本篇文章收錄2023年Berkshire Hathaway股東會下午場第16~20節原文(下午場總共25小節)、繁體中文翻譯、會議摘要，除了OT供自己學習外，也分享給有興趣的朋友們。
16. We are in ‘the perfect sort of game’
17. Arbitrage bet on Activision isn’t looking good
18. If you can’t work for yourself, working for Berkshire is almost as good
19. See’s Candies is a ‘wonderful brand that doesn’t travel’
20. NetJets is a ‘marvelous’ company
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16. We are in ‘the perfect sort of game’
WARREN BUFFETT: Station nine.
Am I right on this? Yeah.
AUDIENCE MEMBER: My name is Avlon Gross (PH). And I am from Los Angeles, California. I am a shareholder. And it’s my fourth year coming to the “Woodstock of Capitalism.” (LAUGHTER)
WARREN BUFFETT: We’re glad you came.
AUDIENCE MEMBER: Thank you so much for everything Warren Buffett and Charlie Munger.
What is the funniest story that you have never told about each other? And also, what is the hardest part of your business? (APPLAUSE)
WARREN BUFFETT: I’ll answer the second. The second part of your question is that we don’t have a hard business. We love our business. Every morning, when I get up, I feel good. I don’t know what’s going to happen that day. Maybe nothing will happen. But maybe something will happen.
And if nothing else, I’ll roll some T-bills or something. But I work with the greatest group of people you can imagine. I mean, we like each other. And nobody is after anybody else’s job, or anything of the sort. It’s ideal working conditions. And it’s five minutes from my home, or thereabouts. So, I haven’t spent my life commuting. I just can’t imagine having anything better.
And Charlie’s got a lot of funny stories you haven’t heard. But we’ll see which one he comes up with.
CHARLIE MUNGER: Well, I think Warren and I are naturally so ridiculous that we don’t need very many funny stories. We each do things that are peculiar enough so that we can keep one another amused.
WARREN BUFFETT: Tell them what you told the lawyer when we were buying Hochschild Kohn.
CHARLIE MUNGER: I don’t remember. You tell them.
WARREN BUFFETT: Well, you remember? (LAUGHTER) It was 1966, and we were down in Baltimore, buying a department store. And we needed a lawyer. And we needed a lawyer who was nearby and would do exactly as told. And Charlie came up with a very good lawyer from Wilmer Cutler’s, I believe. And I don’t know whether Charlie remembers the instructions he gave the lawyer or not.
CHARLIE MUNGER: No. I don’t.
WARREN BUFFETT: Well, Charlie told the lawyer, who we never met before. And he said, “Treat Warren like” — I was 36 at the time or 35. He said, “Treat Warren like any other 90-year-old client.” (LAUGHTER)
This guy knew exactly what he meant. And we made the deal in a hurry. And then we went to the bank, First National Bank, I believe it was — or Maryland National Bank, actually. And there was a fellow named Cammy Slack there, wasn’t there, Charlie?
CHARLIE MUNGER: Yeah.
WARREN BUFFETT: We wanted to borrow $6,000,000 bucks against a $12,000,000 purchase. And Cammy looked at us with bewilderment. And he says, “You want you borrow $6,000,000 for this little old Hochschild-Kohn?” And Charlie and I said something to the effect, “Well, the Maryland National was our first call. And if they didn’t want to do it, we had another bank we’d go to.”
And, anyway, they lent us the money. But when he said little old Hochschild-Kohn, we immediately started thinking, “Maybe this isn’t the best deal we’ve ever seen in our lives.” And from that point on, we were trying to figure out how to sell it. Sandy Gottesman was involved with us then too.
And we had as much fun out of deals that didn’t work in a certain sense as the ones that did work. I mean, if you knew you were going to play golf and you were going to hit a hole in one on every hole, you just hit the ball, and it went in the hole that was 300 yards away, or 400 yards away, nobody would play golf.
I mean, part of the fun of the game is the fact that you hit them to the woods. And sometimes you get them out, and sometimes you don’t.
So, we are in the perfect sort of game. And we both enjoy it. And we have a lot of fun together. And we don’t have to do anything we don’t really believe in doing.
I mean, we are not dictated to by any group. And so, we get to forge our own destiny. And in a sense, forge the principle by which we can run the company. And that’s a huge luxury in life.
And we don’t want to be president of any other company in the world, or CEO, or anything else. We’d have to conform to certain things that we really don’t want to conform to.
Is that a fair description, Charlie?
CHARLIE MUNGER: Yeah, it is.
WARREN BUFFETT: Yeah.
