本篇文章收錄2023年Berkshire Hathaway股東會上午場第26~32節原文(上半場總共32小節)、繁體中文翻譯、會議摘要，除了OT供自己學習外，也分享給有興趣的朋友們。
26. ‘I feel better about the capital we’ve deployed in Japan than Taiwan’
27. Ben Graham’s great investment book is still popular
28. GEICO is talking to carmakers about selling insurance in the showroom
29. Index funds are ‘backing off’ from using voting power
30. Buffett: Greg Abel ‘understands capital allocation as well as I do’
31. Munger has two words for COVID vaccine skeptic
32. ‘It’s hard to judge successor management in a really good business’ like Berkshire
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Section 26 原文：
26. ‘I feel better about the capital we’ve deployed in Japan than Taiwan’
BECKY QUICK: This question comes from Roheet Bellany (PH). “Berkshire bought a substantial position in Taiwan Semiconductor, and contrary to its normal holding timeline, sold almost the entire position within a few short months.
While you cited in a CNBC interview that geopolitical issues were the catalyst, these issues were seemingly no different when you acquired that stock.
So, what else, if anything, changed in those few months and prompted the firm to offload close to $5 billion worth of Taiwan Semiconductor shares?”
WARREN BUFFETT: Taiwan Semiconductor’s one of the best managed companies and important companies in the world. And I think you’ll be able to say the same thing five, or ten, or 20 years from now.
I don’t like its location. And I’ve reevaluated that. I mean, I don’t think it should be any place but Taiwan, although they will be, obviously, opening up chip capacity in this country.
And actually, one of our subsidiaries that we got in Alleghany is participating in their Arizona construction activities.
But it’s a question of we would rather have the same kind of company. And there’s nobody in the chip industry that’s in their league, at least in my view.
And the man that is a 91-year-old or so connected with it, that I think I played bridge with in Albuquerque, and they’re marvelous people, marvelous company. But I’d rather find marvelous people — and I won’t find it in the chip industry.
But marvelous people and marvelous competitive position and everything, I’d rather find it in the United States.
I feel better about the capital that we’ve got deployed in Japan than Taiwan. I wish it weren’t so, but I think that’s the reality. And I’ve reevaluated that in the light of certain things that were going on. Charlie?
CHARLIE MUNGER: Well, my view is that Warren ought to feel comfortable if he wants to. (Laughter)
WARREN BUFFETT: Yeah, yeah. Put that in the minutes. (Laughter)
Section 26 翻譯：
26. 我對我們在日本部署的資本感到比在台灣更有信心。
BECKY QUICK: 這個問題來自Roheet Bellany（PH）。"波克夏購買了大量的台積電股票，但與其正常的持有時間表相反，在短短幾個月內幾乎全部賣出了這個頭寸。
在一次CNBC的訪談中，您提到地緣政治問題是導火線，但當您購買該股票時，這些問題似乎並沒有不同。
那麼，在這幾個月內發生了什麼變化，促使公司出售價值近50億美元的台積電股票？"
WARREN BUFFETT: 台積電是世界上管理最好、最重要的公司之一。我認為在五年、十年或二十年後，你仍然能夠說出同樣的話。
我不喜歡它的地理位置。我已經重新評估過了。我的意思是，除了台灣之外，我認為它不應該去任何地方，儘管他們顯然將在這個國家開設晶片廠。
實際上，我們在Alleghany收購的一家子公司參與了他們在亞利桑那州的建設活動。
但這是一個問題，我們寧願找到同樣類型的公司。在晶片行業，沒有其他公司能與他們相提並論，至少在我看來是如此。
而與台積電有關的那位大約91歲的人，我想我在阿布奎基與他一起打過橋牌，他們是了不起的人，了不起的公司。但我寧願在美國找到了不起的人才，這在晶片行業是找不到的。
但出色的人才、出色的競爭地位以及其他一切，我寧願在美國找到。
對於我們在日本投資的資本，我感到比在台灣更放心。我希望情況不是這樣，但我認為這是現實。在某些事情發生時，我已經重新評估了這一點。Charlie，你有什麼看法？
CHARLIE MUNGER: 哦，我認為如果華倫想感到舒適的話，他應該感到舒適。(笑聲)
WARREN BUFFETT: 是的，是的。將這一點記錄在會議紀要中。(笑聲)
Section 26 會議摘要：
在第26段會議紀要中，有人問到為什麼波克夏購入了大量的台積電股票，卻在短短幾個月內幾乎全部賣出。華倫·巴菲特解釋說，台積電是一家管理良好且重要的公司，他對該公司的前景持樂觀態度，但他重新評估後，對該公司的地理位置不太滿意。他表示更希望在美國找到同樣優秀的公司和人才。巴菲特認為在日本的資本配置比在台灣更令他放心。查理·蒙格則支持巴菲特的觀點，表示他應該感到舒適。
重點是巴菲特對於台積電的評價和資本配置進行了重新評估，他認為台積電是一家優秀的公司，但他更傾向於在美國尋找類似的機會。同時，這段紀要也凸顯了巴菲特和芒格對於地緣政治問題和全球經濟關係的看法，他們認為美國和中國應該加強合作，避免不必要的緊張局勢。
Section 27 原文：
27. Ben Graham’s great investment book is still popular
WARREN BUFFETT: OK, station ten?
AUDIENCE MEMBER: First of all, thank you for making our lives better. My name is Bugomil Baranowsky. I’m a founding partner of Sicart Associates in New York. We manage multi-generational family fortunes, hence my question. Mr. Buffet, in 1976 in your tribute to Benjamin Graham you wrote, “Walter Lippmann spoke of men who plant trees that other men will sit under.” Ben Graham was such a man. You’re both such people. Could you share with us your 100-year vision for Berkshire? It’s a question to you both.
