2023/06/14 美國聯邦公開市場委員會新聞發布會 (FOMC Press Conference)

本篇主要關注6/14美國聯邦公開市場委員會新聞發布會(FOMC Press Conference)，包含委員會聲明、FOMC的經濟預測，另外也收錄6/21 鮑爾主席向國會提交的半年度貨幣政策報告。本篇提供OT自我學習使用，如果覺得有幫助的朋友也歡迎轉載並註明出處。

圖片來源：Wikimedia

內容：

• Federal Reserve issues FOMC statement
• Transcript of Chair Powell’s Press Conference
• Summary of Economic Projections
• Forecast Uncertainty
• Semiannual Monetary Policy Report to the Congress

Federal Reserve issues FOMC statement

(https://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/pressreleases/monetary20230614a.htm)

Recent indicators suggest that economic activity has continued to expand at a modest pace. Job gains have been robust in recent months, and the unemployment rate has remained low. Inflation remains elevated.

The U.S. banking system is sound and resilient. Tighter credit conditions for households and businesses are likely to weigh on economic activity, hiring, and inflation. The extent of these effects remains uncertain. The Committee remains highly attentive to inflation risks.

The Committee seeks to achieve maximum employment and inflation at the rate of 2 percent over the longer run. In support of these goals, the Committee decided to maintain the target range for the federal funds rate at 5 to 5-1/4 percent. Holding the target range steady at this meeting allows the Committee to assess additional information and its implications for monetary policy. In determining the extent of additional policy firming that may be appropriate to return inflation to 2 percent over time, the Committee will take into account the cumulative tightening of monetary policy, the lags with which monetary policy affects economic activity and inflation, and economic and financial developments. In addition, the Committee will continue reducing its holdings of Treasury securities and agency debt and agency mortgage-backed securities, as described in its previously announced plans. The Committee is strongly committed to returning inflation to its 2 percent objective.

In assessing the appropriate stance of monetary policy, the Committee will continue to monitor the implications of incoming information for the economic outlook. The Committee would be prepared to adjust the stance of monetary policy as appropriate if risks emerge that could impede the attainment of the Committee's goals. The Committee's assessments will take into account a wide range of information, including readings on labor market conditions, inflation pressures and inflation expectations, and financial and international developments.

本段新聞稿在說明經濟活動持續以適度的速度擴張，近幾個月的就業增長強勁，失業率保持低位，然而，通脹仍然居高不下。美國的銀行系統健全且有韌性，對家庭和企業的信貸條件收緊可能會對經濟活動、就業和通脹產生影響，這些影響的程度仍然不確定。委員會高度關注通脹風險。

委員會的目標是實現最大就業和長期通脹率為2%。為了支持這些目標，委員會決定將聯邦基金利率的目標範圍維持在5%至5.25%。在這次會議上保持目標範圍穩定，使委員會能夠評估額外的信息及其對貨幣政策的影響。並且委員會將繼續減少其持有的國庫券和機構債券以及機構抵押貸款支持證券，如其先前公布的計劃所述。委員會堅定地致力於將通脹回歸其2%的目標。

在評估適當的貨幣政策立場時，委員會將繼續監控新進信息對經濟前景的影響。如果出現可能阻礙委員會達成目標的風險，委員會將準備適當調整貨幣政策的立場。委員會的評估將考慮到廣泛的信息，包括勞動市場狀況、通脹壓力和通脹預期以及金融和國際發展的讀數。

Transcript of Chair Powell’s Press Conference

(https://www.federalreserve.gov/mediacenter/files/FOMCpresconf20230614.pdf)

CHAIR POWELL.  Good afternoon.  My colleagues and I remain squarely focused on our dual mandate to promote maximum employment and stable prices for the American people.  We understand the hardship that high inflation is causing, and we remain strongly committed to bringing inflation back down to our 2 percent goal.  Price stability is the responsibility of the Federal Reserve.  Without price stability, the economy doesn’t work for anyone.  In particular, without price stability, we will not achieve a sustained period of strong labor market conditions that benefit all. 

Since early last year, the FOMC has significantly tightened the stance of monetary policy.  We have raised our policy interest rate by 5 percentage points, and we’ve continued to reduce our securities holdings at a brisk pace.  We’ve covered a lot of ground, and the full effects of our tightening have yet to be felt.  In light of how far we’ve come in tightening policy, the uncertain lags with which monetary policy affects the economy, and potential headwinds from credit tightening, today we decided to leave our policy interest rate unchanged and to continue to reduce our securities holdings.  Looking ahead, nearly all Committee participants view it as likely that some further rate increases will be appropriate this year to bring inflation down to 2 percent over time.  And I will have more to say about monetary policy after briefly reviewing economic developments. 

The U.S. economy slowed significantly last year, and recent indicators suggest that economic activity has continued to expand at a modest pace.  Although growth in consumer spending has picked up this year, activity in the housing sector remains weak, largely reflecting higher mortgage rates.  Higher interest rates and slower output growth also appear to be weighing on business fixed investment.  Committee participants generally expect subdued growth to continue.  In our Summary of Economic Projections, the median projection has real GDP growth at 1.0 percent this year and 1.1 percent next year, well below the median estimate of the longer-run normal growth rate.  

The labor market remains very tight.  Over the past three months, payroll job gains averaged a robust 283,000 jobs per month.  The unemployment rate moved up but remained low in May at 3.7 percent.  There are some signs that supply and demand in the labor market are coming into better balance.  The labor force participation rate has moved up in recent months, particularly for individuals aged 25 to 54 years.  Nominal wage growth has shown signs of easing, and job vacancies have declined so far this year.  While the jobs-to-workers gap has declined, labor demand still substantially exceeds the supply of available workers.  FOMC participants expect supply and demand conditions in the labor market to come into better balance over time, easing upward pressures on inflation.  The median unemployment rate projection in the SEP rises to 4.1 percent at the end of this year and 4.5 percent at the end of next year. 

Inflation remains well above our longer-run 2 percent goal.  Over the 12 months ending in April, total PCE proces—prices rose 4.4 percent; excluding the volatile food and energy categories, core PCE prices rose 4.7 percent.  In May, the 12-month change in the consumer price index came in at 4 percent, and the change in the core, core CPI was 5.3 percent.  Inflation has moderated somewhat since the middle of last year.  Nonetheless, inflation pressures continue to run high, and the process of getting inflation back down to 2 percent has a long way to go.  The median projection in the SEP for total PCE inflation is 3.2 percent this year, 2.5 percent next year, and 2.1 percent in 2025.  Core PCE inflation, which excludes volatile food and energy prices, is projected to run higher than total inflation, and the median projection has been revised in the SEP up to 3.9 percent this year.  Despite elevated inflation, longer-term inflation expectations appear to remain well anchored, as reflected in a broad range of surveys of households, businesses, and forecasters, as well as measures from financial markets. 

The Fed’s monetary policy actions are guided by our mandate to promote maximum employment and price—and stable prices for the American people.  My colleagues and I are acutely aware that high inflation imposes hardship, as it erodes purchasing power, especially for those least able to meet the higher costs of essentials like food, housing, and transportation.  We are highly attentive to the risks that high inflation poses to both sides of our mandate, and we’re strongly committed to returning inflation to our 2 percent objective. 

As I noted earlier, since early last year, we’ve raised our policy rate by 5 percentage points.  We have been seeing the effects of our policy tightening on demand in the most interest rate–sensitive sectors of the economy, especially housing and investment.  It will take time, however, for the full effects of monetary restraint to be realized, especially on inflation. 

The economy is facing headwinds from tighter credit conditions for households and businesses, which are likely to weigh on economic activity, hiring, and inflation.  The extent of these effects remains uncertain. 

In light of how far we’ve come in tightening policy, the uncertain lags with which monetary policy affects the economy, and potential headwinds from credit tightening, the Committee decided at today’s meeting to maintain the target range for the federal funds rate at 

5 to 5¼ percent and to continue the process of significantly reducing our securities holdings. 

As I noted earlier, nearly, nearly all Committee participants expect that it will be appropriate to raise interest rates somewhat further by the end of the year.  But at this meeting, considering how far and how fast we’ve moved, we judged it prudent to hold the target range steady to allow the Committee to assess additional information and its implications for monetary policy.  In determining the extent of additional policy firming that may be appropriate to return inflation to 2 percent over time, the Committee will take into account the cumulative tightening of monetary policy, the lags with which monetary policy affects economic activity and inflation, and economic and financial developments.   

In our SEP, participants wrote down their individual assessments of an appropriate path for the federal funds rate based on what each participant judges to be the most likely scenario going forward.  If the economy evolves as projected, the median participant projects that the appropriate level of the federal funds rate will be 5.6 percent at the end of this year, 4.6 percent at the end of 2024, and 3.4 percent at the end of 2025.  For the end of this year, the median projection is ½ percentage point higher than in our March projections.  I hasten to add, as always, that these projections are not a Committee decision or plan.  If the economy does not evolve as projected, the path for policy will adjust as appropriate to foster our maximumemployment and price-stability goals.  We will continue to make our decisions meeting by meeting, based on the totality of incoming data and their implications for the outlook for economic activity and inflation, as well as the balance of risks. 

We remain committed to bringing inflation—bringing inflation back down to our 2 percent goal and to keeping longer-term inflation expectations well anchored.  Reducing inflation is likely to require a period of below-trend growth and some softening of labor market conditions.  Restoring price stability is essential to set the stage for achieving maximum employment and stable prices over the longer run. 

To conclude:  We understand that our actions affect communities, families, and businesses across the country.  Everything we do at the Fed is in service to our public mission.  

We will do everything we can to achieve our maximum-employment and price-stability goals.  

Thank you.  And I look forward to your questions. 

MICHELLE SMITH.  Colby. 

COLBY SMITH.  Thank you.  Colby Smith with the Financial Times.  I’m curious what gives you and the Committee the confidence that waiting will not be counterproductive at a time when the monthly pace of core inflation is still so elevated.  Interest rate–sensitive sectors like housing, while they’ve felt the drag of the past Fed actions, have started to recover in some regions, and financial conditions, you know, most recently were easing. 

CHAIR POWELL.  So, I guess I would—I guess I would go back to the beginning of this tightening cycle to address that.  So as we started our rate hikes early last year, we said there were three issues that would need to be addressed kind of in sequence—that of the speed of tightening, the level to which rates would need to go, and then a period of time over which we’d need to keep policy restrictive.  So at the outset, going back 15 months, the key issue was how fast to move rates up, and we moved very quickly by historical standards.  Then last December, after four consecutive 75 basis point hikes, we moderated to a pace of 50—of a 50 basis point hike and then this year to three 25 basis point hikes at sequential meetings. 

So it seemed to us to make obvious sense to moderate our rate hikes as we got closer to our destination.  So the decision to consider not hiking at every meeting and ultimately to hold rates steady at this meeting, I would just say it’s a continuation of, of that process.  The main issue that we’re focused on now is determining the extent of additional policy firming that may be appropriate to return inflation to 2 percent over time—so that the pace of the increases and the ultimate level of increases are separate variables, given how far it—we have come.  It may make sense for rates to move higher but at a more moderate pace. 

I want to stress one more thing—and that is that the Committee decision made today was only about this meeting.  We didn’t make any decision about going forward, including what would happen at the next meeting, including—we did not decide or really discuss anything about going to an every-other-meeting kind of an approach or, or really any other approach.  We really were focused on what to do at this meeting. 

COLBY SMITH.  So there was no kind of initial debate about the possibility of July— any sense of the initial support at this stage for that move? 

CHAIR POWELL.  So again, we didn’t—we didn’t make a decision about July.  I mean, of course, it, it came up in the—in the meeting from time to time.  But really, the focus was, was on what to do today.  I would say about, about July two things:  (1) [the] decision hasn’t been made, (2) I do expect that it will be a “live” meeting. 

MICHELLE SMITH.  Howard. 

HOWARD SCHNEIDER.  Thanks.  Howard Schneider with Reuters.  I was just wondering if you could help us understand the, the narrative here because it feels like there’s been a level shift in the—in the dots, stronger GDP, less of a hit to unemployment, slower progress on inflation.  And I’m wondering in, in this sort of—where’s the disinflation coming from? 

CHAIR POWELL.  Sure. 

