since. We have the man in charge of insurance, Ajit Jain. Ajit? (Applause and cheering)
Section 1 翻譯：
1. 波克夏的“查理斯國王”
華倫·巴菲特：早上好，早上好。感謝大家的到來。奧馬哈熱愛這個活動，我也熱愛，查理也熱愛。我們很高興能在這裡見到你們。
在問題環節開始之前，我們將把這個預備階段儘量縮短，因為我們希望至少回答60個問題，一半來自這個體育館外的觀眾，另一半來自你們。
所以，我想先迅速討論一下董事會和今天早上發佈的收益報告，然後我們就能進入問題環節了。當我今天早上醒來時，我意識到我們在英國某個地方正在進行一場競爭性的廣播。
（笑聲）他們正在慶祝查理斯國王，而我們今天這裡有我們自己的“查理斯國王”。（掌聲和歡呼聲）
緊挨著他的是格雷格·阿貝爾，他負責除保險之外的所有運營工作。（掌聲）
再下面，是我在1986年遇見的一位，從那時起一直給我們帶來好運的人。我們有負責保險業務的阿吉特·賈恩。阿吉特？（掌聲和歡呼聲）
Section 2 原文：
2. Directors introduced
WARREN BUFFETT: And now we have our directors here in front. And if they would just stand briefly and then I’ll go onto the next one, and they’re all here today.
First of all, doing it alphabetically, there’s Howard Buffett, (Applause). There’s Susie Buffett, there’s Steve Burke, Ken Chenault, Chris Davis, Sue Decker, Charlotte Guyman, Tom Murphy Jr., Ron Olson, Wally Weitz, and Meryl Witmer.
That’s as good as you can get.
Section 2 翻譯：
2. 董事介紹
華倫·巴菲特：現在我們的董事們都在這裡。如果他們能簡單地站起來，然後我會繼續下一個，他們今天都在這裡。
首先，按字母順序，有霍華德·巴菲特（掌聲）。還有蘇茜·巴菲特、Steve Burke、Ken Chenault、 Chris Davis、Sue Decker、Charlotte Guyman、Tom Murphy Jr.、Ron Olson、Wally Weitz、Meryl Witmer。
這是最好的陣容了。
Section 3 原文：
3. The woman who organized the whole thing
WARREN BUFFETT: And there’s one other person I would like to mention before we get onto the earnings that were put in the press release this morning. Well, let’s see who we have here. We’ve got —
This is hard to believe. Can you imagine a name, Melissa Shapiro Shapiro? (Laugh) And she was Melissa Shapiro till she married another Shapiro, and she put this whole thing together with no help from me, no help from Charlie, (Applause) and a lot of help from the people in the other room. Melissa. (APPLAUSE and CHEERING)
Yeah, it’s very easy. If you can remember her second name, you can remember her third name. So, Melissa Shapiro Shapiro.
Section 3 翻譯：
3. 整個活動的組織者
華倫·巴菲特：在我們談論今天早上發佈的收益之前，還有一個人我想提一下。好，看看我們這裡有誰。我們有...