WARREN BUFFETT: Yeah. I would like to add one thing about Ben Graham. Ben Graham did all kinds of things for me, and he never expected one thing in return. I mean, just you name it, and he did it, and there wasn’t any hidden — you know, the slightest hint, I should say, of anything he expected in return.
And I checked: He wrote a book in 1949 that, in a sense, said to me, in very persuasive terms, that what I’d been spending the previous eight or nine years worked at, and loving, was all wrong. And that book has been — I check it every now and then on Amazon where it ranks, and, you know, Amazon ranks hundreds and hundreds and hundreds of thousands of books by sales.
And Ben Graham’s book has been up there, like, number 300, or 350, or something like that, forever. And there isn’t book like it. I wrote Harper Collins a note the other day because they’re bringing out another edition. And I asked them how many copies have been sold. And they said the records didn’t go back far enough, but they had 7.3 million copies of this little book that changed my life and continues to outsell every investment book ever.
Investment books come along and, you know, they’re number 400, or 1000 or something for a while, and then all of a sudden, they’re number 25,000, or (Laugh) 200,000.
And this book — you know, in how many areas can you find any book that has had that sustained position? You go back and look at number one in 1950, or number two or number three, and you look at it in ’51 and ’52: They don’t continue.
I mean, they just don’t continue. Cookbooks, maybe one or two of them, last for a while, but there is nothing. And this book lives on, and everybody keeps bringing out new books, and saying a lot of other things. But they aren’t saying anything that’s as important as what he said in 1949 in this relatively thin little book.
So, you know, our vision for Berkshire is exactly what we said today: We want it to be a company that is owned by shareholders and behaves in a way that society is happy that it exists, and not unhappy. And we will have unlimited capital, we’ll get lots of talent, and we’ve got a base that can’t be beat.
And there’s no reason why it can’t be perpetuated, just like Ben’s book, and maybe be an example to other people. And, if so, we’ll be very happy. Charlie?
CHARLIE MUNGER: Yeah. One of the really interesting things about Ben Graham: He was a really gifted teacher, a very honorable profession. And that is what has lasted. However, an interesting fact that he was sheepish about in his old age, was that more than half of all the investment return that Ben Graham made in his whole life came from one stock, one growth stock: GEICO, Berkshire subsidiary.
And at the time he operated, there were a lot of sort of lousy companies that were too cheap, and you could make a little money floating from one to another. But the big money he made was one growth stock, buying one undervalued great company is a very good thing, as Berkshire has found out again and again and again.
WARREN BUFFETT: And Ben wrote a postscript to the ’49 edition pointing out exactly that fact, and acknowledging it, but also took some good lessons from it. “You know,” he said, “that’s the way life is: That you prepare, and you, you know, don’t lose on everything along the way, and then something comes along.”
And GEICO came along because a banker in Fort Worth that had financed Leo Davidson, and I think the banker got three-quarters of it. I don’t mean “Leo Davidson,” Leo Goodwin, who founded GEICO then called Government Employees Insurance Company, and you can figure out the acronym.
The deal almost fell apart. The deal was, as I remember, for maybe a million and a half or something like — a million and a quarter. And it almost fell apart because of a difference of $25,000 in the net worth delivered. This is a business that’s, you know, worth tens of billions.
But he pointed out the irony in that, too. I mean, he was honest, he was totally intellectually honest about the failings, and also the strengths, of his approach. And, to some extent, you know, Charlie and I have seen that in our lives.
I mean, sort of the prepared mind, the willingness to act when you need to act, and the willing to ignore every salesman in the world — and it’s imperative to ignore them, and it’s one or two things that make the right decision.
If you make the right decision on a spouse, I mean, you’ve won the game. You know, there’s an enormously important decision, and you’ve got all the time in the world. I mean, you’ve got more time than you used to have when I was a kid to make that decision.