HOWARD SCHNEIDER.  The labor market’s going to be stronger it looks like—it’s not coming from there.  Demand’s not coming down all that fast.  According to GDP—you’ve doubled your, your estimate of GDP.  So what’s the—what’s the narrative here?  It seems like it’s getting more “immaculate,” rather than more messy. 

CHAIR POWELL.  So you’re, you’re right that the data came in, I would say, consistent with, but on the high side of, expectations.  And if you go back to the old—the former SEP—the last SEP in March, you will see that [compared with March, projected real GDP] growth moved up.  These are not huge moves, but growth estimates moved up a bit.  Unemployment estimates moved down a bit.  Inflation estimates moved up a bit.  And, you know, all three of those kind of point in the same direction—which is, you know, that perhaps more [monetary policy] restraint will be necessary than we had thought at the last meeting.  So although the level, frankly, is, is pretty—the level of 5.6 [percent] is pretty consistent, if you think about it, where the [expected] federal funds rate was trading before the bank incidents of early March.  So—but so we’ve kind of gone back to that.  So your question is, where’s the—where’s the disinflation going to come from?  And I, you know, I don’t think the story has really changed. 

We—the Committee has consistently said and believed that the process of getting inflation down is going to be a gradual one.  It’s going to take some time.  And I think you go back to the—to the three-part framework for [analyzing] core PCE inflation—which is, we think, as good an indicator as you can have for where inflation is going forward.  You start with goods.  With goods, we need to see continued healing in supply conditions—supply-side conditions.  They’ve definitely improved a substantial amount, but if you talk to people in business, they will say it’s not back to where it was.  So that’s, that’s one thing.  And that should enable goods prices to continue—goods, goods inflation to continue to come down over time.  

In terms of housing services inflation—that’s another big piece.  And, and you are seeing there that new rents in new, new leases are, are coming in at low levels.  And it’s really a matter of time as that goes through the pipeline.  In fact, I think any forecast that people are making right now about inflation coming down this year will, will contain a big dose of—this year and next year—will contain a, a good amount of, of disinflation [coming] from that source.  And, and that’s, again, probably going to come slower than we would [previously have expected it to come into] effect. 

That leaves, you know, the big sector, which is a little more than half, pardon me, of the—of core PCE inflation that’s not housing services.  And, you know, we see only the earliest signs of disinflation there.  It’s a sector—it’s a very broad and diverse sector.  I would say [that,] in a number of the parts of that sector, the largest cost would be wage cost.  It’s the service sector, so it’s, it’s heavily labor intensive.  And I think many analysts would say that the key to getting inflation down there is to have a continuing loosening in labor market conditions—which we have seen.  We have actually seen, you know—I go through a number of indicators suggesting there has been some loosening in labor market conditions.  We need to see that continue. 

I would almost say that the, the conditions that we need to see in place to get inflation down are, are coming into place.  And that would be [real GDP] growth meaningfully below trend.  It would be a labor market that’s loosening.  It would be goods pipelines getting healthier and healthier and that kind of thing.  There, there—the things are in place that we need to see, but the process of that actually working on inflation is going to take some time. 

MICHELLE SMITH.  Nick.  

NICK TIMIRAOS.  Nick Timiraos of the Wall Street Journal.  Chair Powell, what’s the value in, in pausing and signaling future hikes versus just hiking now?  I mean, not to be flippant, but I don’t lose weight just by buying a gym membership—I have to actually go to the gym.  Sixteen of your colleagues put down a higher year-end ’23 rate today.  A majority of you think you’re going to have to go up by 50 basis points this year.  So why not just rip off the 

Band-Aid and raise rates today? 

CHAIR POWELL.  So the—first, I would say that the, the question of speed is a separate question from the question—from the—from, from that of level.  Okay.  So—and I think if you look at the SEP, that is our estimate—our individual—it’s, it’s really a cumulation of our individual estimates of how far to go.  I, I mentioned how, how we got to those numbers.  In terms of speed, it’s, it’s what I said at the beginning, which is, speed was very important last year.  As we get closer and closer to the destination—and, according to the SEP, we’re not so far away from the destination, in most people’s accounting—it’s, it’s reasonable—it’s common sense to go a little slower, just as it was reasonable to go from 75 basis points to 50 to 25 at every meeting.  And so the Committee thought overall that it was appropriate to moderate the pace, if only slightly. 

Then there are benefits to that.  So that gives us more information to make decisions.  We may try to make better decisions.  I think it allows the economy a little more time to adapt as we—as we make our decisions going forward, and we’ll get to see, you know—we haven’t really—we don’t know the full extent of, of the consequences of the banking turmoil that we’ve seen.  We, we—it would be early to see those, but we don’t know what the extent is.  We’ll have some more time to see that unfold.  I mean, it’s, it’s just the idea that we’re trying to get this right.  And this is—if you think of the two things as separate variables, then I think—I think that the skip—I shouldn’t call it a skip—the, the decision makes sense. 

NICK TIMIRAOS.  I know you said July is live.  With only one June employment—with only the June employment and the CPI report for June due to be released before the July meeting—you get the ECI after, you get the Senior Loan Officer Survey after, you get some 

bank earnings at the end of next month—what incremental information will the Committee be using to inform their judgment on whether this is, in fact, a skip or a, a longer pause? 

CHAIR POWELL.  Well, I think you’re adding that to the, the data that we’ve seen since the last meeting, too.  You know, we—since we chose to maintain rates at this meeting, it’ll really be a three-month period of data that we can look at.  And I think that’s a full quarter, and I think you can—you can draw more conclusions from that than you can from any six—any sixweek period. 

We’ll look at those things.  We’ll also look at the evolving risk picture.  We’ll look at what’s happening in the financial sector.  We’ll look at all the data, the evolving outlook, and we’ll make a decision. 

MICHELLE SMITH.  Jeanna. 

JEANNA SMIALEK.  Thanks for taking our questions.  Jeanna Smialek, New York Times.  You obviously, in your forecasts, marked up the sort of path for growth, marked down the path for unemployment, and marked up the path for inflation pretty notably.  I wonder, you know, since March, what has changed to make you think that the economy’s a lot more resilient and inflation is going to be a lot more stubborn?  And given that, you know, why do you feel confident that this is as high as you’re going to have to revise the federal funds rate?  Or do you think it’s possible we could have even a higher than 5.6 percent terminal by the end of this, this cycle? 

CHAIR POWELL.  You know, I—I mean, on the first part, I just think we’re following the data and also the outlook.  The economy is—the labor market, I think, has surprised many, if not all, analysts over the last couple of years with its extraordinary resilience, really.  And it’s, it’s just remarkable.  And that’s really, if you think about it—that’s what’s driving it.  It’s job creation.  It’s, it’s wages moving up.  It’s, it’s supporting spending, which in turn is supporting hiring.  And it’s, it’s really the engine, it seems, that is—that is driving the economy.  And so it’s, it’s really the, the data.  In terms of, you know—we, we always write down at these meetings what we think the appropriate terminal rate will be at the end of this year.  That’s, that’s how we do it.  It’s based on our, our own individual assessments of what the most likely path of the economy is.  It can be—it can actually, in reality, wind up being lower or higher.  And, you know, there’s really no way to know.  But it’s—it is—it’s, it’s what people think as of today, and as the—as the data come in, it, it can move around during the intermeeting period.  It could wind up back in the same place.  But it really will be data driven.  I can’t—I can’t tell you that that I ever have a lot of confidence that we can see where the—where the federal funds rate will be that far in advance.  

MICHELLE SMITH.  Steve. 

STEVE LIESMAN.  Mr. Chairman, thanks for taking my question.  You had said back at the end of May that you thought risks were getting closer to being into balance.  Is that still the case, or has your mind changed about the balance of risks out there?  And also, could you give us an idea of what would be a sufficiently restrictive funds rate?  Is the—obviously, the current rate, according to the Committee, is not sufficiently restrictive.  Is it 5.6?    Is it 6?  Where is sufficiently restrictive?  Thank you. 

CHAIR POWELL.  You know, I, I would say again that I think that, over time, the balance of risks, as we move from very, you know—from interest rates that are effectively zero now to 5 percentage points with, with an SEP calling for additional hikes—I think we’ve moved much closer to our destination, which is that sufficiently restrictive rate, and I think that means by—almost by definition that the—that the risks of, of sort of overdoing it and under, underdoing it are, are getting closer to being in balance.  I still think, and my, my colleagues agree, that, that the risks to inflation are to the upside still.  So we don’t—we don’t think we’re there with inflation yet because we’re just looking at the data.  And if you look at the—at the full range of, of inflation data, particularly the core data, you just—you just aren’t seeing a lot of progress over the last year.  Headline, of course, inflation has come down materially, but, as you know, we look at core [inflation] as a better indicator of where inflation overall is going. 

Sufficiently—so I think, you know, what, what we’d like to see is credible evidence that inflation is topping out and then beginning to come down.  That’s, that’s what we want to see— of course that’s what we want to see.  And I, I think it’s—it’s also—we understand that there are lags, but remember that it’s, it’s more than a year since financial conditions began tightening.  I think it’s—I think the reason we’re, we’re comfortable pausing is that we are still—much of the tightening took place over last summer and later into the year.  And I think it’s, it’s reasonable to think that some of that may come into effect.  So we’re, you know—I think stretching out into a more moderate pace is appropriate to, to allow you to make that judgment of sufficiency, you know, more—with more data over time. 

MICHELLE SMITH.  Rachel. 

RACHEL SIEGEL.  Hi, Chair Powell.  Rachel Siegel from the Washington Post.  Thanks for taking our questions.  I wanted to ask further on the lag effects—when you’re considering when you would hike again throughout the course of the year, are there things that you would expect to kick in as those lag effects come, come into effect that would inform your decisions?  Have you learned things over the past year that give you some sense of timeline for when to expect those lags to come into effect? 

CHAIR POWELL.  Yeah.  So it’s a—it’s a challenging thing in, in economics.  It’s, it’s sort of standard thinking that monetary policy affects economic activity with long and variable lags.  Of course, these days, financial conditions begin to tighten well in advance of actual rate hikes.  So if you—if you look back when we were lifting off, we started talking about lifting off—by the time we had lifted off, the two-year [interest rate], which is a pretty good estimate of where [monetary] policy is going, had gone from 20 basis points to 200 basis points. 

So in that sense, tightening happens much sooner than it used to in a world where— where news was in newspapers and not, you know, not on, on the wire.  So that’s, that’s different.  But it’s still the case that what you see is interest-sensitive spending is affected very, very quickly—so housing, and durable goods, and things like that.  But broader demand, and spending, and, and asset values, and things like that—they just take longer. 

And you can pretty much find research to support whatever answer you would like on that.  So there’s not any certainty or agreement in the profession on how long it takes.  So, you know, then that makes it challenging, of course.  So we’re, we’re looking at the calendar.  We’re, we’re looking at what’s happening in the economy.  We’re having to make these judgments. 

Again, it’s one of the main reasons why it makes sense to go at a slightly more moderate pace now as we seek that, that ultimate—I can’t point to—that ultimate endpoint.  I can’t point to a specific data point.  I think we’ll see it when we see inflation, you know, really, really flattening out reliably and then starting to soften.  I think we’ll know that we’re—that it’s working.  And, ideally, by, by taking a little more time, we won’t go well past the level where we need to go. 

RACHEL SIEGEL.  I was curious if you could give us an update on what you’re seeing on credit tightening since the bank incidents for March and how you’re teasing that out apart from these lag effects. 

CHAIR POWELL.  So it’s, it’s too early still to, to try to assess the full extent of what that might mean.  And, you know, that’s something we’re going to be watching, of course.  And, you know, if we were to see what, what we would view as significant tightening beyond what would normally be expected because of, of this channel, then, you know, we would factor that into account on, on—in, in making rate decisions.  So that’s, that’s how we think about it. 

MICHELLE SMITH.  Let’s go to Chris. 

CHRIS RUGABER.  Thanks.  Chris Rugaber at Associated Press.  You mentioned that many of the trends are in place that you want to see—core services ex. housing has come in pretty low in the past couple of months.  And, as you noted, a significant portion of core inflation is now housing prices. And then we’ve had some quirks in used-car prices. 