Section 16 翻譯：
16. 我們正在進行的是「完美的遊戲」
華倫·巴菲特：第九站。
我說得對嗎？對。
觀眾成員：我的名字是Avlon Gross（PH）。我來自加利福尼亞洛杉磯。我是股東。這是我第四年來參加“資本主義的伍德斯托克”（音譯，笑聲）。
華倫·巴菲特：我們很高興你能來。
觀眾成員：非常感謝你們，華倫·巴菲特和查理·蒙格。
你們能分享一下你們從未講過的關於彼此的最有趣的故事嗎？還有，你們業務中最困難的部分是什麼？（掌聲）
華倫·巴菲特：我來回答你的第二個問題。我們的業務並不困難。我們熱愛我們的業務。每天早上，當我起床時，我感覺很好。我不知道那天會發生什麼。可能什麼都不會發生。但也許會有事情發生。
如果沒有其他的，我會轉一些國債短期券或其他東西。但我和一群你能想像到的最棒的人一起工作。我的意思是，我們喜歡彼此。沒有人想要別人的工作，或者其他什麼。工作環境理想。而且大約離我家只有五分鐘的路程。所以，我沒有花一生在通勤上。我無法想像有更好的事情。
查理有很多你們未聽過的有趣故事。但我們看他會提出哪一個。
查理·蒙格：嗯，我認為華倫和我天生就是那麼荒謬，我們不需要太多有趣的故事。我們每個人都做些足夠特殊的事情，所以我們可以互相娛樂。
華倫·巴菲特：告訴他們當我們買下Hochschild Kohn時你對律師說了什麼。
查理·蒙格：我不記得了。你告訴他們。
華倫·巴菲特：你記得嗎？（笑聲）那是1966年，我們在巴爾的摩買下一家百貨公司。我們需要一位律師。我們需要一位在附近的律師，並且會按照我們的指示做事。查理找到了一位非常好的來自Wilmer Cutler的律師，我認為。我不知道查理是否還記得他給律師的指示。
查理·蒙格：不，我不記得。
華倫·巴菲特：嗯，查理告訴這位我們從未見過的律師。他說，“對待華倫就像” — 我那時36歲或者35歲。他說，“對待華倫就像對待任何其他90歲的客戶一樣。”（笑聲）
這個人完全知道他的意思。我們很快地做成了這筆交易。然後我們去了銀行，我相信是第一國家銀行 —— 或者實際上是馬里蘭國家銀行。那裡有一位名叫Cammy Slack的人，對吧，查理？
查理·蒙格：是的。
華倫·巴菲特：我們想借六百萬美元來支付一千兩百萬美元的購買價格。Cammy看著我們，一臉困惑。他說，“你們想借六百萬美元來買這個老舊的Hochschild-Kohn？”查理和我說了些像是，“馬里蘭國家銀行是我們的首選。如果他們不想做，我們有另一家銀行可以去。”
不管怎麼說，他們借給我們錢。但當他說老舊的Hochschild-Kohn時，我們立刻開始想，“也許這不是我們一生中見過的最好的交易。”從那一刻起，我們就在試圖想辦法如何賣掉它。Sandy Gottesman也參與了我們的這筆交易。
我們從沒有奏效的交易中獲得的樂趣跟那些奏效的交易一樣多。我的意思是，如果你知道你要打高爾夫球，你每一洞都會一擊入洞，你只需要打球，球就會進到三百碼或四百碼外的洞，那麼就沒有人會打高爾夫球。
我是說，遊戲的樂趣部分在於你會打到樹林裡。有時候你能把球打出來，有時候你不能。
所以，我們正在進行的是完美的遊戲。我們兩人都喜歡。我們在一起很快樂。我們不需要做任何我們真的不想做的事。
我的意思是，我們不受任何群體的指示。所以，我們可以塑造自己的命運。在某種意義上，塑造我們可以經營公司的原則。這在生活中是一種巨大的奢侈。
我們不希望成為世界上任何其他公司的總裁，或者CEO，或者任何其他職位。我們不想被迫符合我們真的不想符合的某些事情。
這是一個公正的描述，對吧，查理？
查理·蒙格：是的，是的。
華倫·巴菲特：對。
Section 16 摘要：
在這一部分，一位來自洛杉磯的股東提出了兩個問題：巴菲特和蒙格從未講過的最有趣的故事是什麼，以及他們的業務中最困難的部分是什麼。對於第二個問題，巴菲特表示他們的業務並不困難，他們每天早上起來都感到快樂。他們的工作環境理想，與一群他們能想像到的最棒的人一起工作，而且他們互相喜歡對方。
關於有趣的故事，蒙格開玩笑地說，他和巴菲特本身就很荒誕，所以他們不需要很多有趣的故事。然後，巴菲特講述了他們在1966年購買百貨公司時，蒙格如何指導律師對待巴菲特的故事。巴菲特和蒙格都表示，他們非常喜歡他們的工作，並且他們不需要做他們不真正相信的事情。他們不受任何群體的指示，可以塑造自己的命運，這是一種生活中的巨大奢侈。
從這裡面我們可以看到巴菲特和蒙格投資哲學：
- 熱愛工作：巴菲特和蒙格兩人都表示，他們非常享受他們所從事的工作。他們認為他們的工作並不困難，每天早上都會感到興奮和快樂。這與他們的投資哲學密切相關，因為他們經常建議投資者投資於他們熱愛並理解的公司。
- 靈活性與自主性：巴菲特和蒙格指出，他們不需要做他們不相信的事情，他們有能力塑造自己的命運。這顯示了他們在投資決策中的靈活性和自主性，他們堅持根據自己的理解和判斷來選擇投資，而不是被市場的短期波動所驅動。
- 對人性的理解：蒙格的回應揭示了他和巴菲特對人性的理解。他們認識到，即使是最成功的人也會犯錯，也會有荒誕和可笑的一面。這種理解可能使他們在評估投資機會時更具有實際意義，因為他們對公司管理層的評估包括了對其性格和判斷力的理解。
- 創造價值的樂趣：巴菲特比喻他們的業務如同打高爾夫球，享受挑戰並從中找到樂趣，即使有時候球會打到樹林裡。這反映了他們的長期投資哲學，即對投資的耐心和冷靜的判斷，以及他們在投資過程中尋找並創造價值的樂趣。
Section 17 原文：
17. Arbitrage bet on Activision isn’t looking good
WARREN BUFFETT: OK, Becky.