這真難以置信。你能想像一個名字，梅麗莎·夏皮羅·夏皮羅？（笑聲）她之前是梅麗莎·夏皮羅，後來嫁給另一個夏皮羅，她獨力將整個活動組織起來，沒有我的幫助，沒有查理的幫助（掌聲），卻得到了其他房間裡的人的大力支持。梅麗莎。（掌聲和歡呼聲）
是的，很容易。如果你能記住她的第二個名字，你就能記住她的第三個名字。所以，梅麗莎·夏皮羅·夏皮羅。
Section 1~3 會議摘要：
這些會議紀要主要涉及巴菲特股東大會的開場白和對董事以及主要組織者的介紹。
在第一段中，巴菲特向觀眾問候並表達對他們的感謝。他提到正在英國舉行一場關於「查爾斯王子」的競爭性廣播，並將自己的會議稱為「我們自己的查爾斯國王」，指的是董事會成員查爾斯·穆恩格（Charlie Munger）。他接著介紹了負責除保險業務外的所有業務的Greg Abel和負責保險業務的Ajit Jain。
第二段中，巴菲特介紹了董事會的成員，包括Howard Buffett、Susie Buffett、Steve Burke、Ken Chenault、Chris Davis、Sue Decker、Charlotte Guyman、Tom Murphy Jr.、Ron Olson、Wally Weitz和Meryl Witmer。
第三段中，巴菲特表揚了主要組織者Melissa Shapiro Shapiro，稱她獨自策劃了整個會議，並感謝其他工作人員的幫助。
巴菲特向觀眾問候並表達對他們的感謝，並把查理·蒙格被稱為「我們自己的查爾斯國王」；介紹了Greg Abel負責除保險業務外的所有業務，Ajit Jain負責保險業務，巴菲特也介紹了董事會的成員。Melissa Shapiro Shapiro被表揚為此會議主要組織者，沒有巴菲特和穆恩格的幫助。
Section 4 原文：
4. Most Berkshire businesses will report lower earnings next year
WARREN BUFFETT: And with that, I would like to next move onto the earnings and a couple small slides that explain what we’re all about, and then we’re going to get to Q&A. And the slide is up behind me, and there it is.
We reported in the first quarter operating earnings a little over $8 billion. And when we talk about operating earnings, we’re basically referring to the earnings of Berkshire Hathaway as required under GAAP, excluding however, capital gains both realized and unrealized.
There’s a few other very minor items, but basically, we expect to make capital gains over time. Why would we own the stocks otherwise? Doesn’t always work out, but overall, it works out pretty well over time. But in any day, any quarter, any year, even occasionally over a five-year period, the stock prices move around capriciously.
Now, we own a lot of other businesses. We consider those stocks businesses. We own a lot of other businesses where they get consolidated, and they don’t move around in value. Now, if we had a little bit of Burlington stock outstanding, if we had a little bit of the energy stock trading, those stocks would move around a lot.
But the businesses are what count. So, the operating earnings, as you’ll see in the first quarter, came it at about $8 billion. And I would say that in the general economy, the feedback we get is that, I would say, perhaps the majority of our businesses will actually report lower earnings this year than last year.
In various degrees in the last six months or so, at various times, the businesses have left the incredible period, which is about extraordinary as I’ve seen a business since World War II, which poured out a lot of money to people who couldn’t get goods.
It was more extreme in World War II, but this was extreme this time. And it was just a question of getting goods to deliver. And people bought, and they didn’t wait for sales. And if you couldn’t sell them one thing, they would put another thing in their backlog. It was an extraordinary period.
And that period has ended. As you know, it isn’t that employment has fallen off a cliff or anything, in the lest. But it is a different climate than it was six months ago. And a number of our managers were surprised. Some of them had too much inventory on order, and then all of a sudden it got delivered, and people weren’t in the same frame of mind as earlier.
And now we’ll start having sales at places where we didn’t need to have sales before. But despite the fact that this year I think in general will be slower than last year, we actually are situated so that I would expect, and believe me when I say expect, nothing is sure.
Nothing is sure tomorrow, nothing is sure next year, and nothing is ever sure, either in markets or in business forecasts, or in anything else. And we don’t pay much attention to markets or forecasts unless the markets happen to offer something interesting to do.
But nevertheless, we are positioned in two respects, as you’ll see from this first report. Our investment income is going to be a lot larger this year than last year. And that’s built. I mean, as you’ll see in a minute, we’ve had $125 billion or so in very short-term investments.
And believe it or not, not that long ago we were getting four basis points, which is next to nothing on that $125 billion, which means we were getting $50 million a year. And now the same money, just the day before yesterday, we actually bought because of some funny twist the market, because of doubts about the debt ceiling.