So given that these trends are in place, I guess I’m sort of asking the flip side of Nick’s question:  Why signal additional rate hikes?  Aren’t things headed in the direction you need?   Why not simply give it even more time?  Or—it’s surprising to see so much hawkishness in the dots, given what we’re seeing recently. 

CHAIR POWELL.  Yeah.  So, you know, we’ve—remember, we’ve—we’re two and a 

half years into this—or two and a quarter years into this.  And forecasters, including Fed forecasters, have consistently thought that inflation was about to turn down and, you know, traditional—you know, typically forecasted that it would and been wrong. 

So I think if you—I think if you look at the—at core PCE inflation overall—look at it over the last six months—you’re just not seeing a lot of progress.  It’s running, and it’s running at a level, you know, over 4½ percent—far above our, our target and not really, you know, moving down.  We want to see it moving down decisively.  That’s all.  We’re, you know, of course, we’re going to get inflation down to 2 percent over time.  We, we don’t want to do—we, we want to do that with the minimum damage we can to the economy, of course. 

But we have to get inflation down to 2 percent, and we will.  And we just don’t see that yet.  So, hence, you see today’s policy decision:  both, both to write down further rate hikes by the end of this year but also to, you know, to take—to, to moderate somewhat the pace with which we’re moving. 

CHRIS RUGABER.  Quick follow-up.  I mean, the last press conference you mentioned you didn’t see wages driving inflation.  And, you know, there was some research from the San Francisco Fed suggesting wages aren’t necessarily a key driver.  But you’ve talked about the labor market today and the need for softening.  Can you give us a little more, specifically, of how you see the tight labor market driving inflation at this point?  Thank you. 

CHAIR POWELL.  Right.  So I’m, I’m not going to comment on any particular paper, but I, I would say that the—I think the overall picture is that at the beginning in, you know, early 2021, inflation was really becoming from very strong demand for—largely for goods.  People were still at home.  They had money in the bank, and they wanted to spend—they spent a lot on goods. 

And, of course, at the same time—and because of that high demand, to some extent, supply chains got all snarled up.  So prices went way up.  Inflation went way up.  So that was the, the origin, and it wasn’t really particularly about the labor market or wages.  But as you—as you moved into—through ’21, into ’22, and now in ’23, I think many, many analysts believe that it will be important—an important part of getting inflation down, especially in the nonhousing services sector, to getting wage inflation back to a level that is sustainable, that is consistent with 2 percent inflation. 

We actually have seen wages broadly move down but just at a quite gradual pace.  So— and that’s, you know, that’s a little bit of the finding of the Bernanke paper with Blanchard of a few weeks ago, which is very consistent with, with what I, I would think. 

MICHELLE SMITH.  Let’s go to Michael McKee. 

MICHAEL MCKEE.  Michael McKee from Bloomberg Radio and Television.  You said in the past that you don’t like to surprise markets.  It’s kind of been the Fed’s view markets should have an idea of what you’re going to do before you go in.  You also said a number of times that it would take a while to bring inflation down.  You reiterated that again today and that we, we’d get to a point where inflation could be sticky. 

So I’m wondering, as we go into the next meetings, how Wall Street or others should look at your reaction function.  What will you be reacting to—time or data?  In other words, if nothing much changes—if we’re looking at the same sort of labor market, the same sort of inflation levels in July or in September or November—will you move because you’ve said you feel you need to?  Is it time that’s going to require additional movement, or would it be reversal in inflation? 

CHAIR POWELL.  So I, I don’t want to deal with, with hypotheticals about different ways data might move.  And so, we, you know—we of course—we’re not—we don’t go out of our way to surprise markets or the public.  At the same time, our main focus has to be on getting the policy right.  And that’s, that’s what we’re doing here, and that’s what we’ll do for the upcoming meetings. 

I will say the July meeting will be “live,” and we’ll just have to see.  I think you’ll, you’ll see the data, you’ll hear Fed people talking about it, and, and markets will have to make a— make a judgment. 

MICHAEL MCKEE. Well, do you think inflation is likely to continue coming down based on the lags and based on your threat of additional movement?  Or are we going to be in a period where we’re not going to know what’s happening? 

CHAIR POWELL.  You know, I, I think if you look at—if, if you just look at—I’ll just point you to the forecast.  So inflation is running—core PCE inflation is running at about 4½, a little higher than 4½ percent.  And the, the median FOMC participant thinks it will go down to 

3.9 on a 12-month basis.  This is by the end of this year. 

So that’s expecting pretty substantial progress.  That’s, that’s a pretty significant decline for half a year.  So that’s, that’s the forecast.  You know, we’ll—we do try to be transparent in our reaction function.  We’re, we’re committed to getting inflation down.  And that’s the number-one thing.  So that’s how I think about it. 

MICHELLE SMITH.  Let’s go to Victoria. 

VICTORIA GUIDA.  Victoria Guida with Politico.  Could you talk about the balance sheet and how you’re thinking about it?  What, what are you looking for to judge whether we’re approaching reserve scarcity?  And is Treasury issuance going to affect that?  Also, are you considering lowering the RRP rate in order to take some pressure off banks? 

CHAIR POWELL.  So let me say, first of all, on the Treasury part of it—if I can talk about that and then go back to the balance sheet.  So on that—of course, we’ve been very focused on that for a couple of months, as everyone has.  [The] Treasury has laid out its borrowing plans publicly.  I think we all saw—I saw the Secretary’s comments yesterday to the effect that [the] Treasury has consulted widely with market participants about how to avoid market disruption and that they’re going to watch carefully for that. 

So that’s, that’s from the Treasury, which actually sets the, you know, the, the borrowings.  At the Fed, we’ll be monitoring market conditions carefully as the Treasury refills the, the TGA.  The adjustment process is very likely to involve both a reduction in the RRP facility and also in reserves.  It’s really hard to say at the—at the beginning of this which will be—which will be greater. 

We are starting at a very high level of reserves—and still elevated over RRP take-up, for that matter—so we don’t think reserves are likely to become scarce in the near term or even over the course of the year.  So that’s, that’s—that’s the—that’s the Treasury part of the answer.  We will, of course, continue to monitor conditions in money markets, and we’re prepared to make adjustments to make sure that, that monetary policy transmission works. 

Was there another part of your question? 

VICTORIA GUIDA.  Yeah—are you considering lowering the RRP rate to help take some pressure off banks? 

CHAIR POWELL.  So we, we have a number of—I would say the [ON] RRP [facility] doesn’t look like it’s, it’s pulling money out of—out of the banking system.  It’s actually been shrinking here lately.  So I don’t think—that’s not something, something we’ve thought about a lot over time.  It doesn’t really look like that’s, that’s something that we would do. I think it’s—I think it’s a tool that we have. 

If we want to use it, we can.  There are other tools we can—we can use to address money market issues.  But I wouldn’t say that that’s something that’s likely that we would do in the near term. 

MICHELLE SMITH.  Jonnelle. 

JONNELLE MARTE.  Jonnelle Marte with Bloomberg.  Have you seen sufficient cooling in the housing market to bring inflation down?  For example, how does the recent rebound affect your forecasts, and how does it factor into monetary policy? 

CHAIR POWELL.  So certainly housing—very interest sensitive, and it’s the first place, really, or one of the first places, that’s either helped by low rates or, or that is held back by, by higher rates.  And we certainly saw that over the course of the last year.  We now see housing putting in a bottom and maybe even moving up a little bit. 

You know, we’re watching that situation carefully.  I do think we—we will see rents, rents and, and house prices filtering into, into housing services inflation.  And I, I don’t see them coming up quickly.  I, I do see them kind of—kind of wandering around at a relatively low level now, and that’s appropriate. 

JONNELLE MARTE.  Do you think you’ll have to target that with further rate increases? 

CHAIR POWELL.  Well, I think we, we look at everything.  We don’t just look at housing.  So I think, you know, the way it works is the individual participants sit in their offices all over the country, and they write down their forecast and—including their most likely forecasts—including their rate forecast.  And then they send it in on Friday afternoon, and we cumulate it, and then we publish it for you. 

So that’s how—that’s how they do that.  Well, I don’t know that housing is, is itself going to be driving the rates picture, but it’s part of it. 

MICHELLE SMITH.  Let’s go to Edward. 

EDWARD LAWRENCE.  Thank you for taking the question, Mr. Chairman.  Edward 

Lawrence with Fox Business.  So I want to go back to comments you made about, in the past, about unsustainable fiscal path.  The CBO projects the federal deficit to be $2.8 trillion in 10 years.  The CBO also says that federal debt will be $52 trillion by 2033.  At what point do you talk more firmly with lawmakers about fiscal responsibility?  Because—assuming monetary policy cannot handle alone the inflation or keep that inflation in check with the higher-level spending. 

CHAIR POWELL.  I don’t do that.  That’s really not my job.  We—we hope and expect that other policymakers will respect our independence on, on monetary policy.  And we don’t see ourselves as, as, you know, the judges of appropriate fiscal policy.  I will say, and many of my predecessors have said, that we’re on an unsustainable fiscal path and, and that needs to be addressed over time.  But I think trying to get into, into that with lawmakers would be—would be kind of inappropriate, given our independence and our need to stick to our knitting. 

EDWARD LAWRENCE.  Is there any conversation then about the Federal Reserve financing some of that debt that we’re seeing coming down the pike? 

CHAIR POWELL.  No.  Under no circumstances. 

MICHELLE SMITH.  Courtenay. 

COURTENAY BROWN.  Thanks for taking our questions, Chair Powell.  So looking at the SEP, it looks like GDP for this year was raised significantly—your forecast for GDP this year.  The unemployment rate, meanwhile, was pulled downward.  And so should we take that as a sign that the Committee is more confident about the prospects of a soft landing—at least more—at least as it relates to what you were expecting in, in March? 

CHAIR POWELL.  You know, I—I would just say it this way.  I continue to think—and this really hasn’t changed—that there is a path to getting inflation back down to 2 percent without having to see the kind of sharp downturn and, and large losses of employment that we’ve seen in so many past instances.  It’s, it’s possible.  A—in a way, a strong labor market is—that, that gradually cools could, could aid that along—it could aid that along.  But I, I guess I want to come back to the, the main thing, which is, though, simply this.  We, we see—the Committee— as you can see from the SEP, the Committee is completely unified in the need to get inflation down to 2 percent and will do whatever it takes to get it down to 2 percent over time.  That is our plan.  And, you know, we, we understand that allowing inflation to get entrenched into the—in the U.S. economy is the thing that we cannot, cannot allow to happen for the benefit of today’s workers and families and businesses but also for the future.  Getting price stability back and, and restored will benefit generations of people as long as it’s sustained.  And it really is the bedrock of the economy.  And, and you should understand that that is our top priority. 

COURTENAY BROWN.  Just a quick follow-up on that.  I’m just a little confused because you said the Committee will do whatever it takes to get inflation down over time, but when I look at the SEP, inflation is still projected to be elevated next year, but the fed funds rate is lower than where it is now.  Can you help me understand that? 

CHAIR POWELL.  Sure.  So, you know, if you look two and three years out with, with the forecast—first of all, I wouldn’t—I wouldn’t put too much weight on forecasts even one year out because they’re, they’re so highly uncertain.  But what they’re showing is that as inflation comes down in the—in the forecast, if you don’t lower interest rates, then real rates are actually going up, right?  So just to maintain a real rate, the nominal rate at that point—two years out, let’s say—should come down just to maintain real rates.  And if—and actually, you know, since we’re, we’re probably going to—we’re, we’re having real rates that are going to have to be meaningfully positive and significantly.  So for us to get inflation down, that probably means— that, that certainly means that, that it will be appropriate to cut rates at such time as inflation is coming down really significantly.  And again, we’re talking about a couple of years out.  I think, as, as anyone can see, not a single person on the Committee wrote down a rate cut this year, nor do I think it is at all likely to be appropriate, if you think about it.  Inflation has not really moved down.  It has—it has not so far reacted much to our—to our existing rate hikes.  And so we’re going have to keep at it. 

MICHELLE SMITH.  Julie. 

JULIE CHABANAS.  I’m sorry.  Thank you.  Hi, Chair Powell.  Julie Chabanas, AFP News Agency.  The May job report showed a rebound in May in the Black workers’ unemployment.  Is it consistent with the Fed’s maximum-employment mandate?  Are you worried about that—about this rebound? 