BECKY QUICK: This question comes from David Kass, who is a professor at the business school at University of Maryland.
He says, “At last year’s annual meeting, Warren mentioned that Berkshire had taken a large stake in Activision Blizzard as a merger arbitrage play. Since the U.K. regulator has blocked its acquisition by Microsoft, has Berkshire reduced or sold its stake?”
WARREN BUFFETT: Well, I think in terms of what we do with stocks, we don’t give information except when required to, which is in the 13F, or whatever we file. And there’s certain things you can actually figure out by looking at our 10-Q, which we filed this morning.
But you have to look pretty hard. But I would say this. I think Microsoft has been remarkably, what’s the word, willing to cooperate with governing bodies. I mean, they want to do the deal. And they’ve met the opposition, it seems to me, more than halfway.
But that doesn’t mean that it gets done if a given country, in this case the U.K., wants to block it. They’re in a better position to block it than the United States, by just the way the world works. And that doesn’t get solved by offering more money.
So, I don’t know how it turns out. But if it doesn’t go through, I don’t think it’s through any shortcoming by either Microsoft or Activision. But not everything that should happen does happen. And, well, we ran into it when we made the deal with Dominion Energy 18 months ago. And they let us buy a good bit of what we wanted to buy.
And then the government in effect said, “You can’t buy something else,” which I think we would’ve done a better job with than anybody else did, and which the states involved did not object to it, which the customers didn’t object to it. But you don’t take on the United States government, you know?
And you try and figure out things that you won’t have a problem with. And I think in that case, the U.S. government made a mistake. I think the British government’s making a mistake in this case.
But that’s life in the big city, as Charlie would say.
And what we do will depend on a lot of things. Charlie?
CHARLIE MUNGER: Well, I think — well, we do — yeah — you kissed that one off beautifully. (LAUGHTER)
Section 17 翻譯：
17. 對於動視暴雪的套利賭注看來並不樂觀
華倫·巴菲特：好的，Becky。
BECKY QUICK：這個問題來自馬里蘭大學商學院的教授David Kass。
他說：“在去年的年度會議上，華倫提到波克夏已經在動視暴雪上佔有大量股權，作為合併套利的手段。自從英國監管機構阻止了微軟的收購後，波克夏有減少或出售它的股權嗎？”
華倫·巴菲特：關於我們如何處理股票，我們只在需要的時候提供信息，這是在13F中，或者我們提交的其他文件中。還有一些事情你實際上可以通過查看我們今天早上提交的10-Q來找出。
但你需要很努力地去找。但我想說的是，我覺得微軟已經非常，該用什麼詞呢？願意與監管機構合作。我是說，他們想做這個交易。而且他們已經在反對方面做出了超過一半的努力。
但這並不意味著如果某個國家，這種情況下是英國，想要阻止它，那就能完成。根據世界的運作方式，他們比美國更有能力阻止它。而且這個問題不會因為提供更多的錢就能解決。
所以，我不知道結果會怎麼樣。但如果它不能通過，我不認為這是微軟或動視暴雪的任何短處。但並非所有應該發生的事情都會發生。我們在18個月前與多米尼恩能源達成交易時就遇到了這種情況。他們讓我們買下了我們想要買的大部分東西。
然後政府實質上說，“你不能買其他的東西”，我認為我們將比任何人都做得更好，且涉及的州並未反對，顧客也沒有反對。但你知道，你不會對抗美國政府。
你試圖找出你不會遇到問題的事情。我認為在那種情況下，美國政府犯了一個錯誤。我認為英國政府在這種情況下也犯了錯。
但這就是生活在大城市中的情況，正如查理所說。
我們會做什麼將取決於很多事情。查理？
查理·蒙格：嗯，我想，嗯，我們做的，嗯，你將那個問題完美地扮演了。 (笑聲)
Section 17 摘要：
在此部分，觀眾問到了關於波克夏對動視暴雪的套利投資，該公司的收購已被英國監管機構阻止，並詢問是否已經減少或出售其持股。對此，巴菲特並未直接透露公司的股票操作策略，但他承認，微軟和動視暴雪都在努力達成這筆交易，雖然最終可能並不成功。他並引用他們在過去與多米尼恩能源的交易中的經驗，說明即使是最好的計劃，也可能會受到政府監管機構的阻撓。這就是他們所說的“大城市的生活”。
本段展現了哪些巴菲特與蒙格投資的哲學呢？整理如下：
- 巴菲特強調了不確定性和風險管理的重要性。在這個情況下，他們的套利投資可能不會如預期那樣成功，但這是他們在進行這種投資時就已經知道的風險。這種觀點與巴菲特和蒙格的投資哲學相符，他們一直強調對風險的評估和管理。
- 巴菲特並未透露他們是否減少或出售了動視暴雪的持股，這也體現了他們一貫的低調和保密的策略。他們總是尊重市場的隱私，並且在公開信息方面保持謹慎。
- 他們承認，即使是最好的計劃，也可能會受到政府監管的影響。這體現了他們的實際主義，他們理解並接受在現實世界中，事情可能不會總是按照預期的方式進行。
Section 18 原文：
18. If you can’t work for yourself, working for Berkshire is almost as good
WARREN BUFFETT: OK. Station 10. (Laughter)
AUDIENCE MEMBER: Hi, Warren. Hi, Charlie. My name’s Anderson Fuller (PH). And I’m from Avonport, Nova Scotia in Canada.