And, you know, I don’t know whether a third, or whatever percentage, blow that one. You know, it is really interesting.
The thing to do is just keep trying to think things through and not do too many stupid things, “And, sooner or later, you have a lollapalooza,” as Charlie would say.
Section 27 翻譯：
27. 「本·葛拉漢的偉大投資書仍然受到歡迎」
BECKY QUICK: 第十個問題？
聽眾：首先，感謝您讓我們的生活更美好。我的名字是Bugomil Baranowsky，我是紐約Sicart Associates的創始合夥人。我們管理多代家族財富，所以我有一個問題。巴菲特先生，在您1976年對本傑明·格雷厄姆的致敬中，您寫道：“瓦爾特·利普曼曾談到那些種樹讓別人乘涼的人。本·格雷厄姆就是這樣一個人。您們兩位也是這樣的人。您能與我們分享您對伯克希爾的100年願景嗎？這是一個問題，問您們兩位。」
WARREN BUFFETT: 是的。我想再補充一件事關於本·葛拉漢。本·葛拉漢為我做了很多事情，他從未期望回報任何一件事。他做了所有事情，沒有隱藏任何期望的暗示。
我查過，他在1949年寫了一本書，某種意義上對我說，用非常有說服力的方式告訴我，我在之前的八九年中所投入和熱愛的一切都是錯誤的。我偶爾會在亞馬遜上檢查這本書的排名，亞馬遜根據銷售量對數以百萬計的書進行排名。
而本·葛拉漢的書一直位於前列，大約排在300、350或其他位置，持續不變。沒有其他書籍可以媲美它。前幾年來，投資書籍出現了很多，它們可能一度排在400位、1000位，然後突然間，它們排在25,000位、200,000位。
這本書在哪個領域可以找到一本能夠保持這種持續地位的書籍？你回頭看看1950年的第一名，或者1951年、1952年的第二名或第三名：它們沒有繼續存在。
我的意思是，它們就是不繼續存在。烹飪書可能有一兩本能夠持續一段時間，但其他書籍沒有。這本書繼續存在，每個人都在出版新書，說了很多其他的事情，但他們沒有說任何比他在1949年這本相對薄弱的書中所說的更重要的事情。
所以，我們對波克夏的願景正如我們今天所說的：我們希望它成為一家由股東擁有並且以一種讓社會滿意的方式運營的公司，而不是讓社會不滿意。我們將擁有無限的資本，將吸引很多人才，我們有一個無可比擬的基礎。
沒有理由不繼續下去，就像本的書一樣，也許成為其他人的榜樣。如果真的如此，我們將非常高興。Charlie，你有什麼想說的嗎？
CHARLIE MUNGER: 是的。本·葛拉漢的一個真正有趣的特點是，他是一個非常有才華的教師，這是一個非常榮譽的職業。而這也是他留下來的東西。然而，有趣的是，他在晚年對此感到有些尷尬，因為他整個生涯中，超過一半的投資回報來自一家股票，一家成長股票：GEICO，波克夏的子公司。
當時他經營的時候，有很多不好的公司很便宜，你可以從一家到另一家賺一點錢。但他賺到的大錢是一家成長股票，買進一家被低估的偉大公司是一件很好的事情，波克夏一次又一次地證明瞭這一點。
WARREN BUFFETT: 本在1949年的版中，寫了一個附言指出了這一事實，並承認了它，但也從中獲得了一些寶貴的教訓。他說：“你知道，這就是生活：你做好準備，不在途中失敗，然後某些機會出現了。”
GEICO就是這樣出現的，因為一位在沃斯堡的銀行家曾經資助了Leo Davidson，我認為這位銀行家獲得了其中的四分之三。我的意思是“Leo Davidson”不對，是Leo Goodwin，他創辦了GEICO，當時被稱為政府職員保險公司，你可以想出這個首字母縮略詞。
交易差點破裂。交易的價格，據我記得，大約是一百二十五萬美元。這是一家價值數百億的公司。
但他也指出了其中的諷刺。他完全誠實地談論了他的方法的失誤和優點。在某種程度上，Charlie和我在我們的生活中也看到了這一點。
我的意思是，預備的思維，需要時行動的意願，忽略所有業務員，這是不可或缺的，只需要一兩個正確的決策。
如果你在配偶上做出正確的決定，你就贏了這場遊戲。這是一個非常重要的決定，你有足夠的時間做出這個決定，比我小時候有更多的時間。
你知道，我不知道是否有三分之一或其他百分比的人犯了錯。這真的很有趣。
要做的就是繼續努力思考事情，不要做太多愚蠢的事情，“遲早會有一個巨大的成功”，正如Charlie所說的。
Section 27 會議摘要：
在這段會議紀要中，一位與會者提到了本傑明·格雷厄姆（Ben Graham）的投資書籍，並詢問巴菲特和蒙格對波克夏的百年願景的看法。巴菲特首先強調了格雷厄姆對他的影響，稱讚他是一位慷慨無私的人，書中所傳達的觀點改變了他的生活。
巴菲特提到，格雷厄姆於1949年出版的那本書至今仍然非常受歡迎，銷量一直居高不下，沒有其他投資書籍能與之媲美。他表示伯克希爾的願景與今天所宣揚的一致，希望成為一家受股東擁有並且受社會歡迎的公司，並且具有無限的資本、優秀的人才和強大的基礎。
蒙格則提到格雷厄姆是一位優秀的教師，他在一生中獲得的投資回報中，超過一半來自GEICO這一成長股票，這強調了買進一家被低估的優秀公司的重要性。巴菲特和蒙格都認為，在投資和生活中，關鍵在於做好準備、採取行動和選擇正確的機會。
重點是格雷厄姆的投資書籍對巴菲特和蒙格有著深遠的影響，並且在長期以來持續受到廣泛的讀者歡迎。他們希望波克夏能夠成為一個永久存在的公司，以格雷厄姆的書籍作為榜樣，吸引更多人關注和學習投資。同時，他們也強調了在投資和生活中的準備和正確決策的重要性。
Section 28 原文：
28. GEICO is talking to carmakers about selling insurance in the showroom
WARREN BUFFETT: OK. Becky?
BECKY QUICK: “All right. This question comes from Terafta (PH), a shareholder in Sierra Vista, Arizona, who is asking a question of Ajit.
He wants to know about electric vehicles getting insurance from the manufacturer instead of car insurance companies. A recent article in The Wall Street Journal shows that EVs are a small-but-growing percentage of sales. Tesla and GM are offering their own electric vehicle insurance: What will GEICO do to combat this?
AJIT JAIN: Yeah. So, GEICO is talking to a number of original equipment manufacturers as well to try and see how best they can work with the auto manufacturers and offer insurance at the point of sale. There haven’t been very many success stories (Laugh) as yet.
So, we’ll wait and see. You know, clearly, it is a very convenient way to sell auto insurance at the point of sale. But there’s a fair amount of data that needs to be collected on the driver, not just the car. And that makes it a little more complicated.
So, we are talking to some auto manufacturers ourselves, we are hopeful that we will strike a deal with some of them before too long.
Tesla and GM both have talked a lot in the press in terms of getting into the insurance business. And, in fact, GM, I think, has projected they’ll write $3 billion of premiums. Which, you know, it’s hard to imagine where it’ll come from. But there all hot to trot. I think somebody will find the secret sauce before too long, and we ourselves are in that race.
WARREN BUFFETT: Yeah. I would point out that — General Motors Insurance, for decades — and, I mean, this is not a new idea. And Uber wrote a lot of insurance for a while, they laid it off with somebody, and that company got killed by it. But — and I don’t know the deal between Uber and — I forget the name of the company that took it on, Ajit would probably know.
AJIT JAIN: James River.