We bought $3 billion of bills at 5-90. That’s 5.92 bond equivalent yield. So, we will have what produced just not that long ago on a 12-month basis was producing $50 million a year, producing something in the area of $5 billion a year. So, we’re in a position where the investment income is certain to increase quite a bit.
And insurance underwriting does not correlate with business activity. It depends on things like hurricanes, and earthquakes, and other events. So, on a perspective basis, on a probability basis, we’re likely to have a better year this year in insurance underwriting than we had last year.
It just isn’t affected by what you might call the business cycle or what applies to generally in industry, retailing, you name it. So, I would expect in one massive earthquake or one hurricane that came in at just the wrong place could affect that prediction. But on a probabalistic basis, our insurance looks better this year.
So, if you get two of the elements there of our main elements of earnings that look like they will swing in our direction, I would expect, but I can’t promise, that our operating earnings will be greater than last year.
And if we’ll move to the second slide, I give you those operating earnings figures just to give you a overview of what has happened since the pandemic started, and also the year before as a base. And we retain all our earnings, as you know.
So, if we’re retaining $30 billion or $35 billion, or whatever it may be, a year, they should expect more operating earnings over time. I mean, this number should be significantly higher five, or ten, or 15 years from now because we have the advantage of retaining earnings, and that’s what got us to these figures because they were essentially nothing when we started.
And they got there by retaining earnings and will keep retaining earnings. So, it’s no great triumph if these numbers move up. And what we hope is that they move up at a reasonable rate. Historically, they moved up at an unreasonable rate sometimes.
But we were working with much smaller sums then, and that can’t be repeated with our present capital base. Because I note there — I believe it’s on this slide. Let’s take a look. No, that will be — let’s see, it’s on the — well, on the next place, page. Let’s move to the next slide. We show that we had on March 31st, now what was it, $504 billion of GAAP net worth.
Now, what might surprise you is that there’s no other company in the United States that has a number that is that large. Now, that isn’t because we have the most valuable company in the United States. Other companies have used their money to repurchase shares.
They could’ve accumulated $504 billion in GAAP. But basically, we have more under GAAP accounting now than any other company in the U.S. And of course, if you measure return on equity that becomes a very big number to increase at a rapid rate, but we hope to do so.
Not a rapid rate, a decent rate. And right below that, you see something called float. And float is money that is left in our hands somewhat akin, but very importantly different, than a bank deposit. But you have to pay interest to get a bank deposit.
And you have to pay more interest these days, and you have to run a bank and do a lot of things. And basically, this is money that represents unpaid losses at this time. You get paid in advance in insurance. So, what shows up as a net liability on our balance sheet gives us funds to exercise with an amount of discretion that no other insurance company that I know of in the world enjoys, just because we have so much net worth.
And our float now comes to $165 billion, and the man sitting at the far left is responsible for moving that number up from a pittance in 1986 to this incredible figure, which in most years, practically all years, hasn’t cost us anything. So, it’s like having a bank with no employees, no interest, and no ability to withdraw the money in a hurry that we have working for us.
And it’s a very valuable asset that shows up as a liability. And Ajit is responsible for building up this treasure, which has been done by out-competing insurance companies all over the world. And now, a number of our insurance companies, in turn, are run by talented managers who contributed one way or another.
Start with GEICO at the beginning of my career. And that float, if you think about it, just think of a balance sheet. You have liabilities here and you have assets over here, and the liability side finances the asset side. It’s very simple. And stockholders’ equity finances it, long-term debt finances it, and so on.
But stockholders’ equity is very expensive in a real sense. Long-term debt has been cheap for a while, but it can get expensive, and it can also become due eventually and it may not be available. But float is another item that’s a liability but hasn’t cost us anything.
And it can’t disappear in a hurry. And it finances the asset side in the same way as stockholders’ equity. And nobody else thinks of it much that way, but we’ve always thought of it that way, and it’s a build up over time. So, I show at the bottom what’s happened with cash and Treasury bills through March 31st.