And before I ask my question, I just want to thank you for all you’ve done to give us insight into your minds as investors.
So, for me, the most compelling takeaway from Berkshire is your guys’ emphasis on and successful use of properly aligned incentives.
In my view, owning and leading a business has two central benefits. First, you directly benefit as the company grows, through your equity in it, and second, you have autonomy. Incentives for employees are a bit easier to understand, such as offering benefits, fair pay, and creating a strong culture.
But I’ve always struggled to understand them at the highest level. Even though you say Berkshire gives its managers significant flexibility, it must be less than what they had when they were independent.
Additionally, you would think passion and a willingness to sell would be inversely correlated. So, how exactly does Berkshire bridge this gap and incentivize owners of its subsidiaries to give up these benefits to Berkshire? Thank you.
WARREN BUFFETT: Well, what we really hope to find is managers who love their business, but don’t like a lot of what comes with it as a public company. I mean, if they have to spend a lot of time listening to people tell them what to do about this or that, and they can’t afford to irritate them, or they have to go along with their trade association, or whatever they may call it, because you don’t want to look like a free rider.
There’s all kinds of things, compromises that people have to make in most jobs. And Charlie and I solved that problem. I had five bosses in my life. And I liked all five of them. And two of them were just huge factors in making my life better. But I liked all five of them.
A couple of them were, you know, some people hear JCPenney, Cooper Smith, you know, I worked for 75 cents an hour and I loved working at Penny’s. Well, I didn’t love working at Penney’s. But I loved working for Cooper Smith. And, you know, it was 75 cents an hour.
But I had to do what they told me to do, which was to sell men’s shirts first, and then men’s clothing, and then children’s clothing, and so on. And I loved working for the newspaper. And I had a great manager when I was at the University of Nebraska. I got to work for Ben Graham. I mean, everything worked out.
But there’s nothing like working for yourself. And if you can’t own a big company, working at Berkshire Hathaway, from running a company is the closest thing you will get. You don’t have to spend time courting analysts who you’ll probably have contempt for in many cases.
You don’t have to spend time with banks, you know, getting money, and particularly in terrible times.
There’s all kinds of — you get a lot in the way of freedom that I would think would be meaningful to me. And it might be better if you own the whole place yourself.
But maybe you’ve got siblings that want out. Maybe — there’s a million reasons why you may not be able to achieve that unless you sell to Berkshire. And that’s easier, probably, if you have a family business, where people want to go in different directions, than it is with a public company. But there’s still possibilities there.
So, that’s why I think if I owned a public company, and it was worth a great many billions of dollars, and Berkshire Hathaway wanted to buy it, and the shareholders were willing to vote it, I would consider the way I would feel about life, for one thing, I wouldn’t want to retire at 65. I’d want to keep working.
And there are reasons to sell to Berkshire, which Charlie and I, in certain positions, if we were on the other side, would take the deal. But it isn’t for everybody. Charlie?
CHARLIE MUNGER: I think we have a pretty good one. We’ve been very lucky. And I don’t know. It seems to me that most of the people who are going to end up the way we did, they almost already know how to do it.
WARREN BUFFETT: But the most important purchase, in retrospect, that we may have made was National Indemnity. Now because specifically what it did, but what it led to. And Jack Ringwalt controlled the company. And I knew him and liked him. And he knew me. And once a year, he’d get irritated when the Nebraska Department of Insurance, or somebody would come around.
And he said they always came around when the AK-SAR-BEN racetrack was open. I mean, he had all these theories about why it was a pain in the neck to be regulated. And I told Charlie Heider, “Next time Jack is in that mood, where he’s ready to sell, just because he’s tired of fooling around with all these guys, be sure and find him.”
And so, Charlie called me one day. And he says, “Jack is in heat.” And I said, “Bring him over.” And we made a deal. But that’s why Jack sold. And he was happy after he made the deal. And I was happy after we made the deal. So, there’s a man that controlled a business, but just decided these people didn’t seem to bother him as much once they were my problem and not his.
And you just can’t tell when lightening will strike. And that didn’t do magnificent things for us initially. But just look at what it led to, you know?
So, you never — you know, if you knew how you were going to shoot all 18 holes, it wouldn’t be any fun playing. You wouldn’t get out on the first tee. I mean, it’s the uncertainty, the fun of playing the game, the opponents, all kinds of things that make a game interesting. And I think Charlie and I are in the most interesting game in the world.