CHAIR POWELL.  So we are, of course, worried about—there are—there are longstanding differences in racial and ethnic groups across, across our labor market.  That’s a factor that we don’t—we can’t really address with our tools.  But we do consider that when we’re thinking about what constitutes maximum employment—it is, for us, a broad and inclusive goal.  And so we do watch that.  But remember, all unemployment, including Black unemployment, has been bouncing around right near historic lows—historic modern lows here.  So we’re still talking about, I mean, what is as strong a labor market as we’ve seen in, you know, a halfcentury here in the United States.  So overall unemployment of 3.7 percent is, is higher—threetenths higher than it was measured to be at the last—a month ago.  But, still, it’s extraordinarily low.  And so it’s a very, very tight labor market. 

MICHELLE SMITH.  Megan. 

MEGAN CASSELLA.  Thank you.  I want to follow up first a little bit just on the rent question on housing.  We heard Governor Waller talk about how—I’ll back up.  We haven’t quite seen the slowdown in rents show up in CPI yet.  And we did hear Governor Waller talk about how an uptick in housing might mean that there’s not going to be as much relief coming or a shorter bit of relief than we thought.  Can you talk about how you’re thinking about that and how that played into today’s outcome? 

CHAIR POWELL.  I wouldn’t say—that’s, you know—as a factual matter, that’s correct.  We do need to see, you know, rents bottom out here or at least stay quite low in terms of their increases because we want—we want the, you know, we want inflation to come down.  And rental is, is a very large part of the CPI—about a third—and it’s about half of that for the PCE.  So it’s important.  And so we’re—it’s something that we’re watching very carefully.  It’s part of the overall picture.  I wouldn’t say it’s the decisive part, but take a step back.  What you see is— look at—look at core inflation over the past six months, a year.  You’re just not seeing a lot of progress—not the kind of progress we want to see.  And that, that’s—it’s hard to avoid that.  And, you know, the Committee—people on the Committee—the median went up significantly, so that the median participant now thinks that core PCE inflation on a 12-month basis will be 3.9 percent this year.  So, once again, every year for the past three years, it’s gone up over the course of the year, and that’s doing that again.  So we see that, and we see that inflation forecasts are coming in low again, and we see that—that that tells us that we need to do more.  And so we’re—that’s why you see the SEP with—where it is. 

MEGAN CASSELLA.  Could you also talk briefly about your outlook for wages and, given the recent slowdown in core services excluding housing, how far you think wages might need to fall in order to get inflation back in line? 

CHAIR POWELL.  So wages will continue to increase.  So we, we, you know—what we’re talking about is having wage increases still at a very strong level but at a level that’s consistent with 2 percent inflation over time.  And so I, I think we’ve seen some progress—all, all of the major measures of wages have, have moved down from extremely elevated—not extremely elevated—highly elevated levels a year or so ago, and they’re, they’re moving back down but, but quite gradually.  And, and, you know, we want to see that, that process continue gradually.  Of course, it’s great to see wage increases, particularly for people at the lower end of the income spectrum.  But we want that as part of the process of getting inflation back down to 2 percent, which benefits everyone.  I mean, inflation hurts those same people more than anyone else.  People on a fixed income are hurt the worst, and the fastest, by high inflation. 

MICHELLE SMITH.  Greg.  

GREG ROBB.  Thank you so much, Chair Powell.  Greg Robb from MarketWatch.  I just wondered if the Committee has talked at all about the labor market and, and—there, there’s strikes now in Hollywood and now the United Autoworkers are talking about a possible strike.  I mean, aren’t workers—they have—we have some—workers have power now and are going to be seeking higher wages.  Does that come up in your discussions?  Thanks. 

CHAIR POWELL.  So the topic of wages in the labor market and dynamics in the labor market could—is about as central a topic to our discussions as, as anything.  I mean, it’s, it’s very—labor economics, you know, and the labor market are utterly central.  You know, it’s half of our mandate.  So we spend a lot of time talking about that.  I think, you know, we—there, there are structural issues that are really not for the Fed.  And so we don’t spend a lot of time— although we take notice of, of what’s going on, but we’re not, you know—we’re not involved in discussions or debates over, over strikes and things like that.  But we—you know, we, we look, and we see what’s going on.  And, you know, we’re making judgments about what it will take to get inflation down to 2 percent in the aggregate.  And as I said, don’t think that was about—I didn’t—most folks would say now it wasn’t really about that—about wages at the beginning.  And it’s becoming more about that as we—as we get into really service-sector inflation, which is the part of the economy where we have seen the least progress. 

MICHELLE SMITH.  Let’s go to Mark for the last question. 

MARK HAMRICK.  Thank you, Mr. Chairman.  Mark Hamrick with Bankrate. Wondering what your thoughts are now about systemic risk now that we’re about three months past the failure of Silicon Valley Bank.  And also, specifically, what are the risks associated with commercial real estate as well as nonbank financials?  And could you further elevate those risks with higher still rates, possibly for longer? 

CHAIR POWELL.  So I’m trying to think where to start.  I’ll start with commercial real estate.  We—of course, we’re watching that situation very carefully.  There’s a substantial amount of commercial real estate in the banking system.  A, a large part of it is in smaller banks.  It’s well distributed—to the extent it’s well distributedthen, then the system could, could take losses.  We do expect that there will be losses, but they’ll be—they’ll be banks that have concentrations, and those banks will experience larger losses.  So we’re well aware of that.  We’re monitoring it carefully.  You know, it feels like—it feels like something that will be around for some time, as opposed to, you know, something that will suddenly hit and, and, you know, work its way into systemic risk. 

In terms of nonbank financials—financial sector—there’s been a ton of work.  And, you know, clearly in the—in the pandemic, it really was—it was the nonbank financial sector where, where issues really arose.  And, you know, there’s a lot of work going on in—with the 

Administration, in particular, leading that to try to address issues in the Treasury market and, and in all kinds of areas in the nonbank financial market.  And—but, you know, our jurisdiction at 

the Fed is over banks—actually bank holding companies and some banks.  So that’s, that’s really our main focus.  

You know, in terms of the events of March—as I mentioned earlier, we will be carefully monitoring that situation.  You know, our, our job generally involves worrying about a lot of things that may go wrong, and that would include the banks.  It might be hard for me to identify something that we don’t worry about rather than that we do worry about.  So we’re watching those things very carefully.  And as we see things unfold—as we see what’s happening with credit conditions and, and also all the individual banks that are out there, you know, we’ll be able to take, to the extent it’s appropriate, we can take, if they’re macroeconomic implications, we can take that into account in our rate setting.  And so I guess that’s what I would say. 

MARK HAMRICK.  Can I just follow up on the last part of that?  Do you—do you risk further exacerbating those issues if you get up to another 50 basis points? 

CHAIR POWELL.  So that’s—and, and I was—I guess I meant to address that by saying as we—as we watch, we’ll see what’s happening.  And if we—if we’re seeing the kind of tightening of conditions that, that you could be referring to, then we can factor that—because really, we’re—we use our—our rate tool is, is, you know, is—it really has macroeconomic purposes.  So we’ll, we’ll take that into account.  Of course, we have responsibility for financial stability as well.  And that also is a factor that we’re always going to be considering. 

Thank you very much. 

本分文件為鮑爾主席在6月14日完整新聞稿，OT覺得跟記者的對談相當有趣，因此提供本件的翻譯如下：

美聯儲主席鮑爾：各位下午好。我和我的同事們始終專注於我們的雙重使命，那就是為美國人民促進最大就業和穩定價格。我們理解高通脹帶來的困難，並堅定承諾將通脹率拉回到我們2%的目標。價格穩定是美聯儲的責任。如果沒有價格穩定，經濟對所有人來說都沒有用。特別是在沒有價格穩定的情況下，我們將無法實現長期的強勁勞動力市場狀況，這對所有人都有利。

從去年初以來，聯邦公開市場委員會（FOMC）已經大幅收緊了貨幣政策立場。我們將我們的政策利率提高了5個百分點，並繼續以快速的步伐減少我們的證券持有量。我們已經走過了很多路，而我們的緊縮政策的全效尚未被感受到。鑑於我們在收緊政策上已走得很遠，貨幣政策對經濟的影響的不確定時滯，以及來自信貸收緊的潛在阻力，我們今天決定維持我們的政策利率不變，並繼續減少我們的證券持有量。展望未來，幾乎所有委員會參與者都認為，今年可能需要進一步增加利率，以便隨著時間的推移將通脹降至2%。稍後在簡單回顧經濟發展後，我將對貨幣政策有更多的說明。

美國經濟去年明顯放緩，最近的指標表明經濟活動持續以適度的速度擴張。雖然今年消費支出增長已經加快，但房地產部門的活動依然疲弱，主要反映出抵押貸款利率上升。較高的利率和較慢的產出增長也似乎正在壓制商業固定投資。委員會參與者普遍預期增長將持續緩慢。在我們的經濟預測摘要中，實質GDP增長的中位數預測今年為1.0%，明年為1.1%，遠低於長期正常增長率的中位數估計。

勞動力市場仍然非常緊張。過去三個月，薪資工作增長平均每月有強勁的283,000個工作。五月份失業率上升，但仍然保持在3.7%的低位。有些跡象表明勞動力市場的供求正在達到更好的平衡。近幾個月來，勞動力參與率上升，尤其是對於25至54歲的人群。名義薪資增長有放緩的跡象，今年到目前為止，職位空缺數量已經減少。儘管求職者與工作的比例已經下降，但勞動力需求仍大幅超過可用工人的供應。FOMC參與者預期，隨著時間的推移，勞動力市場的供需狀況將達到更好的平衡，從而緩解通脹上行壓力。在經濟預測摘要中，今年年底的失業率中位數預測上升至4.1%，明年年底上升至4.5%。

通脹仍遠高於我們長期的2%目標。在截至4月的12個月內，核心個人消費支出物價（不包括波動較大的食品和能源類別）上升了4.7%。5月份，消費者物價指數的12個月變動率為4%，核心消費者物價指數的變動率為5.3%。雖然通脹壓力從去年年中以來有所緩解，但仍然持續偏高，將通脹降回2%還有很長的路要走。在經濟預測摘要中，個人消費支出物價指數的中位數預測今年為3.2%，明年為2.5%，2025年為2.1%。核心個人消費支出物價指數預計將高於總體通脹，而中位數預測已在經濟預測摘要中上修至今年的3.9%。儘管通脹水平較高，但長期通脹預期似乎仍然保持穩定，這反映在家庭、企業和預測者的廣泛調查以及金融市場的指標中。

聯邦儲備系統的貨幣政策是根據我們促進美國人民的最大就業和穩定物價的使命來制定的。我和我的同事們非常清楚，高通脹給人們帶來了困難，因為它侵蝕了購買力，尤其是對那些無力負擔食品、住房和交通等生活必需品的人來說。我們非常關注高通脹對我們使命的兩個方面帶來的風險，我們堅決致力於將通脹恢復到2%的目標。

正如我之前提到的，自去年初以來，我們已將政策利率上調了5個百分點。我們已經看到我們貨幣政策收緊對經濟最敏感的利率敏感型行業，尤其是住房和投資領域的需求產生的影響。然而，完全體現貨幣緊縮對通脹的影響需要時間。經濟面臨著對家庭和企業信貸條件更為嚴格的逆風，這可能對經濟活動、就業和通脹產生壓力。這些影響的程度仍不確定。

考慮到我們在緊縮貨幣政策方面所取得的進展，貨幣政策對經濟的影響存在不確定的滯後效應，以及信貸收緊可能帶來的逆風，本委員會決定在今天的會議上將聯邦基金利率的目標區間維持在5%至5.25%之間，並繼續大幅減少我們的證券持倉。

正如我之前提到的，幾乎所有委員會參與者預計到今年年底進一步提高利率可能是合適的。但在本次會議上，考慮到我們已經走得有多遠、有多快，我們認為保持目標區間穩定是明智的，以便讓委員會評估額外的信息及其對貨幣政策的影響。在確定可能適合的額外政策緊縮程度以實現通脹在長期內恢復到2%的目標時，委員會將考慮貨幣政策的累積收緊、貨幣政策對經濟活動和通脹的滯後效應，以及經濟和金融發展情況。

在我們的經濟預測摘要中，參與者根據每個人對未來最可能的情景進行的評估，撰寫了對於聯邦基金利率的適當路徑的個人評估。如果經濟按照預測發展，中位數參與者預計今年年底的聯邦基金利率水平將為5.6%，2024年底為4.6%，2025年底為3.4%。與我們三月份的預測相比，今年年底的中位預測上調了0.5個百分點。我必須強調，這些預測並不代表委員會的決策或計劃。如果經濟發展不如預期，貨幣政策的路徑將根據需要進行調整，以促進我們實現最大就業和價格穩定的目標。我們將繼續根據所有來自數據的整體信息和其對經濟活動和通脹前景以及風險平衡的影響來做出每次會議的決策。

我們仍然致力於將通脹降至2%的目標並保持長期通脹預期的穩定。降低通脹可能需要一段低於趨勢增長的時間和一些勞動市場狀況的緩和。恢復價格穩定是實現長期內最大就業和價格穩定的基礎。

總結一下：我們明白我們的行動對全國各地的社區、家庭和企業產生影響。我們在聯邦儲備系統所做的一切都是為了履行我們的公共使命。

我們將竭尽全力實現最大就業和價格穩定的目標。

謝謝。期待您的提問。

MICHELLE SMITH. Colby.