And I will tell you that in the month of April, we’ve probably added about $7 billion to that factor. Now, part of that is because we didn’t buy as much stock, because that reduces cash and Treasury bills. We bought about $400 million worth of stock in the month of April.
That’s a minus in terms of cash available. And we, however, sold, net, some stock, which produced maybe $4 billion. And of course, we had operating earnings, probably $2.5 billion or something in that area. And my guess is we probably increased our cash and Treasury bills $6 billion and $7 billion in the month.
And I just want to give you a feel for how the cash flows at Berkshire. And then if we move to the final — I think it’s the final one. We should have the one up there, Class A equivalent shares outstanding. And you’ll notice that every year the number of our shares go down.
So, if we own more businesses, and the businesses make more money, your share as shareholders at Berkshire increases every year without you laying out any money. Now you’re laying out the alternative which you could receive in dividends. But the reason we’ve gotten to where we are is because we kept the money.
We did pay a dividend in 1967, $0.10 a share. It was a terrible mistake. (Laugh) And I always tell people that I’d for the men’s room and the directors voted while I was gone. But that isn’t true. I was there, I confess. (Laugh) But we’ve reinvested, and it’s produced the $500 billion plus of shareholders’ equity and the $30 billion plus of operating earnings.
And we’ll continue to follow that policy because it makes a great deal of sense. And with that, I think we’ve taken care of the preliminaries. The 10-Q is on the web page. And if you have a week or two vacation, you could spend it reading the 10-Q.
But that is the essence of Berkshire.
Section 4 翻譯：
4. 大多數波克夏的企業將在明年報告較低的盈利
華倫·巴菲特：在此之後，我想轉向盈利方面，以及幾張簡單的幻燈片，解釋我們的基本情況，然後我們將進入問答環節。幻燈片就在我後面，就在那裡。
我們在第一季度報告的營運收益略高於80億美元。當我們談到營運收益時，基本上是指Berkshire Hathaway根據GAAP（美國公認會計原則）的要求，不包括實現和未實現的資本利得。
還有一些其他非常小的項目，但基本上，我們希望隨著時間的推移獲得資本利得。否則我們為什麼要持有股票呢？這並不總是能實現，但總體而言，長期來看效果還是相當不錯的。但無論是在任何一天、任何一個季度、任何一年，甚至偶爾在五年期內，股價都會隨意波動。