Section 18 翻譯：
18. 如果你不能為自己工作，為波克夏工作幾乎一樣好
華倫·巴菲特：好的，第10站。(笑聲)
觀眾：嗨，華倫。嗨，查理。我叫安德森·富勒（音），我來自加拿大新斯科舍省的艾馮港。
在我問我的問題之前，我想感謝你們，因為你們讓我們對你們作為投資者的思維有了深入的了解。
對我來說，從波克夏獲取的最引人入勝的收穫是你們對於正確激勵方式的強調和成功運用。
在我看來，擁有並領導一個企業有兩個核心好處。首先，隨著公司的成長，你可以通過你在其中的股權直接受益，其次，你有自主權。對於員工的激勵更容易理解，例如提供福利，公平的薪酬，並創建一個強大的文化。
但我一直在努力理解最高層次的激勵。即使你說波克夏給其經理人提供了相當大的靈活性，但這肯定比他們獨立時少。
此外，你會認為熱情和願意出售會呈反相關。那麼，波克夏究竟如何搭建這座橋樑，激勵其子公司的所有者放棄這些好處給波克夏呢？謝謝。
華倫·巴菲特：我們真正希望找到的是熱愛他們的業務，但不喜歡做公開公司帶來的很多事情的經理人。我是說，如果他們不得不花很多時間聽人們告訴他們該如何做這個那個，他們不能惹惱他們，或者他們不得不跟他們的行業協會或者他們可能稱之為什麼的組織一致，因為你不想看起來像是免費搭車者。
在大多數工作中，人們都必須做出各種妥協。查理和我解決了這個問題。我一生中有五個老闆。我喜歡所有五個人。其中兩個在使我的生活變得更好方面起到了巨大的作用。但我喜歡所有五個人。
其中有幾個，你知道，有些人聽到JCPenney，Cooper Smith，你知道，我以每小時75美分的工資工作，我喜歡在Penney工作。好吧，我並不喜歡在Penney工作。但我喜歡為Cooper Smith工作。而且，你知道，這是每小時75美分的工資。
但我必須做他們告訴我做的事情，首先是賣男士襯衫，然後是男士衣服，然後是兒童衣服，等等。我喜歡為報紙工作。當我在內布拉斯加大學時，我有一個很棒的經理。我有機會為本·格雷厄姆工作。我的一切都進展得很順利。
但是沒有什麼比為自己工作更好。如果你不能擁有一家大公司，那麼在波克夏工作，從經營一家公司的角度來看，可能是你能得到的最接近的事情。你不必花時間討好分析師，大多數情況下你可能對他們有蔑視之感。
你不必花時間和銀行打交道，尤其是在困難的時候。
你會得到很多我認為對我有意義的自由。如果你完全擁有整個地方，那可能更好。
但也許你有想退出的兄弟姐妹。也許有一百萬種原因，除非你把公司賣給波克夏，否則你可能無法實現那個目標。如果你有一個家族企業，人們想走不同的方向，那麼賣給波克夏可能更容易，雖然對於公開公司來說可能還有一些可能。
所以，我認為如果我擁有一家公開公司，而它值很多億美元，並且波克夏想要購買，並且股東願意投票同意，我會考慮我對生活的感覺，首先，我不想在65歲退休。我想繼續工作。
有賣給波克夏的原因，如果查理和我在某些位置，如果我們處於對面，我們會接受這筆交易。但這並不適合每個人。查理？
查理·蒙格：我認為我們有一個很好的辦法。我們非常幸運。我不知道。我覺得大多數最終會像我們這樣的人，他們幾乎已經知道如何做到。
華倫·巴菲特：但從回顧中我們可能做出的最重要的購買是National Indemnity。現在不是特指它做了什麼，而是它引領了什麼。傑克·林沃特控制著公司。我認識他並且喜歡他。他也認識我。每年一次，他會在內布拉斯加保險部或者其他人來的時候感到煩躁。
他說他們總是在AK-SAR-BEN賽馬場開放的時候來。我是說，他有所有這些關於為什麼做為一個受監管的人會感到煩燥的理論。我告訴查理·海德，"下次傑克在那種心情，準備出售，就因為他厭倦了與所有這些人打交道，一定要找到他。”
於是，查理有一天給我打電話。他說，“傑克正在尋找機會。”我說，“帶他過來。”我們達成了一項協議。但這就是傑克出售的原因。他在達成協議後感到很高興。我們達成協議後也感到很高興。所以，這是一個控制著公司的人，但是只是決定這些人在成為我的問題而不是他的問題之後似乎就不再煩擾他了。
你無法預知何時會有閃光。一開始它並沒有給我們帶來太多好處。但看看它引領了什麼，你知道？
所以，你永遠不知道，你知道，如果你知道你要如何打完所有的18個洞，你就不會玩高爾夫球了。在購買公司時，我們不會預設一切都會運作良好。它們有時候會，有時候不會。但我們知道，如果我們留在賽道上，我們的成績會是什麼。
Section 18 摘要：
本段重點主要在於 Warren Buffett 和 Charlie Munger 如何透過對公司高層激勵的運用，讓他們即使失去了完全的自主權，依然願意且能將公司發展得很好。他們認為，如果公司高層愛他們的業務，但不喜歡成為公眾公司所帶來的各種問題（比如需要投入大量時間應對分析師、銀行以及規管者），那麼賣給波克夏可能是他們的最佳選擇。
在波克夏，這些公司高層可以擁有更多的自由，專注於他們愛的業務，而無需為其他諸多事項分心。然而，這並不適合每一個人，而是特定的情況和特定的人。
巴菲特和蒙格的投資哲學在此處的體現是他們的長期投資觀，尤其是對於公司管理層的尊重和信任。他們不干涉被投資公司的日常運營，給予公司高層足夠的彈性，讓他們能夠依照自己的方式經營公司。這種哲學源於他們的信念，即：如果你投資一個有出色管理團隊的好公司，那麼最好的策略就是讓他們自由地運作。
此外，巴菲特和蒙格也強調，他們的成功並非一蹴可幾，而是需要長時間的等待和觀察。他們的成功源於他們對待投資的耐心和紀律，這一點在他們講述 National Indemnity 的收購經歷時得到了展現。他們知道有些機會需要時間才能出現，並且願意等待。他們認為投資就像是一場遊戲，有樂趣，有挑戰，也有不確定性，這也是他們熱愛投資的原因之一。
本節內容凸顯了巴菲特和蒙格的投資哲學：他們尊重和信任公司的管理層，有長期投資的視角，有耐心等待投資機會的決心，同時也享受投資帶來的樂趣。
Section 19 原文：
WARREN BUFFETT: OK. Becky?