COLBY SMITH. 謝謝。Colby Smith，來自金融時報。我想知道您和委員會有什麼樣的信心，認為等待不會在核心通脹仍然如此高企的情況下產生反效果。利率敏感行業如房地產，在過去的貨幣政策行動中感受到壓力，但在某些地區已經開始恢復，金融環境最近也在放鬆。

CHAIR POWELL. 所以，我想我會回到這個緊縮周期的開始來回答這個問題。當我們去年年初開始加息時，我們說有三個問題需要按順序解決，即加息速度、利率需要達到的水平以及需要保持貨幣政策收緊的時間。所以在15個月前，最重要的問題是加息的速度，按照歷史標準，我們的加息速度非常快。然後去年12月，在連續四次75個基點的加息後，我們將加息節奏降低到了50個基點，然後在今年的三次會議上每次降低25個基點。

所以在我們接近目標時，減緩加息速度對我們來說是顯而易見的。在這次會議上考慮不在每次會議上加息，最終將利率保持穩定，我只能說這是該過程的延續。我們現在關注的主要問題是確定可能適合的額外政策緊縮程度，以實現通脹在長期內恢復到2%的目標，因此考慮到我們已經取得了多大的進展，增加的速度和最終的增幅水平是不同的變量。可能更合理的是利率上升，但速度更為適度。

我想強調一件事，那就是委員會今天的決定僅涉及本次會議。我們沒有對未來做出任何決定，包括下次會議的情況，包括我們沒有決定或真正討論過是否採取每兩次會議一次的方式或其他任何方式。我們真正關注的是如何在本次會議上採取行動。

COLBY SMITH. 所以目前沒有關於7月的討論嗎？初步支持那一舉措的感覺？

CHAIR POWELL. 所以再說一次，我們並沒有對7月做出決定。當然，在會議中有時會提到7月。但真正的焦點是今天該做什麼。我想說的是，關於7月有兩點：(1) 決定尚未作出，(2) 我確實預計這將是一次「活躍」的會議。

MICHELLE SMITH. Howard.

HOWARD SCHNEIDER. 謝謝。Howard Schneider，路透社記者。我想知道你是否能幫助我們理解這裡的情況，因為感覺聯邦基金利率預測圖發生了水平上的變化，GDP增長更強勁，對失業率的打擊減少，通脹進展較慢。我想知道，這種對通脹的抑制來自哪裡？

CHAIR POWELL. 好的。

HOWARD SCHNEIDER. 勞工市場看起來會更強勁，問題並不是來自那裡。需求下降的速度並不那麼快。根據國內生產總值（GDP），你們提高了GDP的預估。那麼這是什麼樣的情況，這種通脹抑制來自哪裡？

CHAIR POWELL. 你是對的，數據與預期相符，但在高端。如果你回顧以前的國家經濟預測（SEP） - 也就是三月的預測 - 你會發現[相較於三月，GDP預測]成長有所提高。這些變化並不大，但成長預估略微上升。失業預估也有所下降。通脹預估有所上升。這三個方面都指向同一個方向 - 也就是說，或許需要更多[貨幣政策]限制，超出我們上次會議時的預期。儘管這個水平相當高，如果你仔細考慮一下，在3月初的銀行事件之前，聯邦基金利率的預期是多少。所以，我們又回到了那個水平。你問的是，通脹從哪裡來？我不認為情況有什麼變化。

我們一直認為，降低通脹將是一個漸進的過程，需要一些時間。我認為你可以回到對核心個人消費支出物價指數（PCE）通脹進行分析的三部分框架。從商品方面來看，我們需要看到供應條件的持續改善。它們確實有了相當大的改善，但如果你與商界人士交談，他們會說還沒有恢復到以前的水平。這就是一個方面。這應該使商品價格隨時間繼續下降。

至於住房服務物價，這是另一個重要因素。你可以看到，新租賃的租金水平很低。這只是時間問題。實際上，我認為人們目前對通脹在今年和明年下降的預測將包含相當多從這個方面產生的通脹抑制。而且，這可能會比我們預期的進展要慢。

這留下了占核心個人消費支出物價的一半以上的大型部門。在那裡，我們只看到了最早的通脹抑制跡象。這是一個非常廣泛和多樣化的部門。我會說，從這個部門的一些部分來看，最大的成本是工資成本。這是服務業，所以它在勞動力方面非常密集。我認為許多分析師會說，降低那裡的通脹關鍵在於繼續緩和勞動力市場條件 - 我們已經看到了。實際上，我們確實看到了一些指標，表明勞動力市場條件有所放鬆。我們需要看到這種情況持續下去。

我幾乎可以說，我們需要看到的降低通脹的條件正在形成。這將意味著實質GDP增長顯著低於趨勢水平，勞動力市場放鬆，商品管道變得越來越健康，等等。我們需要看到這些條件，但這個過程實際上在通脹上起作用將需要一些時間。

MICHELLE SMITH. Nick.

NICK TIMIRAOS. 謝謝，我是華爾街日報的Nick Timiraos。Powell主席，對於暫停並預示未來加息與現在就加息相比，有什麼價值？我不是在隨便說，但僅僅購買一個健身會籍並不能讓我減肥，我必須真正去健身房。您的十六位同事今天提高了他們對2023年底利率的預估。大多數人認為今年您需要上調50個基點。那麼，為什麼不立即加息呢？

CHAIR POWELL. 首先，我想說速度的問題是與程度的問題分開的。如果你看看SEP，那是我們對於前進的最有可能情景的個人評估的累積。我剛剛提到了我們如何得出這些數字。至於速度，正如我剛剛開始時所說的，去年速度非常重要。隨著我們越來越接近目標，根據SEP，在大多數人的計算中，我們與目標之間的距離並不遙遠，放慢速度是合理的，就像在每次會議上從75個基點到50個基點再到25個基點的降低速度是合理的。所以，委員會認為，總體上稍微減緩步伐是合適的。

然後，這樣做有好處。這使我們有更多信息來做出決策。我們可能會試圖做出更好的決策。我認為這可以讓經濟多一些時間來適應我們未來的決策，而且我們將能夠看到，你知道的，我們對於銀行業動盪的後果尚未完全了解。這個過程將需要一些時間。這只是我們試圖做到正確。如果你將這兩個變量視為獨立的，那麼這個決策是有道理的。

NICK TIMIRAOS. 我知道你說七月的會議是實時的。僅在六月的就業和CPI報告公布之前，你將在之後獲得就業成本指數（ECI），你將在之後獲得高級貸款官調查報告，你將在下個月底獲得一些銀行盈利報告 - 委員會將使用哪些增量信息來判斷這是一次略過還是更長時間的暫停呢？

CHAIR POWELL. 嗯，我認為你將這些添加到我們自上次會議以來看到的數據中。你知道，既然我們選擇在這次會議上保持利率不變，我們可以觀察三個月的數據。我認為這是一個完整的季度，你可以從中得出比從任何六周期間得出更多的結論。

我們將觀察這些事情。我們還將關注風險形勢的演變。我們將關注金融部門的動態。我們將關注所有的數據、不斷變化的前景，然後做出決定。

MICHELLE SMITH. Jeanna.

JEANNA SMIALEK. 謝謝你回答我們的問題。我是《紐約時報》的Jeanna Smialek。很明顯，在你的預測中，你將增長路徑上調了，將失業路徑下調了，並顯著上調了通脹路徑。我想知道，自三月以來，有什麼變化使你認為經濟更具韌性，而通脹將更加頑強？鑑於這一點，你為什麼對於聯邦基金利率的修正就到這個程度感到有信心？或者你是否認為在這一周期結束時，終點甚至可能高於5.6%？

CHAIR POWELL. 我認為在第一部分中，我們只是在按照數據和前景的指引。過去幾年，勞動力市場的韌性實在令人驚訝，真的是出乎意料的。這是非常了不起的。這實際上是推動經濟的引擎。所以，這確實是數據的結果。至於，你知道的 - 我們總是在這些會議上記錄下我們認為今年年底適當的終端利率是多少。這是我們的個人評估，即經濟最可能的路徑。實際上，它可以在現實中低於或高於這個數字。你知道，真的沒有辦法知道。但它是基於今天的情況，隨著數據的到來，它在會議期間可能會有所變動。它可能最終回到同一位置。但它真的將由數據驅動。我不能告訴你，我對於能提前多遠看到聯邦基金利率的情況有多有信心。

MICHELLE SMITH. Steve.

STEVE LIESMAN. 主席，感謝您回答我的問題。在五月底時，您曾表示您認為風險越來越接近平衡。這一情況是否仍然存在，或者您對於目前的風險平衡是否改變了看法？此外，您能否給我們一個關於足夠 rest 基金利率的想法？顯然，根據委員會的看法，目前的利率還不足以限制。是5.6%嗎？是6%嗎？足夠 rest 在哪裡？謝謝。

CHAIR POWELL. 我認為，隨著時間的推移，隨著我們從現在的幾乎零利率移動到5個百分點，並且SEP預計還會進行額外的加息，我們已經更接近我們的目標，即足夠限制的利率。幾乎可以說，過度做和不足做之間的風險正在趨於平衡。我仍然認為，我的同事們也同意，通脹風險仍然偏向上行。所以我們認為，我們在通脹問題上還沒有達到目標，因為我們只看數據。如果你看看整個範圍的通脹數據，特別是核心數據，你會發現在過去一年中沒有太多的進展。當然，整體通脹已經明顯下降，但是正如你所知，我們將核心通脹視為更好的指標來預測整體通脹的走向。

足夠的——所以我認為，我們想看到有可信的證據表明通脹達到頂峰並開始下降。這是我們想看到的，當然這是我們想看到的。我認為，我們理解存在一些滯後效應，但請記住，金融條件在實際利率提高之前就開始收緊。因此，如果回顧我們當初開始提及利率上升時，當我們實際上提高利率時，二年期（這是對貨幣政策走勢的相當好估計）已經從20個基點上升到了200個基點。

因此，在這個世界上，變緊需要比過去更早，因為新聞現在可以快速傳遞。這是不同的。但仍然存在一種情況，即利率敏感的支出非常迅速受到影響，例如房地產和耐用品等。但更廣泛的需求、支出、資產價值等則需要更長的時間才能受到影響。

你可以找到支持任何答案的研究。因此，在這個領域沒有任何確定性或共識。這當然讓情況變得更具挑戰性。所以我們正在看日曆、觀察經濟的發展，我們必須做出這些判斷。

再說一次，這也是為什麼現在以稍微更緩慢的步伐前進是有意義的原因之一，因為我們正在尋找那個最終的，我不能指出的終點。我無法指出一個具體的數據點。我認為當我們看到通脹趨於平穩，並開始下降時，我們會意識到這是有效的。理想情況下，通過多花一些時間，我們將不會超出我們需要達到的水平。