WARREN BUFFETT: James — yeah. And, you know, it is not a new idea, it’s not magic in the least. I mean, it is hard to come up with something that is better at matching risk to reward — I’m sorry, risk to price, than a bunch of very smart people are doing at Progressive, and a bunch of very smart people are doing, to a greater extent, at GEICO.
And, I mean, it just was fascinating to me when Uber went into it, you know? And they were going to get their head handed to them. But they laid off a good bit of it — a very substantial percentage of it, with somebody else, who got their head handed to them.
(Laugh) And, you know, but it was a story, you know, and Wall Street loves it. We’ve got 80 car dealerships that do a lot of business, and, you know, we’ve got the people buying the cars, and the place, and we form an insurance company around those dealer groups, for some reason, that writes insurance: You know, it’s hard to improve on the present system. And — (Laugh)
AJIT JAIN: Yeah.
WARREN BUFFETT: I wouldn’t pay a penny — oh, I’d pay to avoid it, actually. I mean — (laughs) and — go ahead, Ajit.
AJIT JAIN: Yeah. The only point I’d like to add is the margins on writing auto insurance are 4%. Which is a very small number, and once there are more people that are trying to take a bite of the apple, it just becomes very, very difficult to keep all the mouths fed in a profitable manner.
WARREN BUFFETT: Yeah. You can say there was one big, new idea in property — in car insurance, back in 1920 or so when State Farm started, and State Farm still has it. Next to Berkshire, it’s the leader in having net worth. It’s a mutual company, but some guy just figured that there was a cartel running car insurance. “A Farmer from Merna” is the name of the book, I think, over in Illinois, and he created a system where he really took 20 points or so out of the cost.
And surprise, surprise, here he is, you know? And nobody’s owned stock in State Farm — it’s an insult to capitalism, actually. Everything (Laughs) you learned at the business school says it shouldn’t work, because nobody owns it, nobody’s going public with it, no nothing.
But it’s got more net worth — it’s almost probably double. Leaving Berkshire out of the picture, it’s probably double the next guy, and nobody’s really improved on their system that much.
So, it’s fascinating how people don’t really look at the essence. You know, these are cases that should carry a message. But the truth is, in Wall Street anything can get sold.
The test is whether you can sell it or not. If you can sell it, it’ll get sold, and a bunch of insurance companies came along and got it sold. And this can be a story about this stock or that stock, and it sounded good when they talked about it at Uber for a while. And it is really interesting. The investing public does not learn much.
Section 28 翻譯：
28. GEICO正在與車廠商討論在車展銷售保險
貝基·奎克（Becky Quick）：「好的，這個問題來自阿利桑那州塞拉維斯塔（Sierra Vista）的股東Terafta（暫譯），他想向Ajit提問。
他想瞭解有關電動車從製造商而非汽車保險公司獲得保險的情況。《華爾街日報》最近的一篇文章顯示，電動車在銷售中所占比例雖然還很小，但正在逐漸增加。特斯拉和通用汽車都提供自家的電動車保險。GEICO將採取什麼措施來應對這一情況呢？」
AJIT JAIN：「是的，GEICO正在與一些汽車製造商進行對話，試圖找出如何在汽車銷售時提供保險的最佳方式。迄今為止，並沒有太多成功的案例（笑）。
所以，我們將拭目以待。顯然，這是一種在汽車銷售時方便銷售汽車保險的方式。但是，需要收集大量有關駕駛員的數據，而不僅僅是汽車的數據。這使得事情變得更加複雜。
所以，我們自己也正在與一些汽車製造商進行對話，我們希望不久之後能與其中一些達成協議。
特斯拉和通用汽車都在媒體上談論著進入保險業務。事實上，我想通用汽車預計他們將寫入30億美元的保費。這很難想像這些保費從哪裡來。但他們都熱衷於這一領域。我想在不久的將來，有人會找到成功的秘訣，而我們自己也在這場競爭中。」
WARREN BUFFETT：「是的。我想指出，通用汽車保險已經存在數十年了——這不是一個新點子。而且Uber曾經寫過很多保險，他們與一家公司合作，後來那家公司就因此倒閉了。但是——我不知道Uber和——我忘了那家接手的公司的名字，Ajit可能知道。
AJIT JAIN：「是James River。」
WARREN BUFFETT：「對，James——是的。你知道，這不是一個新點子，一點也不神奇。比起前進保險公司（Progressive）的一群非常聰明的人，和更多的非常聰明的人，就在於把風險與價格更好地匹配的方法上，我覺得很有趣。我當時對Uber進入這一領域很感興趣，你知道，他們肯定會失敗。但是他們將其中很大一部分交給了別人，而那家公司就被這事害死了。
（笑）你知道，這就是一個故事，華爾街就是喜歡這些故事。我們擁有80家汽車經銷店，業務非常繁忙，而且我們有買車的人，還有地方，我們圍繞這些經銷商群體創建了一家保險公司，你知道，要改進現有的體系是很難的。哈哈（笑）
AJIT JAIN：「是的。」
WARREN BUFFETT：「我不會花一分錢——哦，我寧願花錢避免它，真的。（笑）而且——請繼續，Ajit。」
AJIT JAIN：「是的。我只想補充一點，寫汽車保險的利潤率只有4％。這個數字很小，一旦有更多人試圖分一杯羹，就很難以盈利的方式供養所有人。