BECKY QUICK: Here’s a question from Simon Withers (PH), in Perth, in Western Australia.
“It’s been a long time since we’ve heard about See’s Candy and NetJets. Could you please give us an update on See’s performance, and when you project it will run out of places to open stores in the United States?
“And could you also give us an overview of how NetJets has performed since its acquisition, and whether it’s achieved the potential you saw at the time of that acquisition?”
WARREN BUFFETT: Well, with See’s it hasn’t been a question of opening stores. We found out that we have this wonderful brand that doesn’t travel. You know? The mystique, the actual product, the feelings people have about some things, as we said before, I mean, it sometimes it’s limited to given markets.
Dr. Pepper sells at a huge rate in Dallas-Fort Worth, and maybe at 10 times the percentage per capita, maybe that it has in Detroit, or Boston. And you say, “Well, how can that be with a product that’s been around for a century?” And people travel. You have national advertising.
And I’m not sure. But I keep learning more, as I watch different brands. And Charlie and I, our economics were so good in California, that we tried in many cases the same experiment over and over again. It doesn’t cost much to experiment. And we’ve tried everything in the world to cause a brand to travel.
And we always think we were right for the first week. And then we find out that the magic — we can beat any other candy store, pretty much. But there aren’t any candy stores anymore to speak of, as the world has changed. So, See’s is 101 years now. It has magic.
And it has limited magic in sort of the adjacent West. It’s gravitational, almost. And then you get to the East. And incidentally, in the East, people prefer dark chocolate to milk chocolate. In the West, people prefer milk chocolate to dark. In the East, you can sell miniatures, and dark — in the West —
I mean, there’s all kinds of crazy things in the world that consumers do. But you want to keep observing it, because you do learn a little. And with Charlie and I, the temptation to keep trying things, because the economics were so good if we succeeded, so we tried various things. And, of course, every manager wants to try that comes along.
Because they’ve learned that it should work. But it doesn’t work. So, but that’s what makes it very interesting.
Section 19 翻譯：
19. See's Candies 是一個「美妙的品牌，但它的影響力並不遠大」
華倫·巴菲特：好的，Becky？
BECKY QUICK：這是一個來自西澳大利亞珀斯的 Simon Withers（PH）的問題。
“我們很久都沒有聽到關於See's Candy和NetJets的消息了。您能否請給我們關於See's的表現的最新更新，以及您預計何時它將在美國開設商店的地方耗盡？
“您能否也給我們一個關於NetJets自被收購以來的表現的概覽，以及它是否已經實現了您在收購時看到的潛力？”
華倫·巴菲特：關於 See's，問題並不在於開設新的商店。我們發現我們有一個美妙的品牌，但它的影響力並不遠大。您知道嗎？一些東西的神秘感、實際的產品、人們對某些東西的感覺，正如我們之前所說，這有時候是受到特定市場的限制。
Dr. Pepper在達拉斯-沃思堡的銷售率極高，可能是底特律或波士頓人均消耗的十倍。你會問，"一個存在了一個世紀的產品，人們都在旅行，你有全國性的廣告，怎麼會這樣呢？"
我不確定。但是當我看著不同的品牌時，我學到了更多。查理和我在加州的經濟情況非常好，所以我們在許多情況下嘗試了同樣的實驗。實驗不需要太多的成本。我們嘗試過各種方式讓品牌走向遠方。
我們總是覺得我們在第一周就做得對。然後我們發現，那種魔力——我們可以打敗任何其他糖果店。但是，現在的世界幾乎沒有什麼糖果店可以說起。所以，See's現在已經101年了，它有魔力。
它在西部附近的地區有著有限的魔力。它幾乎像是地心引力一樣。然後你來到東部。順便說一句，在東部，人們更喜歡黑巧克力而不是牛奶巧克力。在西部，人們更喜歡牛奶巧克力而不是黑巧克力。在東部，你可以賣迷你巧克力和黑巧克力——在西部——
我的意思是，消費者在世界上有各種奇怪的行為。但你需要一直觀察它，因為你可以學到一點東西。查理和我總是有種嘗試新事物的誘惑，因為如果我們成功了，經濟效益將非常好，所以我們嘗試了各種事物。當然，每個新來的經理都想嘗試。
因為他們學到了它應該會成功。但是它不會成功。所以，但這就是讓它非常有趣的地方。
Section 19 摘要：
在本節中，華倫·巴菲特討論了See's Candies的表現以及品牌影響力的範疇。他確認該品牌在其主要市場（主要是加利福尼亞和西部地區）具有強大的吸引力，但這種魔力並未在全國範圍內傳播。他也提到了一些消費者行為的地理差異，比如在東部，人們更喜歡黑巧克力，而在西部，人們更喜歡牛奶巧克力。
這段可以了解巴菲特和蒙格的投資哲學的其中一部分，是關於瞭解並購買有持久競爭優勢的公司。在這個案例中，See's Candies的品牌忠誠度和認可度在其主要市場中是無可比擬的，這使其在該地區獲得了持久的競爭優勢。然而，由於品牌的吸引力無法廣泛傳播，因此該公司未能在全國範圍內建立起同樣的競爭優勢。
該段也提到了巴菲特和蒙格對於持續嘗試並學習的態度，即使多次嘗試讓See's Candies的品牌擴展到更大的地理範圍都沒有成功。他們認為這種嘗試並學習的過程使業務變得更有趣，並且如果成功，將帶來極大的經濟效益。
然而，儘管沒有得到預期的成功，他們並未對See's Candies感到失望。這反映了他們對長期投資的承諾，並且即使面臨困難，也願意持續投資並努力改進。這種耐心和持久的態度是巴菲特和蒙格投資哲學的核心元素之一。
Section 20 原文：
WARREN BUFFETT: And NetJets, we have really learned how to distinguish, and justifiably distinguish a service to people that you have to be very well to do to use it.