RACHEL SIEGEL. 我想問一下，關於信貸收緊，自三月份的銀行事件以來，您看到了什麼情況，以及您如何將其與這些滯後效應區分開來？

CHAIR POWELL. 對於我們能夠評估其可能意味著什麼的完整程度，現在仍然為時尚早。這是我們當然會密切關注的事情。如果我們看到與正常預期相比顯著的收緊，那是因為這個渠道，那麼我們會在考慮利率決策時將其納入考慮。這就是我們對待這個問題的方式。

MICHELLE SMITH. 讓我們請克里斯問問題。

CHRIS RUGABER. 謝謝。我是美聯社的克里斯·魯加貝爾。您提到許多趨勢已經符合您的期望，核心服務（不包括住房）在過去幾個月中表現得相當平穩。而且，如您所提到的，核心通脹中相當大的一部分現在是房價。此外，我們在二手車價格中也看到了一些奇特現象。

鑒於這些趨勢已經存在，我想問的是，為什麼要信號額外的加息呢？事情難道不是朝著您所需要的方向發展嗎？為什麼不給予更多的時間？根據我們最近看到的情況，看到這麼多鷹派預期（在點數預測中），感到有些驚訝。

CHAIR POWELL. 是的，我們已經兩年半了，或者說兩年四分之一了。預測者，包括聯邦儲備系統的預測者，一直認為通脹即將回落，並且通常預測它會回落，結果卻是錯誤的。

所以，我認為，如果你看一下核心PCE通脹整體的情況——在過去六個月中觀察它——你會發現並沒有看到很大的進展。它仍然保持在4.5%以上的水平，遠高於我們的目標，並且並沒有實質下降。我們希望看到它明顯下降。這就是我們想要的。當然，我們將在一段時間內將通脹降至2%。我們當然不希望對經濟造成最小的損害。

但是我們必須將通脹降至2%，我們會做到的。我們只是還沒有看到那一天。因此，由於這個原因，你可以看到今天的政策決定：在今年年底進一步上調利率，但同時稍微減緩我們的步伐。

CHRIS RUGABER. 快速追問一句。在上次的新聞發布會上，您提到您沒有看到工資推動通脹。您知道，舊金山聯邦儲備銀行的一些研究也指出，工資並不一定是關鍵驅動因素。但您今天談到了勞動力市場和軟化的需求，您可以更具體地解釋一下在這一點上您是如何看待緊縮的勞動力市場正在推動通脹的嗎？謝謝。

CHAIR POWELL. 對。我不會對任何一篇特定的論文發表評論，但我可以說整體來看，我認為一開始，也就是2021年初，通脹主要來自對商品的強勁需求。人們還在家中，他們手中有存款，他們想要消費，他們在商品上花費了很多。

工資並不是一個主要的推動因素。當然，薪資會上漲，這是必然的，但整體上，它們並不是驅動通脹的主要因素。通脹的主要推動因素是需求。而需求又來自於就業市場的健康情況，工資上漲，這促使人們進一步消費，進一步支持雇傭。這就是推動經濟增長的引擎。所以，從這個意義上說，這是數據在引導我們。

需要注意的是，就像我剛才提到的，我們仍然沒有看到通脹正在下降。我們要確保它能夠下降，這是我們要追求的目標。

CHAIR POWELL. 當然，在某種程度上，由於高需求，供應鏈混亂，物價大幅上漲，通脹大幅上升。這是起源，並不是特別與勞動力市場或工資有關。但是隨著時間的推移，隨著我們進入2021年、2022年和2023年，我認為許多分析師相信，尤其是在非住房服務部門，將工資通脹恢復到可持續、與2%通脹一致的水平，對於降低通脹至關重要。

事實上，我們確實看到工資整體上有所下降，但進展相當緩慢。這也與伯南克和布蘭查德幾周前的論文發現非常一致。我認為這是合理的。

MICHELLE SMITH. 讓我們來問問Michael McKee。

MICHAEL MCKEE. 我是Michael McKee，來自彭博新聞和電視台。您過去曾說過，您不喜歡給市場帶來驚喜。聯邦儲備系統的觀點通常是，市場應該在您行動之前就知道您將做出的決定。您也多次提到，將需要一段時間才能降低通脹。您今天再次重申，我們會達到一個通脹可能會持續的點。

所以我想知道，當我們進入下一次會議時，華爾街或其他人應該如何看待您的反應機制？您將根據時間還是數據做出反應？換句話說，如果沒有太多變化，如果我們在7月或9月或11月看到相同的勞動力市場狀況和通脹水平，您是否會出於您認為必須的原因而行動？是時間需要進一步的行動，還是通脹逆轉將需要進一步的行動？

CHAIR POWELL. 所以，我不想談論關於數據可能如何變動的假設性問題。我們當然不會特意讓市場或公眾感到驚訝。同時，我們的主要焦點必須是確保政策正確。這就是我們在這裡做的，也是我們在即將舉行的會議上將要做的。

我可以說，7月的會議將是「活躍」的，我們只能拭目以待。我認為您將會看到數據，聽到聯邦儲備系統的人對此進行討論，市場將不得不做出判斷。

MICHAEL MCKEE. 好吧，您是否認為通脹有可能持續下降，基於這些滯後效應和您提到的進一步行動的威脅？還是我們將進入一個我們無法了解正在發生的時期？

CHAIR POWELL. 如果您看看我們的預測，我只能向您指出。核心個人消費支出物價指數（PCE）通脹率約為4.5％，略高於4.5％。聯邦公開市場委員會（FOMC）的中位數參與者認為，到今年年底，這一數字將下降至3.9％。這是在12個月的基礎上。

所以這預期有相當大的進展。半年來的大幅下降是相當明顯的。這就是預測。我們嘗試在我們的反應機制中保持透明。我們致力於降低通脹。這是首要事項。這就是我對此的看法。

MICHELLE SMITH. 讓我們問Victoria。

VICTORIA GUIDA. 我是Victoria Guida，來自Politico。您能談談關於資產負債表的問題以及您對此的考慮嗎？您將根據什麼來判斷我們是否接近準備金稀缺？國債發行會對此產生影響嗎？此外，您是否考慮降低逆回購利率以減輕銀行的壓力？

CHAIR POWELL. 首先，讓我談談國債部分，如果我可以談談，然後再回到資產負債表。當然，我們在過去幾個月一直非常關注此問題，就像其他人一樣。財政部公開公布了其借款計劃。我想我們都看到了部長昨天的發言，他表示財政部已經廣泛與市場參與者進行了磋商，以避免市場動盪，並將密切關注這一情況。

這就是財政部的說法，他們實際上制定了借款計劃。在聯邦儲備系統方面，我們將仔細監視市場狀況，監測財政部填補財政總務局（TGA）的過程。調整過程很可能涉及對逆回購（RRP）工具和準備金的減少。在此之初很難說哪個會更大。

我們起始時的準備金水平非常高，仍高於逆回購的使用水平，所以我們認為在短期內甚至在整個年度內，準備金不太可能變得稀缺。這就是關於國債部分的回答。當然，我們將繼續密切關注貨幣市場的狀況，並做出必要的調整，以確保貨幣政策的傳遞有效運作。

還有其他問題嗎？

VICTORIA GUIDA. 是的，您是否考慮降低逆回購利率以幫助減輕銀行的壓力？

CHAIR POWELL. 我們有很多工具——我可以說逆回購（RRP）並沒有從銀行體系中撤出資金。實際上，它最近一直在縮減。所以我不認為這是我們長期以來考慮的問題。看起來似乎不太可能進行這樣的操作。我認為這只是我們手頭上的一種工具。如果我們想使用它，我們可以使用。還有其他工具可以應對貨幣市場的問題。但我不認為這是我們在短期內可能採取的行動。

MICHELLE SMITH. Jonnelle.

JONNELLE MARTE. 我是Jonnelle Marte，來自彭博社。您是否認為住房市場已經足夠降溫以降低通脹？例如，最近的反彈對您的預測有何影響？它如何影響貨幣政策？

CHAIR POWELL. 住房市場確實非常受利率影響，它是第一個或者說是其中一個受益於低利率或受制於高利率的地方。我們在過去一年中確實看到了這一點。現在我們看到住房市場正在触底，甚至可能稍微回升。

我們正在密切關注這一情況。我認為租金和房價將進一步影響住房服務的通脹。我並不認為它們會迅速上升。目前我看到它們在相對較低的水平上徘徊，這是合理的。

JONNELLE MARTE. 您是否認為您需要進一步提高利率來解決這個問題？

CHAIR POWELL. 嗯，我們會考慮各方面的因素。我們不僅僅關注住房市場。所以我認為，每個參與者都在他們所在的辦公室裡，編制他們的預測，包括他們最可能的預測，包括他們的利率預測。然後他們在星期五下午把它提交，我們將它累加起來，然後為您公佈。

這就是他們的做法。我不知道住房市場是否會推動利率走向，但它是其中的一部分。

MICHELLE SMITH. 我們轉向Edward。

EDWARD LAWRENCE. 感謝您回答我的問題，主席先生。我想回到您過去對不可持續的財政路徑的評論。國會預算辦公室預測，未來十年聯邦赤字將達到2.8萬億美元。CBO還表示，到2033年，聯邦債務將達到52萬億美元。在何時您會與立法者更堅定地討論財政責任？因為假設單純的貨幣政策無法單獨應對通脹或控制高水平支出。

CHAIR POWELL. 我不會那樣做。那並不是我的工作。我們希望和期望其他政策制定者尊重我們在貨幣政策上的獨立性。我們不認為自己是適當的財政政策評判者。我要說，我和我的前任們多次表示，我們的財政路徑是不可持續的，需要隨著時間的推移予以解決。但我認為試圖在這個問題上與立法者進行討論是不適當的，鑑於我們的獨立性和堅守自己的本分的需要。

EDWARD LAWRENCE. 那麼是否有關於美聯儲資助即將到來的那些債務的對話？

CHAIR POWELL. 絕對不會。

MICHELLE SMITH. 輪到Courtenay了。

COURTENAY BROWN. 感謝您回答我們的問題，Powell主席。根據您的預測，今年的國內生產總值（GDP）顯著上升，同時失業率下降。那麼我們應該把這看作是委員會對軟著陸前景更有信心的跡象，至少與您在三月時的預期相比是這樣嗎？

CHAIR POWELL. 我想這樣說。我繼續認為，這一點並未改變，即有一條路徑可以將通脹降至2%而無需看到我們在許多過去的情況下見到的急劇下滑和大量失業。這是可能的。一個逐漸降溫的強勁勞動力市場可能有助於實現這一點。但我想回到主要觀點，即委員會完全一致地認為有必要將通脹降至2%，並將盡一切努力在未來將其降至2%。這是我們的計劃。我們明白，讓通脹在美國經濟中扎根是我們絕不能允許發生的事情，這不僅對當今的工人、家庭和企業有益，也對未來有益。恢復物價穩定將使幾代人受益，只要能持續下去，這確實是經濟的基石。您應該明白，這是我們的首要任務。

COURTENAY BROWN. 對此我有一個追問。我有點困惑，因為您剛才說委員會將竭盡所能在未來降低通脹，但如果看SEP，明年通脹預計仍將居高不下，但聯邦基金利率低於現在的水平。您能幫我理解這一點嗎？

CHAIR POWELL. 當然。所以，如果您查看兩三年後的預測，首先，我不會過多依賴甚至一年後的預測，因為它們非常不確定。但它們顯示，隨著預測中的通脹下降，如果您不降低利率，實際利率實際上是在上升的，對吧？為了保持實際利率不變，通脹下降時，兩年後的名義利率應該下降。而且，實際上，您知道，由於我們可能會遭遇必須實際上有意地維持實質利率水平，這意味著在通脹大幅下降時，降息可能是合適的。再次強調，我們談論的是兩年後的情況。我認為，正如任何人都可以看到的，委員會沒有一個成員預計在今年降息，我也認為這很不可能是合適的，如果您考慮一下。通脹實際上並未下降，它對我們現有的加息措施並沒有太大反應。所以我們必須繼續努力。

MICHELLE SMITH. 朱莉。

JULIE CHABANAS. 抱歉，謝謝您。嗨，鮑威爾主席。我是法新社的朱莉·夏巴納斯。五月份的就業報告顯示黑人工人的失業率有所反彈。這與美聯儲的最大就業使命一致嗎？您是否對這種反彈感到擔憂？