現在，我們擁有許多其他業務。我們將這些股票視為業務。我們擁有許多其他業務，它們會被合併，並且其價值不會波動。如果我們持有少量的Burlington股票，如果我們交易少量的能源股票，那些股票將會有很大的波動。
但業務才是最重要的。所以，正如你們在第一季度看到的，營運收益約為80億美元。而根據我們所獲得的回饋，在整體經濟方面，我們的多數業務今年的盈利可能會比去年下降。
在過去的六個月左右的不同程度上，不同的時間，企業已經離開了這段令人難以置信的時期，這是我自二戰以來所見過的一個非常特殊的時期，它向那些無法獲得商品的人們提供了大量資金。
雖然二戰時更加極端，但這次的情況也是極端的。只是一個問題，就是如何獲得商品供應。人們購買了商品，而且他們不等待打折。如果你賣不出一種商品，他們會把另一種商品放在待發貨列表中。這是一個非凡的時期。
而這個時期已經結束了。正如你們所知道的，這不是就業驟降或其他什麼的問題。但現在的氛圍與六個月前不同。一些我們的經理們感到驚訝。他們中的一些人訂了太多的庫存，突然之間貨物就到了，而人們的心態與之前不同。
現在，我們將在以前不需要進行銷售的地方開始進行銷售。儘管我認為今年的經濟增長整體上可能比去年慢，但我們實際上處於這樣的情況，我預計（相信我所說的）這一點，但沒有什麼是確定的。
明天沒有什麼是確定的，明年也沒有什麼是確定的，事實上，無論是市場還是商業預測，或者其他任何事情，都無法確定。除非市場碰巧提供一些有趣的機會，否則我們不太關注市場或預測。
但儘管如此，從這份第一份報告中可以看出，我們在兩個方面處於有利位置。今年的投資收入將比去年大很多。這是建立在基礎上的。你會在一分鐘內看到，我們在非常短期的投資中有大約1,250億美元。
信不信由你，就在不久前，我們在這1,250億美元上只能獲得四個基點的回報，幾乎是微不足道的，這意味著我們每年只能獲得500萬美元。而現在，就在前天，由於市場上某些有趣的變化，由於對債務上限的懷疑，我們實際上用同樣的資金進行了購買。
我們以5.90%的債券等效收益率，購買了30億美元的票據。這意味著，以前每年只能獲得5000萬美元收益的投資，現在每年將產生約50億美元的收益。因此，我們的投資收入肯定會大幅增加。
而保險承保與商業活動無關，它取決於颶風、地震和其他事件等因素。從整體的角度來看，從概率的角度來看，我們今年在保險承保方面可能會比去年有更好的表現。
它並不受所謂的商業週期或一般行業，如零售等的影響。因此，如果沒有一次大規模地震或颶風來襲，這可能會影響這一預測。但從概率的角度來看，我們的保險業勢頭在今年看起來更好。
所以，如果我們的兩個主要收入要素都朝著我們的方向發展，我預計我們的營運收益將比去年更高，但我不能保證這一點。
如果我們轉到第二張投影片，我會向您呈現這些營運收益數字，以便讓您對自疫情爆發以來的情況有個概述，並以前一年作為基礎。正如您所知，我們保留了所有的收益。
所以，如果我們每年保留300億美元或350億美元，或任何數額，他們應該預期隨著時間的推移，營運收益將增加。我的意思是，這個數字在五年、十年或十五年後應該顯著增加，因為我們有保留收益的優勢，這就是我們能夠達到這些數字的原因，因為一開始時這些數字基本上是為零。
它們通過保留收益而達到這一點，並且將繼續保留收益。所以，如果這些數字上升，這並不是一個了不起的成就。我們希望它們以合理的速度增長。從歷史上看，有時它們增長得不合理。
但那時我們處理的資金規模要小得多，這無法在我們目前的資本基礎上重複。因為我注意到——我相信它在這張投影片上。讓我們看一下。不對，它將會——讓我們看一下，它在——好吧，下一個地方，在下一張投影片上。我們展示了我們在3月31日時，呃，是什麼，5040億美元的GAAP淨資產。
或許會讓您驚訝的是，在美國沒有其他公司的數字能達到如此之大。這並不是因為我們是美國最有價值的公司。其他公司已經利用他們的資金回購股份。
他們本來可以累積5040億美元的GAAP淨資產。但基本上，我們在GAAP會計上的資產比美國的其他公司還要多。當然，如果以股東權益報酬率來衡量，這個數字會快速增加，但我們希望能夠做到這一點。
不是快速增長，而是適度的增長。在那之下，您可以看到一個名為「float」的東西。float是指留在我們手中的資金，與銀行存款有些相似，但非常重要的不同點在於，您必須支付利息才能獲得銀行存款。
現今你必須支付更多的利息，你必須經營一家銀行，做許多事情。基本上，這些資金代表著目前尚未支付的損失。在保險中，您是提前支付的。因此，在我們的資產負債表上呈現為淨負債的部分為我們提供了一筆資金，具有其他世界上我所知道的任何保險公司都無法享受的自由裁量權，這僅僅是因為我們擁有如此巨大的淨資產。