But if you’re very well to do, in effect, you’re spending your heir’s money. I mean, it’s what I told my Aunt Alice after she went from teaching to be worth millions and millions of dollars. And she came to see me. She’d never been married. And she said, “Can I afford to buy this fur coat?” in 1968 or ’69. And I said, “Alice, you aren’t buying it. Your nieces and nephews are buying it, because that’s who you’re leaving your money to.”
“Speaking on behalf of your nieces and nephews I would say we want you to buy it.” And it’s the same way. Do your heirs want you to fly around in that jet? Or do they want you to leave a little more money to your foundation or your kids? And the way to solve that one is to offer your kids a few hours themselves.
Then their attitude can change. So, it’s in a class by itself. It’s done what Ferrari has done in a different sort of way in cars. Ferrari sells 11,000 cars a year. I mean, maybe 12,000. And they’re known throughout the world. And we’ll have a Chevy dealership in Boston or something. We’ll sell as many cars. But we’re not Ferrari.
And NetJets has 600 — well, counting Europe, I mean, it’s maybe 650, but we’re going to buy 100 planes this year. And we won’t sell any, because we’ve got a backlog. And we took a NetJet flight over to Tokyo. And we arrived in good shape. And we spent a couple days there. And we flew back.
And there’s just nothing to it. Now, you can say, “Well, you’re getting sort of decadent and all that in your old age.” But the money will go to philanthropy. And the money will probably be a hundred billion or more. And I figured the philanthropies want me to spend a few bucks on myself.
All it has to do is be better than the last dollars that are spent by various philanthropies, which have plenty of problems finding things to do that make lots of sense. So, NetJets, there isn’t any competitor. We had looked the other day at Wheels Up.
Stock came out at $10 a couple years ago. It was selling at 48 cents the other day. And they’ve got 12,600 people that have given a billion dollars, a little over a billion dollars on prepaid cards where they’ve given them money, and they get a certain number of hours later on.
And they don’t — I think there’s a good chance that some people are going to be very disappointed later on.
When they have money to do the NetJets, they know they’ll get on the same planes, with the same pilots as I and my family have flown on since before we bought the company. So, the decision wasn’t shaped by some commercial objective.
A couple years before, I’d never heard of NetJets. And Frank Rooney mentioned it to me. And I bought share immediately. And we bought the company. And, well, my kids have to fly commercial sometimes. But sometimes they get to use ours, too.
But I’ve never flown anything else. And why would I? I mean, it’s the gold standard. And nobody will match our fleet. I mean, if you got 600 planes, you’ve got them a lot more places in the United States than anybody else will have theirs. I think we’re the second largest fleet (UNINTEL) commercial airliners.
And our fleet’s growing, like I said, at the rate of a hundred planes a year. So, it’s a marvelous company.
And Adam Johnson has performed. You just can’t believe what he’s done with the business. It was a tough model for a long time. But he’s brought it where it is. And we should have a wonderful company forever. Charlie?
CHARLIE MUNGER: Well, NetJets has been remarkable. You can argue that it’s worth as much as any airline now.
WARREN BUFFETT: It’s so different. And Charlie — we had a hard time selling Charlie a NetJets membership. And then we figured the way to get him to buy a membership was to put a coach seat in the fuselage. (LAUGHTER)
And that really knocked him off. I think he’s the only one we sold on the basis of that.
CHARLIE MUNGER: I used to come to the Berkshire annual meetings on coach from Los Angeles. And it was full of rich stockholders. And they would clap when I came into the coach section. I really liked that. (LAUGHTER) (APPLAUSE)
WARREN BUFFETT: But I’ve got to tell you, we semi-corrupted him. He feels he kind of has to explain it, but he still flies in NetJet himself, so. And it’d be crazy not to. You know, your heirs are paying for it. I mean, find me anybody whose estate came in at less than zero because of what they spend on NetJets, threw them into that position, let me know.
But I’ve never seen a case yet. And it won’t be the case for the Buffett family. And it’s the residual bottom beneficiary that’s paying for your membership.
And it’s a little hard to get used to paying that much money though, when you’ve lived like Charlie and I have most of our lives.