POWELL主席. 當然，我們當然關注長期以來在種族和族裔群體之間存在的勞動力市場差異。這是一個我們無法用工具解決的因素。但是，當我們思考最大就業的定義時，我們考慮到這一點，對我們而言，這是一個廣泛和包容性的目標。因此，我們關注這一點。但請記住，包括黑人失業在內的所有失業率一直在歷史上的現代最低水平附近波動。因此，我們仍然談論的是就業市場非常強勁，可以說是半個世紀以來美國見證的最強勁的勞動力市場。總體失業率為3.7%，比上個月上升了百分之三。但是，仍然處於非常低的水平。因此，這是一個非常緊繃的勞動力市場。

MICHELLE SMITH. 梅根。

MEGAN CASSELLA. 謝謝。首先，我想進一步談談關於住房租金的問題。我們注意到CPI中的租金放緩尚未反映出來。我們聽到沃勒總裁談到，住房市場的回升可能意味著救濟將不會像我們想像的那樣長久。您能談談您對此的看法，以及這如何影響了今天的結果嗎？

POWELL主席. 事實上，根據事實，這是正確的。我們確實需要看到租金在這裡觸底，或者至少保持相當低的增長水平，因為我們希望通脹下降。租金是CPI中的一個非常重要的組成部分，約占三分之一，對於PCE而言約占一半。所以這很重要。這是我們非常仔細關注的一部分。這是整體情況的一部分，但我不會說它是關鍵性的部分。但讓我們退一步看。過去六個月、一年，看看核心通脹率，您會發現進展不大，沒有我們希望看到的那種進展。這是不可避免的。正如您所看到的，委員會成員，根據12個月的基礎，核心PCE通脹預測今年將達到3.9%。再一次，過去三年的每一年都是如此，它在一年的過程中上升，今年也是如此。所以我們看到這一點，並且看到通脹預測再次低於預期，這告訴我們我們需要更多的努力。因此，這就是您看到SEP的原因。

MEGAN CASSELLA. 您能否簡要談談您對工資的展望，以及鑑於最近核心服務（不包括住房）的放緩，為了讓通脹恢復正常，您認為工資可能需要下降多少？

POWELL主席. 工資將繼續增加。所以，我們在談論的是工資增長仍然處於非常強勁的水平，但這個水平與通脹率持續維持在2%的水平一致。所以我認為我們已經看到了一些進展-所有主要的工資指標從一年前的非常高水平下降，而且他們正在緩慢地回落。當然，看到工資增加是很好的，特別是對於收入低端的人群來說。但我們希望將其作為將通脹率恢復到2%的過程的一部分，這對每個人都有利。我的意思是，通脹對這些人的傷害比其他任何人都大，固定收入的人在通脹高企時受到的傷害最嚴重，也最快。

MICHELLE SMITH. 格雷格。

GREG ROBB. 非常感謝您，鮑威爾主席。我是MarketWatch的格雷格·羅布。我只是想知道委員會是否討論過勞動力市場，目前好萊塢有罷工，美國汽車工人工會也在討論可能的罷工。我的意思是，工人現在具有一定的權力，將尋求更高的工資。這在您的討論中有提到嗎？謝謝。

POWELL主席. 勞動力市場中的工資問題和動態是我們討論的核心議題之一，幾乎與其他任何事情一樣重要。勞動經濟學和勞動力市場是非常核心的。這是我們使命的一半。所以我們花了很多時間討論這個問題。我認為有一些結構性問題不是聯邦儲備系統可以解決的。所以我們不會花太多時間-雖然我們會注意到正在發生的事情，但我們不會參與討論或爭論罷工等事情。但我們會看到正在發生的事情。我們會對如何將通脹率整體降至2%做出判斷。正如我所說，大多數人現在會說，一開始這並不是關於工資的問題。隨著我們進入服務業通脹，這一點變得越來越重要，而在這一部分經濟中，我們看到的進展最少。

MICHELLE SMITH. 最後一個問題，馬克。

MARK HAMRICK. 謝謝您，主席。我是Bankrate的馬克·哈姆里克。我想知道您現在對系統性風險的看法，因為離硅谷銀行倒閉已經過去大約三個月。此外，商業房地產以及非銀行金融機構存在哪些風險？在利率更高的情況下，這些風險是否會進一步加劇？

POWELL主席. 我正在努力思考從哪裡開始回答。我會從商業房地產開始。我們當然非常密切地關注這種情況。銀行體系中有大量的商業房地產，其中很大一部分位於較小的銀行。它被良好分散-在良好分散的情況下，體系可以承擔損失。我們確實預計將會有損失，但是那些有集中風險的銀行將會遭受更大的損失。因此，我們非常清楚這一點。我們正在仔細監測這種情況。感覺就像這種情況將會持續一段時間，而不是突然爆發並逐漸形成系統性風險。

至於非銀行金融機構-金融部門-已經有大量工作在進行中。在流行病爆發期間，非銀行金融部門是問題出現的地方。在特別是領導的情況下，與政府進行了大量工作，以解決財政市場和非銀行金融市場的各種問題。但是，我們在聯邦儲備系統中的權限僅限於銀行，實際上是銀行控股公司和一些銀行。這是我們的主要關注點。

關於三月份的事件-如我之前提到的，我們將仔細監測該情況。我們的工作通常涉及對可能出現的很多問題擔憂，包括銀行。對我來說，很難找出我們不擔心的事情，而不是我們擔心的事情。所以我們非常仔細地觀察這些事情。當我們看到事情的發展，看到信貸條件和所有獨立的銀行時，如果有宏觀經濟影響，我們可以在我們的利率設定中考慮到這一點。這就是我要說的。

MARK HAMRICK. 對最後一部分我可以追問嗎？如果利率再上升50個基點，您是否會進一步加劇這些問題？

POWELL主席. 是的，這是-我想著我之前的回答，我是想說我們將觀察情況，看到正在發生的事情。如果我們看到您可能指的那種收緊條件的情況，我們可以將其納入考慮，因為我們的利率工具主要用於宏觀經濟目的。所以我們會考慮這一點。當然，我們也有財務穩定的責任，這也是我們一直在考慮的因素。

非常感謝。

在鮑爾主席的新聞發布會上，討論了通脹、勞動市場、住房市場以及財務風險等多個議題。主要的會議重點如下：

• 通脹和利率：委員會一致認為將通脹控制在2％是首要任務。雖然已經實施了利率提高措施，但通脹仍然居高不下，需要更多努力將其降至目標水平。
• 勞動市場：雖然就業市場表現強勁，但存在不同族裔之間的差異。委員會重視實現廣泛和包容性的最大就業目標。
• 住房市場：住房市場對通脹有重要影響，尤其是租金和房價。委員會關注租金和住房服務通脹，希望看到租金趨於穩定，以幫助降低整體通脹。
• 財務風險：委員會密切關注商業房地產和非銀行金融部門的風險。商業房地產可能面臨損失，但整體風險尚未升至系統性水平。在非銀行金融部門，政府正在努力解決相關問題。
• 利率政策：委員會承諾根據數據和時間來制定利率政策，並會密切關注經濟環境的變化。在通脹下降並取得實質進展之前，加息的節奏可能會減緩。
• 財政政策：Fed不評價財政政策，並期望其他政策制定者尊重其獨立性。然而，他們認為長期而言，可持續的財政政策非常重要。
• 平衡表：Fed將繼續密切關注市場條件，以確保貨幣政策的傳遞機制正常運作。他們預計在繼續調整貨幣政策時，將調整RRP利率和儲備水平。

會議的主要重點是通脹控制、勞動市場情況、住房市場影響、財務風險監控以及利率政策的制定。Powell主席重申將努力將通脹控制在2％水平，同時考慮勞動市場和住房市場的相關因素。此外，Fed將繼續監測財務風險，並根據數據和時間來制定利率政策。

Summary of Economic Projections

(https://www.federalreserve.gov/monetarypolicy/files/fomcprojtabl20230614.pdf)

In conjunction with the Federal Open Market Committee (FOMC) meeting held on June 13–14, 2023, meeting participants submitted their projections of the most likely outcomes for real gross domestic product (GDP) growth, the unemployment rate, and inflation for each year from 2023 to 2025 and over the longer run. Each participant’s projections were based on information available at the time of the meeting, together with her or his assessment of appropriate monetary policy—including a path for the federal funds rate and its longer-run value—and assumptions about other factors likely to affect economic outcomes. The longer-run projections represent each participant’s assessment of the value to which each variable would be expected to converge, over time, under appropriate monetary policy and in the absence of further shocks to the economy. “Appropriate monetary policy” is defined as the future path of policy that each participant deems most likely to foster outcomes for economic activity and inflation that best satisfy his or her individual interpretation of the statutory mandate to promote maximum employment and price stability.

在2023年6月13日至14日的聯邦公開市場委員會（FOMC）會議期間，會議參與者提交了他們對2023年至2025年以及長期內實質國內生產總值（GDP）增長、失業率和通脹的最可能結果的預測。每位參與者的預測都基於會議時可用的信息，以及他或她對適當貨幣政策（包括聯邦基金利率的路徑和其長期價值）的評估，以及對可能影響經濟結果的其他因素的假設。長期預測代表每位參與者對每個變量在適當的貨幣政策下，並在經濟不再受到進一步衝擊的情況下，預期會隨時間收斂到的價值。"適當的貨幣政策"被定義為每位參與者認為最有可能促進經濟活動和通脹結果的政策未來路徑，這些結果最能滿足他或她對法定任務的個人解釋，該任務是促進最大就業和價格穩定。

以下是一些重點數據：

• 2023年的實質GDP增長中位數預測為1.0%，2024年為1.1%，2025年為1.8%。
• 2023年的失業率中位數預測為4.1%，2024年和2025年均為4.5%。
• 2023年的個人消費支出（PCE）通脹中位數預測為3.2%，2024年為2.5%，2025年為2.1%。
• 2023年的核心PCE通脹（排除食品和能源）中位數預測為3.9%，2024年為2.6%，2025年為2.2%。
• 2023年的聯邦基金利率中位數預測為5.6%，2024年為4.6%，2025年為3.4%。

本分報告中FOMC提供了許多圖表值得觀察：

Table 1. 2023年6月聯邦儲備理事會成員及聯邦儲備銀行行長們根據各自假設的適當貨幣政策所做的經濟預測

Figure 1. 2023-2025年以及長期的經濟預測的中位數、中心趨勢和範圍

Figure 2. FOMC參與者對適當貨幣政策的評估：聯邦基金利率目標範圍的中點或目標水平

Figure 3.A. 對2023-2025年及長期內實質GDP變化的預測分布

Figure 3.B. 對2023-2025年及長期內失業率的預測分布

Figure 3.C. 對2023-2025年及長期內個人消費支出(PCE)通脹的預測分布

Figure 3.D. 對2023-2025年的核心個人消費支出(PCE)通脹的預測分布

Figure 3.E. 對2023-2025年以及更長期內，聯邦基金利率適當目標範圍中點或聯邦基金利率適當目標水平的評估分布

關於上述圖表，FOMC也說明了其預測的不準確性，原文如下，OT就沒有再另外進行翻譯。

Forecast Uncertainty

The economic projections provided by the members of the Board of Governors and the presidents of the Federal Reserve Banks inform discussions of monetary policy among policymakers and can aid public understanding of the basis for policy actions. Considerable uncertainty attends these projections, however. The economic and statistical models and relationships used to help produce economic forecasts are necessarily imperfect descriptions of the real world, and the future path of the economy can be affected by myriad unforeseen developments and events. Thus, in setting the stance of monetary policy, participants consider not only what appears to be the most likely economic outcome as embodied in their projections, but also the range of alternative possibilities, the likelihood of their occurring, and the potential costs to the economy should they occur.