我們的float現在達到1650億美元，坐在最左邊的這位先生負責將這個數字從1986年的微不足道增加到這個驚人的數字，在大多數年份，幾乎所有年份，這幾乎沒有花費我們任何費用。所以，這就像擁有一家沒有員工、沒有利息並且無法快速提取資金的銀行，為我們工作。
這是一個非常有價值的資產，但在負債中顯示。Ajit負責建立這個寶藏，通過在全球與其他保險公司競爭而實現。現在，我們的一些保險公司則由具有才華的經理人來運營，他們以各種方式做出了貢獻。
從我職業生涯的開始就開始談GEICO。如果你思考一下這個float，就想想資產負債表。你在這裡有負債，那裡有資產，負債一邊資助了資產一邊。這很簡單。股東權益資助它，長期債務資助它，諸如此類。
但股東權益從實質上來說非常昂貴。長期債務一直很便宜，但它可能會變得昂貴，並且最終可能會到期，而且可能不可用。但float是另一項負債，但沒有花費我們任何費用。
而且它不會迅速消失。它以與股東權益相同的方式資助了資產一邊。沒有人以這種方式大量考慮它，但我們一直以這種方式思考，它是隨著時間的推移逐步累積的。因此，我在底部展示了3月31日之前的現金和國庫券的情況。
我可以告訴你，在4月份，我們可能增加了約70億美元的資金。其中一部分原因是因為我們沒有買那麼多股票，因為那會減少現金和國庫券。我們在4月份買了價值約4億美元的股票。
這在可用現金方面是一個負數。然而，我們總體而言賣出了一些股票，可能賺取了約40億美元。當然，我們還有營運收益，可能是25億美元左右。我猜我們在那個月份可能增加了60億到70億美元的現金和國庫券。
我只是想讓你瞭解波克夏的現金流動情況。然後，如果我們轉到最後一張幻燈片——我認為是最後一張。我們應該把那一張放上去，等價A類股份的流通數量。你會注意到，我們的股份數量每年都在減少。
因此，如果我們擁有更多的業務，並且這些業務賺更多的錢，你作為波克夏的股東，每年的股份都會增加，而無需支付任何錢。現在，你可以選擇獲得股息。但我們之所以取得現在的成就，是因為我們保留了這筆錢。
1967年，我們支付了每股0.10美元的股息，這是個可怕的錯誤。（笑）我總是告訴人們，那時我去男廁所，董事們在我不在的時候投票決定的。但這不是真的。我當時在場，我承認。（笑）但我們一直再投資，這就產生了超過5000億美元的股東權益和超過300億美元的營業收益。
我們將繼續遵循這一政策，因為這是非常明智的。這些是我們的初步報告。10-Q報告在網頁上可供查閱。如果你有一周或兩周的假期，你可以花時間閱讀10-Q報告。
但這就是波克夏的本質。
Section 4 會議摘要：
在Section 4 中，巴菲特先提到了Berkshire Hathaway在第一季度報告的運營收益超過80億美元。他解釋了運營收益的概念，即根據GAAP會計準則，不包括實現和未實現的資本利得。此外，他提到Berkshire Hathaway在投資收入和保險承保方面的定位，預計今年的投資收入將比去年增加，而保險承保則不受商業活動的影響。
然後，巴菲特展示了一些數據，說明自大流行病開始以來的營業收益情況，並強調Berkshire Hathaway持續保留收益的優勢，這使得營業收益和股東權益不斷增加。他提到，Berkshire Hathaway的GAAP淨值已達到5040億美元，並指出公司的流動資金（float）也大大增加，從1986年的微不足道數字發展到1650億美元，這為公司提供了極大的財務靈活性。
巴菲特還提到，儘管預計今年一些業務的收益可能會較去年下降，但由於投資收入的增加和保險承保的穩定性，他預計Berkshire Hathaway的運營收益將超過去年。他強調了長期保留收益的重要性，並表達了對公司未來增長的期望。
最後，巴菲特提到了Berkshire Hathaway的現金流和股本結構，並解釋了公司的分紅政策以及為股東提供的增值機會。他強調公司將繼續遵循保留收益的策略，並表示這一策略是成功的原因之一。
因此我們可以知道Berkshire Hathaway在第一季度報告了運營收益超過80億美元，並且預計投資收入將增加，保險承保方面表現穩定。公司的GAAP淨值已達到5040億美元，流動資金（float）增至1650億美元。一些業務的收益可能會較去年下降，但整體運營收益預計持續增長。
Section 5 原文：
5. Failure to guarantee Silicon Valley Bank’s deposits would have been ‘catastrophic’
WARREN BUFFETT: And with that, I will start with Becky Quick, and we will alternate between Becky and the audience. And her questions have come in from all of the country, and I believe you identified the sender. And go to it, Becky.