WARREN BUFFETT：「是的。可以說，1920年左右，汽車保險中有一個大而新的點子，當時州農場（State Farm）開始運營，而且到現在州農場仍然保持著這一點子。在波克夏之外，它是資產淨值方面的領導者。它是一家相互保險公司，但有個人發現汽車保險是由一個卡特爾壟斷運營的。《一個來自默納的農民》是那本書的名字，我想，它在伊利諾伊州，他創建了一個系統，真的從成本中省了20個點左右。
令人驚訝的是，他在這裡，你知道？沒有人擁有州農場的股份——對資本主義來說這是一種侮辱。商學院裡學到的一切（笑），它不應該成功，因為沒有人擁有它，沒有人將其上市，什麼都沒有。
但它的資產淨值更高——它可能是第二名的兩倍，而且沒有人真的在那方面對他們的體系進行了太多改進。
所以，這真是有趣，人們並沒有真正看到本質。你知道，這些案例應該傳達出一個信息。但事實上，在華爾街上，任何東西都可以賣掉。
關鍵是你是否能夠將其賣出。如果你能賣出它，它就會賣出去，有些保險公司來了，把它賣出去。這可能是關於這檔股票或那檔股票的故事，當他們談論它時，它聽起來很好。真的很有趣，投資大眾並沒有學到太多。」
Section 28 會議摘要：
這段會議紀要討論了關於汽車保險的議題。GEICO（波克夏旗下的保險公司）正在與汽車製造商進行對話，以在展廳銷售保險。目前還沒有太多成功的案例，因為這需要收集有關駕駛人的大量數據，而不僅僅是車輛資訊，這使得這個過程變得更加複雜。
與此同時，特斯拉和通用汽車等公司已經開始提供自己的電動車保險。GEICO也在與一些汽車製造商進行對話，希望能夠與他們達成協議。
在討論中，Warren Buffett提到了汽車保險業的利潤率只有4％，並指出在過去曾有類似的業務模式，但這不是一個新點子。他強調前進保險公司（Progressive）和GEICO等公司已經在風險與價格之間找到了很好的平衡。
此外，他提到了State Farm這家保險公司，它在汽車保險領域有著很高的地位和資產淨值，並且沒有太多公司能夠真正改進他們的系統。
他還強調投資大眾並沒有從這些案例中學到太多，而在華爾街上，任何事情只要能夠被賣出，就有市場。
Section 29 原文：
29. Index funds are ‘backing off’ from using voting power
WARREN BUFFETT: OK. Station 11.
AUDIENCE MEMBER: Hi. My name’s Jeff Merriam (PH). I’m from Edina, Minnesota. We’ve been coming for years. To make that professor from the earlier question really nervous, half our family’s wealth is in Berkshire Hathaway. (Laugh)
WARREN BUFFETT: (Laugh) But let’s make Charlie nervous. (Laugh)
AUDIENCE MEMBER: My question has to do with voting control in the future. There was a question earlier about corporate raider. I was more wondering about who is actually going to own the voting control? Is it going to be institutions? CalPERS? BlackRock? Are they eventually going to get their way with the ESG checkboxes that we’re going to have to check? And what should we be thinking about that?
WARREN BUFFETT: Well, you’re thinking very well. And the interesting thing is the big aggregations look like, of course, they’d be in index funds. But what index funds want is they want a world in which society doesn’t get upset with them about the fact they’ve got all the voting power. And I would say in the last year or two it’s looked like a better idea for them not quite to get as — what was the phrase that Charlie used?
CHARLIE MUNGER: But they’ve backed off a lot.
WARREN BUFFETT: Yeah, they backed off a lot. And it’s in their interest to back off. And, interestingly enough, in looking at money management, you know, the game is not performance, it’s assets under management. And index funds produce a tiny, tiny, tiny fee on assets under management. Because it was pioneered by Vanguard, and when it became successful it was very easy to replicate. Not so “easy,” but, I mean, it was inevitable that it be copied.
But it came with a management fee of two basis points. So, what people that have offered index funds would really like is you to buy their other funds, or let them manage money in some other way, so that they get higher fee on assets under management.
Which, of course, is (Laugh) exactly why the index fund was invented in the first place. So, it’s not a “loss leader,” but it is a way to pull money in, and then you hope that people ignore what was said by —what’s the name that — you know, that — John Bogel — Jack Bogel — ignore him.
And, essentially, they give up the (UNINTEL) idea, “And that we’ll offer you a fund that does this in India, and we’ll offer you another fund that does that.” And, of course, those management fees are higher.
So, they’re really counter-selling the idea that John Bogel came along with. But in the process, they have achieved a lot of votes, and that was fun for a while, but the last thing in the world they want to do is have Washington, or the American public, decide that they’re throwing around their weight too much.
So, they’re tending to back off. Now, if you figure out where their self-interest is, you can judge where their behavior is going to go. Charlie? You want to defend them? (Laugh)
CHARLIE MUNGER: No, you can square what you just said. (Laugh) You’re totally right on everything.
WARREN BUFFETT: Well, in that case I won’t ask anybody else.