Section 20 翻譯：
NetJets 是一個「了不起」的公司 華倫·巴菲特：至於 NetJets，我們真的學會了如何區分，並有理由區分為人們提供服務，你必須非常富裕才能使用它。
但是如果你非常富裕，實際上，你花的是你繼承人的錢。我的意思是，這就是我告訴我阿姨愛麗絲的，她從教學轉行，價值數百萬美元。她來見我，她從未結婚過。她說，"我可以買這件毛皮大衣嗎？"在1968或'69年。我說，"愛麗絲，你沒有在買，你的侄女和侄子在買，因為你要把錢留給他們。"
"代表你的侄女和侄子，我會說我們希望你買。"這就是同樣的道理。你的繼承人希望你在那架飛機上飛來飛去嗎？還是他們希望你把更多的錢留給你的基金會或你的孩子們？解決這個問題的方法是給你的孩子們一些時間。
然後他們的態度就可能改變。所以，它是獨一無二的。它做到了法拉利在汽車方面用不同的方式做到的事情。法拉利每年銷售11,000輛汽車，也許是12,000輛。它們在全世界都知名。我們在波士頓或某處將擁有一家雪佛蘭經銷店。我們將銷售同樣多的汽車。但我們不是法拉利。
NetJets 擁有 600 台 - 好吧，包括歐洲，我是說，可能有 650 台，但我們今年將購買 100 架飛機。我們不會賣出任何一架，因為我們有訂單需求。我們乘 NetJet 的飛機飛往東京。我們抵達時狀態良好。我們在那裡待了幾天。然後我們飛回來。
沒有什麼大不了的。現在，你可以說，"嗯，你老了，變得有些頹廢。"但是這筆錢將用於慈善事業。這筆錢可能將達到一千億美元或更多。我認為慈善機構希望我為自己花一些錢。
這就需要比各種慈善機構花的最後一筆錢更好，這些慈善機構在找到有意義的事情上有很多問題。所以，NetJets，沒有任何競爭者。前幾天我們看了 Wheels Up。
幾年前股價是10美元。前幾天是48美分。他們有12,600人已經捐出超過10億美元的預付卡，他們已經給了他們錢，他們之後會得到一定數量的小時。
我認為有可能有些人之後會非常失望。
當他們有錢去坐 NetJets，他們知道他們將登上我和我的家人在我們購買公司之前就已經乘坐過的同一架飛機，同一位飛行員。所以，這個決定並不是由一些商業目標塑造的。
幾年前，我從未聽說過 NetJets。然後弗蘭克·魯尼向我提及。我馬上就買了股份。我們購買了這家公司。好吧，我的孩子們有時不得不乘坐商業航班。但是有時他們也能乘坐我們的。
但是我從未乘坐過其他任何東西。我為什麼要這麼做呢？我的意思是，這是黃金標準。沒有人會匹配我們的機隊。我的意思是，如果你有 600 架飛機，你在美國的地方比任何人都多。我認為我們是第二大商業航空公司的機隊（UNINTEL）。
我們的機隊正在以每年一百架的速度增長。所以，這是一個了不起的公司。
亞當·約翰遜的表現讓人難以置信。你無法相信他對這個業務所做的一切。這個模型很長時間都很艱難。但他帶領它走到了現在的位置。我們應該永遠擁有一家美好的公司。查理？
查理·蒙格：嗯，NetJets 的表現確實令人驚嘆。你可以說現在它的價值和任何航空公司一樣多。
華倫·巴菲特：它非常不同。查理 - 我們曾經很難向查理出售 NetJets 會員資格。然後我們想到了一個方法讓他購買會員資格，那就是在機身中放置一個教練座位。（笑聲）
那真的把他打倒了。我想他是我們唯一一個因此而購買的人。
查理·蒙格：我過去會乘坐經濟艙從洛杉磯來到波克夏的年會。經濟艙裡都是富有的股東。當我走進經濟艙的時候，他們會鼓掌。我真的很喜歡那樣。（笑聲）（掌聲）
華倫·巴菲特：他覺得他有點需要解釋，但他仍然自己飛 NetJet。這不瘋狂也不知道是什麼。你知道，你的繼承人正在為它付款。我的意思是，如果有人因為在 NetJets 上的花費導致他們的遺產少於零，讓我知道。
但是我到現在還沒有看到過這樣的情況。對於巴菲特家族來說也不會是這種情況。這是付款你的會員費的最終受益人。
對於像查理和我這樣的人來說，當你大部分的生活都過得很節儉時，花那麼多錢可能會有點不習慣。
Section 20 摘要：
在本節中，巴菲特和蒙格大致討論了 NetJets 這家公司以及他們對其業務模式的讚賞。巴菲特認為它是一家了不起的公司，並提到他們計劃今年購買100架飛機，因為他們有需求積壓。與競爭對手 Wheels Up 比較之後，指出後者的股價在幾年內從10美元下跌到48美分。他們也討論了 NetJets 提供的獨特服務，特別是對於那些非常富有的人，並將其與 Ferrari 在汽車行業的定位相比。最後，巴菲特和蒙格討論了他們如何看待自己和家人使用 NetJets 的情況，並表達了他們對公司未來的樂觀態度。
本段中體現巴菲特和蒙格過往的投資哲學和經驗相關的地方如下：
- 認識優秀公司：巴菲特和蒙格總是強調尋找優質的公司來投資，他們對 NetJets 的讚賞顯然反映了這種看法。他們認為該公司是一家出色的公司，並期待其未來的成功。
- 瞭解公司和業務模型：他們對 NetJets 的深入理解也反映了他們投資哲學的另一部分，那就是深入瞭解投資公司的業務模型和行業情況。巴菲特對 NetJets 和其競爭對手 Wheels Up 的比較顯示了他對行業的深入理解。
- 長期投資：巴菲特和蒙格的投資策略以長期持有為核心。他們的話語反映出對 NetJets 長遠發展的信心，這也與他們的投資哲學一致。
- 值得信賴的管理團隊：他們讚揚 NetJets 的管理層 Adam Johnson 表現出色，這也反映了他們在投資時重視找到能夠有效管理公司的優秀管理團隊的哲學。
巴菲特和蒙格在討論 NetJets 時展現了他們的核心投資原則：找到一家有優秀管理團隊的優質公司，對其有深入的理解，並持有長期的投資視野。
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