BECKY QUICK: Thanks, Warren. The first question comes in from Randy Jeffs in Irvine, California. And his question is, “If Silicon Valley Bank’s deposit had not been fully covered, what do you think the economic consequences would’ve been to the nation?”
WARREN BUFFETT: Well, I’d would just simply say it would’ve been catastrophic. (Laugh) And that’s why they were covered. And even though the FDIC limit is $250,000, that’s the way the statute reads, but that is not the way the U.S. is going to behave any more than they’re going to let the debt ceiling cause the world to go into turmoil.
And I can’t imagine anybody in the administration, in the Congress, in the Federal Reserve, whatever it may have been, FDIC — I can’t imagine anybody saying, “I’d like to be the one to go on television tomorrow and explain to the American public why we’re keeping only $250,000 insured, and we’re going to start a run on every bank in the country and disrupt the world financial system.” (Laugh) So, I think it was inevitable. Charlie, do you have anything?
CHARLIE MUNGER: No, I have nothing to add.
WARREN BUFFETT: OK.
Well, incidentally, I should mention this now, Ajit and Greg will be here in the morning session which ends at noon. And so, if you have questions to direct to them, the time to do it is in the first half of the show. And then after lunch Charlie and I will be back.
Section 5 翻譯：
5. 若未能保證矽穀銀行的存款，後果將是「災難性的」
華倫·巴菲特：好的，接下來我將與貝姬·奎克進行對話，我們將在貝姬和觀眾之間輪流提問。她的問題來自全國各地，我相信你已經確定了發送者。請開始，貝姬。
貝姬·奎克：謝謝，華倫。第一個問題來自加利福尼亞州爾灣的蘭迪·傑夫斯。他的問題是：“如果矽谷銀行的存款未能得到充分保障，你認為對國家的經濟後果會是什麼？”
華倫·巴菲特：嗯，我只能說那將是災難性的。（笑）這就是為什麼它們得到了保障。即使美國聯邦存款保險公司的限額是25萬美元，根據法律規定是這樣的，但美國不會這樣行事，就像他們不會讓國債上限引起世界陷入混亂一樣。
我無法想像在政府、國會、聯邦儲備系統或其他機構中，有人會說：“我想成為明天上電視向美國公眾解釋為什麼我們只保險了25萬美元，我們將在全國各地引發一場銀行擠兌並擾亂世界金融體系。”（笑）所以，我認為這是不可避免的。查理，你有什麼要說的嗎？
查理·蒙格：不，我沒有什麼要補充的。
華倫·巴菲特：好的。
順便提一下，我現在應該提到這個，阿吉特和葛列格將在早上的會議上出席，該會議將在中午結束。所以，如果你有問題要向他們提問，最好是在節目的前半部分進行。然後，在午餐後，查理和我會回來。
Section 5 會議摘要：
在第5段會議紀要中，Becky Quick提問了一個來自Randy Jeffs的問題，問如果未能完全保證矽谷銀行的存款，對國家的經濟後果會是什麼。巴菲特回答說，那將是災難性的，這就是為什麼它們得到了保障。儘管FDIC的保險限額是25萬美元，但美國不會只保障這個金額，就像他們不會讓債務上限引起全球動盪一樣。他認為沒有人願意在電視上解釋為什麼只保障25萬美元，並且會引發全國所有銀行的擠兌和擾亂全球金融體系。巴菲特認為這是不可避免的。Charlie Munger表示沒有什麼可補充的。
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