Section 29 翻譯：
29. 指數基金正在「減少」使用投票權力
WARREN BUFFETT: 好的，第11個。
觀眾：嗨，我的名字是Jeff Merriam（音譯），來自明尼蘇達州的Edina。我們多年來一直都來參加股東會。為了讓之前的那位教授真的感到緊張，我們家一半的財富都在波克夏。
WARREN BUFFETT: （笑）但我們要讓Charlie感到緊張。（笑）
觀眾：我的問題與未來的投票控制有關。之前有人問到了關於企業掠奪者的問題，我更想知道的是誰將真正擁有投票控制權？是機構嗎？加州公務員退休基金（CalPERS）？貝萊德（BlackRock）？他們最終是否會以我們必須勾選的ESG核選框為條件而獲得他們的意願？我們應該如何思考這個問題？
WARREN BUFFETT: 哦，你的思考很好。有趣的是，大型機構似乎會選擇指數基金。但指數基金希望的是，他們希望在社會不因他們擁有所有投票權而對他們感到不滿。我會說，在過去一兩年中，對他們來說，似乎不再完全獲得——Charlie用了什麼詞？
CHARLIE MUNGER: 但他們已經大大減少了。
WARREN BUFFETT: 是的，他們已經大大減少了。這符合他們的利益。有趣的是，在看待資金管理方面，遊戲規則不是表現，而是資產管理。指數基金對資產管理的費用非常非常非常低。因為Vanguard公司開創了這一概念，當它成功後，很容易被複製。不是那麼「容易」，但我們可以說是不可避免地被複製。
但它帶來的管理費用只有兩個基點。所以，那些提供指數基金的人實際上希望你購買他們的其他基金，或者讓他們以其他方式管理資金，以便獲得更高的管理費用。
這當然也是指數基金最初被發明的原因。它不是一種「拋售產品」，而是一種吸引資金的方式，然後你希望人們忽視約翰·柏格爾（John Bogle）所說的話。
而且，他們提供了一些其他基金，做一些其他的投資。當然，這些基金的管理費用更高。
所以，他們實際上在反銷約翰·柏格爾帶來的理念。但在此過程中，他們獲得了很多選票，這在一段時間內是有趣的。但他們最不想看到的是華盛頓或美國公眾決定他們過分使用權力。
所以，他們傾向於退縮。現在，如果你能找出他們的自身利益在哪裡，你就可以判斷他們的行為將會怎樣。Charlie？你想為他們辯護嗎？（笑）
CHARLIE MUNGER: 不，你剛才說的完全正確。（笑）你對一切都是對的。
WARREN BUFFETT: 那麼，在這種情況下，我就不問其他人了。
Section 29 會議摘要：
這段會議紀要中，股東提問了關於未來的投票控制權的問題，特別提到了機構如CalPERS和BlackRock是否最終會以ESG核選框為條件獲得投票控制權。巴菲特表示，指數基金（index funds）在過去一兩年已經大幅減少使用投票權力，因為他們希望避免社會對他們擁有所有投票權的不滿。此外，指數基金的目標是資產管理，而不是追求高表現，因此他們希望通過銷售其他基金或以其他方式管理資金來獲得更高的管理費用。
巴菲特進一步指出，指數基金的管理費用非常低，因為它們是根據資產管理量來收取費用的。然而，指數基金的成功被其他公司複製，這些公司可能希望通過提供其他基金來獲得更高的管理費用。指數基金在過去獲得了很多選票，但他們不希望引起華盛頓或美國公眾對他們過度使用權力的不滿，因此他們傾向於減少使用投票權力。
巴菲特和蒙格指出，瞭解指數基金的自身利益可以判斷它們的行為走向。整個討論的重點在於指數基金在管理投票權力方面的角色和行為變化。
Section 30 原文：
30. Buffett: Greg Abel ‘understands capital allocation as well as I do’
WARREN BUFFETT: OK. Becky? (Laughter)
BECKY QUICK: All right. This question comes from Almu (PH) Grinnell (PH), and this is for Warren and Greg.
“Since 2019 Berkshire repurchased huge amounts of stock, reducing approximately 10% of the share count, and increasing the intrinsic value per share for the continuing shareholders. Greg is expected to be the successor of Warren as CEO, so will he be in charge of the main capital allocation decisions, including future share buybacks?
Greg has been key in the development of Berkshire Hathaway Energy, and I think a good capital allocator. Has he been involved in the share repurchases that have been executed over the past years?
And do you, both Warren and Greg, work together in the estimation of Berkshire’s intrinsic value, and the share buyback decisions?”
WARREN BUFFETT: Well, the answer is that Greg — I’m going to turn it over to him, but the answer is Greg understands capital allocation as well as I do, and that’s lucky for us.
And he will make those decisions, I think, very much in the same framework as I would make them. And we’ve laid out that framework now for 30 years, (Laugh) or something like that. People make it way more complicated than — I mean, particularly if you’re working on a doctorate or something, it’s just a great subject to have lots of footnotes in, you know, 50 pages, or 100 pages.
But it’s no more complicated than if you and I and Charlie had a business, and you wanted to sell your interest, and we could buy it for less than we thought it was worth, and without misleading you in any way about what was going on. And we’d buy it then. But, Greg, you’re on because you’re going to be doing it in the future. (Laugh)
GREG ABEL: Right. Yeah, well, I think, Warren, you said it really well. I mean, the framework’s been laid out, we know how you approach it, and how you and Charlie have approached it, and really don’t see that framework changing. When the opportunity present itself, we’ll want to be an active repurchaser of Berkshire shares. We think it’s a great outcome for Berkshire shareholders to own a larger piece of each of our operating businesses and the portfolio of the equity companies when the opportunity presents itself.
WARREN BUFFETT: It can be the dumbest thing you can do, or it can be the smartest thing you can do. And (Laugh) you know, to make it more complicated than that, and start getting into all this (UNINTEL), you obviously do what the business needs to do first if the opportunities are there: Grow your present business, buy additional businesses, whatever it may be.
And then you make a decision on dividends. But that decision becomes pretty irrevocable because you don’t cut dividends without having major effects in your shareholder base and a lot of things.
And then, if you’ve got ample capital, and you don’t see that you’re going to use it all, and your stock is attractive, and it enhances the intrinsic value for the remaining shareholders, it’s a no-brainer.
And if it’s above the price of intrinsic value, it’s a no-brainer that you don’t even listen to anybody, no matter what investment banker comes in and tells you, “Here’s how to do a repurchase program.”