Table 2 summarizes the average historical accuracy of a range of forecasts, including those reported in past Monetary Policy Reports and those prepared by the Federal Reserve Board’s staff in advance of meetings of the Federal Open Market Committee (FOMC). The projection error ranges shown in the table illustrate the considerable uncertainty associated with economic forecasts. For example, suppose a participant projects that real gross domestic product (GDP) and total consumer prices will rise steadily at annual rates of, respectively, 3 percent and 2 percent. If the uncertainty attending those projections is similar to that experienced in the past and the risks around the projections are broadly balanced, the numbers reported in table 2 would imply a probability of about 70 percent that actual GDP would expand within a range of 1.5 to 4.5 percent in the current year, 1.1 to 4.9 percent in the second year, and 0.7 to 5.3 percent in the third year. The corresponding 70 percent confidence intervals for overall inflation would be 1.0 to 3.0 percent in the current year, 0.3 to 3.7 percent in the second year, and 0.6 to 3.4 percent in the third year. Figures 4.A through 4.C illustrate these confidence bounds in “fan charts” that are symmetric and centered on the medians of FOMC participants’ projections for GDP growth, the unemployment rate, and inflation. However, in some instances, the risks around the projections may not be symmetric. In particular, the unemployment rate cannot be negative; furthermore, the risks around a particular projection might be tilted to either the upside or the downside, in which case the corresponding fan chart would be asymmetrically positioned around the median projection.

Because current conditions may differ from those that prevailed, on average, over history, participants provide judgments as to whether the uncertainty attached to their projections of each economic variable is greater than, smaller than, or broadly similar to typical levels of forecast uncertainty seen in the past 20 years, as presented in table 2 and reflected in the widths of the confidence intervals shown in the top panels of figures 4.A through 4.C. Participants’ current assessments of the uncertainty surrounding their projections are summarized in the bottom-left panels of those figures. Participants also provide judgments as to whether the risks to their projections are weighted to the upside, are weighted to the downside, or are broadly balanced. That is, while the symmetric historical fan charts shown in the top panels of figures 4.A through 4.C imply that the risks to participants’ projections are balanced, participants may judge that there is a greater risk that a given variable will be above rather than below their projections. These judgments are summarized in the lower-right panels of figures 4.A through 4.C.

As with real activity and inflation, the outlook for the future path of the federal funds rate is subject to considerable uncertainty. This uncertainty arises primarily because each participant’s assessment of the appropriate stance of monetary policy depends importantly on the evolution of real activity and inflation over time. If economic conditions evolve in an unexpected manner, then assessments of the appropriate setting of the federal funds rate would change from that point forward. The final line in table 2 shows the error ranges for forecasts of short-term interest rates. They suggest that the historical confidence intervals associated with projections of the federal funds rate are quite wide. It should be noted, however, that these confidence intervals are not strictly consistent with the projections for the federal funds rate, as these projections are not forecasts of the most likely quarterly outcomes but rather are projections of participants’ individual assessments of appropriate monetary policy and are on an endof-year basis. However, the forecast errors should provide a sense of the uncertainty around the future path of the federal funds rate generated by the uncertainty about the macroeconomic variables as well as additional adjustments to monetary policy that would be appropriate to offset the effects of shocks to the economy.

If at some point in the future the confidence interval around the federal funds rate were to extend below zero, it would be truncated at zero for purposes of the fan chart shown in figure 5; zero is the bottom of the lowest target range for the federal funds rate that has been adopted by the Committee in the past. This approach to the construction of the federal funds rate fan chart would be merely a convention; it would not have any implications for possible future policy decisions regarding the use of negative interest rates to provide additional monetary policy accommodation if doing so were appropriate. In such situations, the Committee could also employ other tools, including forward guidance and asset purchases, to provide additional accommodation.

While figures 4.A through 4.C provide information on the uncertainty around the economic projections, figure 1 provides information on the range of views across FOMC participants. A comparison of figure 1 with figures 4.A through 4.C shows that the dispersion of the projections across participants is much smaller than the average forecast errors over the past 20 years.

以下收錄6月21號鮑爾主席參加聽證會關於貨幣政策報告

Semiannual Monetary Policy Report to the Congress

(https://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/testimony/powell20230621a.htm)

Chairman McHenry, Ranking Member Waters, and other members of the Committee, I appreciate the opportunity to present the Federal Reserve's semiannual Monetary Policy Report.

We at the Fed remain squarely focused on our dual mandate to promote maximum employment and stable prices for the American people. My colleagues and I understand the hardship that high inflation is causing, and we remain strongly committed to bringing inflation back down to our 2 percent goal. Price stability is the responsibility of the Federal Reserve, and without it, the economy does not work for anyone. In particular, without price stability, we will not achieve a sustained period of strong labor market conditions that benefit all.

I will review the current economic situation before turning to monetary policy.

Current Economic Situation and Outlook

The U.S. economy slowed significantly last year, and recent indicators suggest that economic activity has continued to expand at a modest pace. Although growth in consumer spending has picked up this year, activity in the housing sector remains weak, largely reflecting higher mortgage rates. Higher interest rates and slower output growth also appear to be weighing on business fixed investment.

The labor market remains very tight. Over the first five months of the year, job gains averaged a robust 314,000 jobs per month. The unemployment rate moved up but remained low in May, at 3.7 percent. There are some signs that supply and demand in the labor market are coming into better balance. The labor force participation rate has moved up in recent months, particularly for individuals aged 25 to 54. Nominal wage growth has shown some signs of easing, and job vacancies have declined so far this year. While the jobs-to-workers gap has narrowed, labor demand still substantially exceeds the supply of available workers.1

Inflation remains well above our longer-run goal of 2 percent. Over the 12 months ending in April, total personal consumption expenditures (PCE) prices rose 4.4 percent; excluding the volatile food and energy categories, core PCE prices rose 4.7 percent. In May, the 12-month change in the consumer price index (CPI) came in at 4.0 percent, and the change in the core CPI was 5.3 percent. Inflation has moderated somewhat since the middle of last year. Nonetheless, inflation pressures continue to run high, and the process of getting inflation back down to 2 percent has a long way to go. Despite elevated inflation, longer-term inflation expectations appear to remain well anchored, as reflected in a broad range of surveys of households, businesses, and forecasters, as well as measures from financial markets.

Monetary Policy

With inflation remaining well above our longer-run goal of 2 percent and with labor market conditions remaining tight, the Federal Open Market Committee (FOMC) has significantly tightened the stance of monetary policy. We have raised our policy interest rate by 5 percentage points since early last year and have continued to reduce our securities holdings at a brisk pace.2 We have been seeing the effects of our policy tightening on demand in the most interest rate–sensitive sectors of the economy. It will take time, however, for the full effects of monetary restraint to be realized, especially on inflation.

The economy is facing headwinds from tighter credit conditions for households and businesses, which are likely to weigh on economic activity, hiring, and inflation.3 The extent of these effects remains uncertain.

In light of how far we have come in tightening policy, the uncertain lags with which monetary policy affects the economy, and potential headwinds from credit tightening, the FOMC decided last week to maintain the target range for the federal funds rate at 5 to 5-1/4 percent and to continue the process of significantly reducing our securities holdings. Nearly all FOMC participants expect that it will be appropriate to raise interest rates somewhat further by the end of the year. But at last week's meeting, considering how far and how fast we have moved, we judged it prudent to hold the target range steady to allow the Committee to assess additional information and its implications for monetary policy. In determining the extent of additional policy firming that may be appropriate to return inflation to 2 percent over time, we will take into account the cumulative tightening of monetary policy, the lags with which monetary policy affects economic activity and inflation, and economic and financial developments. We will continue to make our decisions meeting by meeting, based on the totality of incoming data and their implications for the outlook for economic activity and inflation, as well as the balance of risks.

We remain committed to bringing inflation back down to our 2 percent goal and to keeping longer-term inflation expectations well anchored. Reducing inflation is likely to require a period of below-trend growth and some softening of labor market conditions. Restoring price stability is essential to set the stage for achieving maximum employment and stable prices over the longer run.

Before concluding, let me briefly address the condition of the banking sector. The U.S. banking system is sound and resilient. As detailed in the box on financial stability in the June Monetary Policy Report, the Federal Reserve, together with the Treasury Department and the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, took decisive action in March to protect the U.S. economy and to strengthen public confidence in our banking system. The recent bank failures, including the failure of Silicon Valley Bank, and the resulting banking stress have highlighted the importance of ensuring we have the appropriate rules and supervisory practices for banks of this size. We are committed to addressing these vulnerabilities to make for a stronger and more resilient banking system.

We understand that our actions affect communities, families, and businesses across the country. Everything we do is in service to our public mission. We at the Fed will do everything we can to achieve our maximum-employment and price-stability goals.

Thank you. I am happy to take your questions.

以下為聽證會摘要：

在聯邦儲備局提交的半年度貨幣政策報告中，主席表示聯邦儲備局致力於實現最大就業和穩定價格的雙重目標。他強調通脹壓力對經濟和勞動市場的不利影響，並表示聯邦儲備局將努力將通脹降至2％的目標水平。

在經濟狀況方面，美國經濟去年放緩，最近的指標顯示經濟活動持續以溫和的速度擴張。儘管今年消費支出有所增加，但房地產部門的活動仍然疲軟，主要是由於較高的抵押利率。較高的利率和較慢的產出增長似乎也對企業固定投資產生了壓力。

勞動力市場仍然非常緊張。在今年前五個月，就業增長平均每月增加31.4萬個就業崗位。失業率在5月上升，但仍然處於低位，為3.7％。勞動力參與率在最近幾個月有所上升，特別是25至54歲人群。名義工資增長有所放緩，今年迄今為止職位空缺也有所下降。雖然工作機會與勞動力供應之間的差距縮小了，但勞動力需求仍然遠遠超過可用勞動力的供應。

通脹仍遠高於2％的長期目標。根據4月份結束的12個月期間，個人消費支出（PCE）總價格上漲了4.4％；排除食品和能源類別的核心PCE價格上漲了4.7％。5月份，消費者物價指數（CPI）的12個月變化率為4.0％，核心CPI變化率為5.3％。儘管通脹壓力自去年年中以來有所緩解，但仍然持續高企，將通脹降至2％的過程還有很長的路要走。

在貨幣政策方面，由於通脹持續遠高於目標水平且勞動市場狀況緊張，聯邦公開市場委員會（FOMC）已大幅收緊貨幣政策。自去年初以來，聯邦基金利率已上調了5個百分點，並繼續迅速減少證券持有量。對於貨幣緊縮的影響，特別是對經濟中最受利率影響的部門的需求，需要時間才能完全體現。

鑑於貨幣政策的收緊程度、貨幣政策對經濟的影響滯後以及信貸收緊可能帶來的風險，FOMC上周決定將聯邦基金利率目標區間維持在5%至5-1/4%的水平，並繼續大幅減少證券持有量。幾乎所有FOMC參與者預計到年底時將適當地進一步提高利率。然而，考慮到我們所取得的進展、貨幣政策對經濟的影響滯後以及信貸收緊可能帶來的風險，我們認為保持目標利率區間不變是明智的，以便讓委員會評估更多信息及其對貨幣政策的影響。在確定可能適當的進一步政策收緊程度以使通脹隨時間回歸2％時，我們將考慮貨幣政策的緊縮累計、貨幣政策對經濟活動和通脹的影響以及經濟和金融發展。我們將根據所有入場數據的整體情況及其對經濟活動和通脹預期的影響以及風險的平衡，逐次進行决策。

聯邦儲備局致力於將通脹降至2％的目標並確保長期通脹預期保持穩定。降低通脹可能需要一段低於趨勢增長的時間和一些勞動市場疲軟。恢復價格穩定對於實現最大就業和穩定價格至關重要。

最後，主席簡要提到了銀行業的狀況。美國銀行體系健全且具有韌性。主席承認銀行失敗的重要性，並表示聯邦儲備局致力於解決這些漏洞，以建立更強大和更具彈性的銀行體系。

重點：

• 聯邦儲備局致力於實現最大就業和穩定價格的雙重目標。
• 美國經濟活動持續以溫和的速度擴張，但房地產部門仍然疲軟。
• 勞動力市場狀況緊張，但供需逐漸平衡。
• 通脹壓力仍然高企，目標是將通脹降至2％的目標水平。
• 貨幣政策已大幅收緊，但完全效果需要時間。
• 銀行業狀況健全，聯邦儲備局致力於解決銀行體系的漏洞。

OTORI Z. and ChatGPT

民國111年6月28日