Section 30 翻譯：
30. 巴菲特：葛列格·阿貝爾「對資本配置的理解與我一樣」
BECKY QUICK: 好的。 Becky?（笑）
BECKY QUICK：這個問題來自Almu (PH) Grinnell（PH），是關於華倫和葛列格的。問題是：
「自2019年以來，波克夏回購了大量股票，減少了約10％的股份數量，同時提高了每股的內在價值，使持續的股東受益。葛列格被認為是華倫的繼任者，那麼他是否將負責主要的資本配置決策，包括未來的股票回購？
葛列格在波克夏能源的發展中扮演了重要角色，也是一位元出色的資本配置者。他是否參與了過去幾年的股票回購？而你們兩位，華倫和葛列格，是否一起估計波克夏的內在價值和股票回購決策？」
WARREN BUFFETT：好的，答案是葛列格——我把這個問題交給他，但答案是葛列格對資本配置的理解與我一樣好，我們真幸運。
我認為他會在與我相同的框架下做出這些決策。我們已經確立了這個框架已經30年了，或者說差不多。人們把它弄得比實際情況更複雜，特別是對於那些攻讀博士學位的人，這是一個可以加註腳註、有50頁或100頁的很棒的主題。
但事實上，它沒有那麼複雜，就好像你、我和查理經營一家企業，你想出售你的利益，而我們可以以低於我們認為價值的價格買下來，同時不以任何方式欺騙你。那麼我們就會買下來。但是，葛列格，你要準備接手了。（笑）
GREG ABEL：沒錯。是的，我認為，華倫，你說得很好。框架已經確立，我們知道你的方法，以及你和查理的方法，我不認為這個框架會改變。當機會出現時，我們會成為波克夏股東的積極回購者。我們認為，當機會出現時，持有波克夏股份的股東能夠擁有我們經營業務和股票組合中各個公司更大的一部分是一個很好的結果。
WARREN BUFFETT：這可能是你能做的最愚蠢的事情，也可能是你能做的最明智的事情。你知道，如果把它弄得比這更複雜，並開始涉及所有這些（未理解之物），那你顯然做了業務首先需要做的事情，如果有機會的話：發展現有業務，購買其他業務，或者其他什麼。
然後你就要作出股息的決定。但這個決定是相當不可撤銷的，因為你不能削減股息而不對股東基礎和其他許多方面產生重大影響。
如果你有足夠的資本，而且你看不到你將如何使用它，而且你的股票具有吸引力，它增加了剩餘股東的內在價值，那就是明智的選擇。
如果股票價格高於內在價值，那麼無論什麼投資銀行家來告訴你“這是如何進行回購計劃的”，你都不需要聽他們的建議。（笑）
Section 30 會議摘要：
在這段會議紀要中，一位股東問到關於未來的投票控制權歸屬問題，以及葛列格·阿貝爾是否會負責主要的資本配置決策，包括未來的股票回購。華倫·巴菲特回答表示，葛列格對資本配置的理解與他一樣出色，這對波克夏而言是一大幸運。
他補充說葛列格將在未來做出這些決策，並以相同的框架進行。巴菲特強調波克夏已經確立了30年的資本配置框架，並且這個框架並不比人們想像的那麼複雜。資本配置的核心在於以合理的價格購買公司股份，使剩餘股東的內在價值增加。
此外，葛列格阿貝爾也表示，當機會出現時，他們希望成為波克夏的積極回購者，這對股東來說是一個很好的結果，因為他們能夠擁有波克夏各個運營業務和股票組合中的更大份額。
重點是葛列格對資本配置有深入的理解，他將在未來負責進行資本配置決策，並與巴菲特一起評估波克夏的內在價值和股票回購決策。同時，巴菲特提到，資本配置不應該被過分複雜化，關鍵在於根據機會和股票內在價值來做出明智的決策。
Section 31 原文：
31. Munger has two words for COVID vaccine skeptic
WARREN BUFFETT: OK: Station 1.
AUDIENCE MEMBER: I’m Tom Nelson, a podcaster from North Oaks, Minnesota.
Charlie, in 2022 you used phrases like, “really massively stupid,” “massive kind of ignorance,” and “crazy” to describe what you said was the 30% of Americans hesitant to submit themselves to untested mRNA COVID gene therapy. Do you stand behind those quotes today?
CHARLIE MUNGER: Yeah. Sure. (Laughter and applause)
WARREN BUFFETT: Well, we got time for one more, then, before lunch.
Section 31 翻譯：
31. Munger對於COVID疫苗懷疑論者只有兩個詞
WARREN BUFFETT: 好的，第1個站。
股東：我是Tom Nelson，來自明尼蘇達州North Oaks的播客主持人。
Charlie，在2022年，你用了一些詞語，如“非常愚蠢”，“極度無知”和“瘋狂”，來形容你所說的30%的美國人對未經測試的mRNA COVID基因治療持懷疑態度。你今天還支持這些言論嗎？
CHARLIE MUNGER: 是的。當然。（笑聲和掌聲）
WARREN BUFFETT: 好的，那麼在午餐之前，我們還有時間回答一個問題。
Section 32 原文：
32. ‘It’s hard to judge successor management in a really good business’ like Berkshire
WARREN BUFFETT: (Laughter) Becky?
BECKY QUICK: OK. (Laughter) Thought I was out, but let’s see. How about — let’s see here — (Laughter)
WARREN BUFFETT: Could be, “How about lunch?” pretty soon. But —
BECKY QUICK: (Laugh) No, no, OK. Let’s take that one for you. This one comes from Drew Estes. This is a question for Warren: “In your 1969 Letter to Partners you said, ‘In any company where the founder and chief driving force behind the enterprise is still active, it’s still very difficult to evaluate second men.’”
‘“The only real way to see how someone is going to do when running a company is to let them run it.’
This wise statement now applies to Berkshire. Once the ‘second men’ are running Berkshire, what would you advise owners of Berkshire to watch for? Specifically what actions, if taken, should give us concern?”
WARREN BUFFETT: Well, I think I would have some comfort in the fact that 99% of my net worth is (Laugh) in the company — so I’ve probably got a stronger interest in it, and perhaps $100 billion or more of philanthropy will be affected by it. But I would say that I don’t have a second choice. I mean, it is that tough to find, but I’ve also seen Greg in action, and I feel 100% comfortable.
And, like I say, I don’t know: If something happened to Greg I would tell the directors, you know, they have a problem, and I don’t have anybody to name, and if they put somebody in Berkshire on automatic pilot, it can work extremely well for a long time.
I mean, it isn’t like the businesses go away or any other thing of the sort. And it’s hard to judge successor management in a really good business. Because if they don’t show up at the office, it’ll keep working for a long time. And maybe that lack of useful input may show itself in five years. I mean, it may go a long, long, long time.
And how are the shareholders, you know, advised by a bunch of people that are concerned about whether you’re meeting earnings projections or something telling them whether the management’s any good? It is very, very hard, it’s very hard. I’ve been on the board of 20 companies: It’s very hard. If you asked me to rank the management of each one, it’s very difficult to do.
Because some are just better businesses than others. Some would be better off not managed hardly at all. Others really need help, but they got a lousy business. And Tom Murphy told me a long, long, long time ago, he said, “The secret of business is to buy a good business. And it’s OK to inherit one, too.” (Laugh)
And Greg is inheriting a good business, and I think he will make it better. But I don’t think it’s easy to put any one of the next ten nominees in and try and judge, three years later, whether they’ve done a good job or not. So, that’ll be a very interesting job for the board.
But it shouldn’t listen to Wall Street on it. They’ve got the job. If they put somebody in — if there’s a surprise, we both go down in a plane, they put somebody in, they’ve got a real job in assessing that person. I mean, it will depend on how good he or she is as a talker, it’ll depend on, you know, them courting Wall Street to be supportive of them, all kinds of things.
And we’ve got some very good people on the board, but they would be challenged in that position, as would I, where I have been in that position in other companies, where a very great leader has left, and on the way from the funeral, you know, nobody knows what to do exactly.
Section 32 翻譯：
32. “在一家像波克夏這樣的優秀企業中，很難評估繼任管理層”
WARREN BUFFETT:（笑聲）Becky？
BECKY QUICK: 好的。（笑聲）以為我可以休息了，但是讓我看看。嗯……
WARREN BUFFETT: 很快就到午餐時間了。但是……
BECKY QUICK:（笑）不，不，好的。這個問題來自Drew Estes。這是給Warren的問題：“在你1969年的合夥人信中，你說過，‘在創始人和企業的主要推動力仍然活躍的任何公司中，評估第二個人非常困難。’
‘唯一真正瞭解一個人在經營一家公司時的表現的方法是讓他們去運營。’
這個明智的陳述現在適用于波克夏。一旦‘第二個人’開始運營波克夏，你會建議波克夏的所有者注意什麼？具體來說，如果採取了什麼行動，我們應該感到擔憂？”
WARREN BUFFETT: 嗯，我想我會對此感到安心，因為我淨資產的99%（笑）在這家公司裡——所以我對此可能有更大的興趣，而且也許1000億美元或更多的慈善事業將受到影響。但我要說，我沒有第二選擇。我是說，這很難找到，但我也看到了Greg的行動，我感到100%的舒適。
而且，我不知道，如果Greg發生了什麼事，我會告訴董事們，他們有麻煩了，而我沒有其他人可以提名，如果他們讓某人自動管理波克夏，這可能會在很長時間內非常成功。
我是說，這並不意味著業務會消失或其他什麼。在一個真正優秀的企業中，很難評估繼任管理層。因為如果他們不去辦公室，它會長期運作。而且也許這種缺乏有用的投入可能在五年後顯現出來。我是說，它可能會持續很長時間。
而股東們又是如何接收一群關注你是否滿足盈利預期之類的人告訴他們管理層是否出色的建議呢？這是非常非常困難的，非常困難。我在20家公司的董事會任職過：這非常困難。如果你讓我對每一家公司的管理進行排名，這是非常困難的。
因為有些公司只是比其他公司更好。有些公司幾乎不需要管理。有些公司確實需要幫助，但它們是糟糕的企業。湯姆·墨菲很久很久以前告訴我，他說，“經商的秘訣是購買一家好公司。繼承一家好公司也可以。”（笑）
Greg正在繼承一家優秀的公司，我認為他會使其更好。但是我不認為任何一個下一任提名人的表現都很容易判斷，就在三年後判斷他們是否做得好。所以，這對於董事會來說將是一項非常有意思的工作。
但他們不應該聽取華爾街的意見。這是他們的工作。如果他們讓某人出任——如果發生意外，我們兩個一起墜機，他們任命某人，他們在評估那個人時將面臨真正的挑戰。我是說，這將取決於他或她作為一個說客有多好，這將取決於他們爭取華爾街的支持，各種各樣的事情。
我們的董事會有一些非常出色的人，但他們將面臨這個位置的挑戰，就像我曾經在其他公司中處於這個位置一樣，在那裡一個偉大的領導者離開後，在從葬禮回來的路上，你知道，沒有人確切地知道該怎麼做。
Section 32 會議摘要：
在這段會議中，有人問到關於繼任者管理層的問題，具體是關於當繼任者接管波克夏後，如何評估他們的表現以及應該注意哪些行動可能引起擔憂。巴菲特表示他對波克夏的繼任者管理層有信心，他認為Greg（預計是繼任者）和他自己一樣懂得資本配置，他們會在相同的框架下進行決策。然而，他也提到在一個優秀的企業中很難評估繼任管理層，因為即使他們不在辦公室出現，企業也能長期運作良好。巴菲特認為評估繼任者管理層是一項非常有挑戰性的任務，但他相信董事會會承擔起這個責任，而不應聽取華爾街的意見。他強調企業的優秀性是重要的，而在好的企業中，管理層可能起到的作用相對較小。
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